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Cyber-security domain is inherently dynamic. Not only does system configuration 
changes frequently (with new releases and patches), but also new attacks and 
vulnerabilities are regularly discovered. The threat in cyber-security is human, and hence 
intelligent in nature. The attacker adapts to the situation, target environment, and 
countermeasures. Attack actions are also driven by attacker’s exploratory nature, thought 
process, motivation, strategy, and preferences. Current security risk assessment is driven 
by cyber-security expert’s theories about this attacker behavior.  
The goal of this dissertation is to automatically generate the cyber-security risk 
scenarios by: 
 Capturing diverse and dispersed cyber-security knowledge  
 Assuming that there are unknowns in the cyber-security domain, and new 
knowledge is available frequently 
 Emulating the attacker’s exploratory nature, thought process, motivation, 
strategy, preferences and his/her interaction with the target environment 
 Using the cyber-security expert’s theories about attacker behavior 
The proposed framework is designed by using the unique cyber-security domain 
requirements identified in this dissertation and by overcoming the limitations of current 
risk scenario generation frameworks.  
The proposed framework automates the risk scenario generation by using the 
knowledge as it becomes available (or changes). It supports observing, encoding, 
validating, and calibrating cyber-security expert’s theories. It can also be used for 
assisting the red-teaming process.  
The proposed framework generates ranked attack trees and encodes the attacker 
behavior theories. This information can be used for prioritizing vulnerability remediation. 
The proposed framework is currently being extended for developing an automated threat 
response framework that can be used for analyzing and recommending countermeasures. 
This framework contains behavior driven countermeasures that uses the attacker behavior 
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Cyber-security domain is inherently dynamic. Not only does system configuration 
changes frequently (with new releases and patches), but also new attacks and 
vulnerabilities are regularly discovered. The threat in cyber-security is human, and hence 
intelligent in nature. The attacker adapts to the situation, the target environment, and to 
the countermeasures. Attack actions are also driven by attacker’s exploratory nature, 
thought process, motivation, strategy, and preferences. Current cyber-security risk 
assessment is driven by expert’s theories about attacks and attacker behavior.  
The goal of this dissertation is to automatically generate the cyber-security risk 
scenarios by: 
 Capturing diverse and dispersed cyber-security domain (for example, the 
knowledge about characteristics of software systems, their design, use, features, 
known as well as potential vulnerabilities and attacks etc.). 
 Assuming that there are unknowns in the cyber-security domain, and new 
knowledge is available frequently  
 Emulating the attacker’s exploratory nature, thought process, motivation, 
strategy,  preferences, and his/her interaction with the target environment  
 Using cyber-security expert’s theories  
Current manual risk scenarios are generated by red-team. Red-team consists of a 
group of cyber-security experts emulating real attacker. Manual attack trees are generated 
using cyber-security expert’s theories about attacker behavior (attacker’s exploratory 
nature, thought process, motivation, strategy, and preferences) and diverse type of 
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knowledge (characteristics of software, and known as well as potential vulnerabilities and 
attacks), but their quality is dependent on the analyst’s expertise. Risk scenarios 
generated by current automated frameworks produce repeatable outcome but they use 
limited information (primarily about presence of vulnerability, connectivity between 
software systems, attacker’s initial privileges, and privileges gained by exploiting 
vulnerabilities), do not capture attacker behavior, and do not use expert theories to 
generate risk scenarios. Current automated framework also assumes that complete 
knowledge is available a priori. This assumption is not valid in cyber-security domain. 
Current automated approach requires re-encoding knowledge and re-generating risk 
scenarios when new knowledge is available.  
It is widely accepted in cyber-security domain that the main objective of the attacker 
is to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information. The 
proposed automated framework generates risk scenarios describing how the attacker can 
compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information. However, 
current automated risk scenarios are generated only for attacker gaining restricted 
privilege on the target software system [1] or for violating a security property of the 
software[2]. This represents only one of the ways the attacker can achieve his/her goal of 
compromising the information confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
The proposed framework simplifies the risk scenario generation without limiting the 
type of knowledge that can be used. The proposed framework also assumes that the 
knowledge is incomplete and there are unknowns in cyber-security domain. According to 
the Office of Management and Budget [3], the cyber-security risk assessment is complex 
process and does not improve the state of security. The lack of improvement in security 
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can also be attributed to current risk scenario generation frameworks not identifying and 
using the unique cyber-security domain characteristics and requirements. This 
dissertation identifies the unique cyber-security domain characteristics, which are used as 
requirements for designing the proposed framework. 
Chapter 2 describes the state of cyber-security. Chapter 3 describes how risk 
assessment is done in different domains, identifies the unique requirements for doing risk 
assessment in cyber-security domain, introduces current risk scenario generation 
frameworks and their limitations, and describes how the proposed framework overcomes 
these limitations. Chapter 4 uses these unique cyber-security domain requirements to 
design an automated risk scenario generation framework. It also compares the proposed 
framework’s design with the current risk scenarios generation frameworks. Chapter 5 
describes the proposed framework’s architecture. The implementation of proposed 
framework is described in Chapter 6 and 7, and the modes of operations of the proposed 
framework are described in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 compares the proposed framework with 
current cyber-security risk scenario generation frameworks using a case study. Chapter 
10 summarizes the research contribution, applications, and extensions of the framework. 
Finally, Chapter 11 describes the conclusion.  
4 
 
2 Characterization of the Security Domain 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“Out of every IT dollar spent, 15 cents goes to security. Security staff is being hired 
at an increasing rate. Surprisingly, however, enterprise security isn’t improving.”, 
according to the “Global State of Security” survey [4] . Accurate cyber-security risk 
assessment and investment are critical problems faced by many organizations today. One 
critical part of risk assessment is risk scenario generation. Risk scenarios describe how an 
undesirable outcome (for example, attacks, accidents, etc.) may occur. This dissertation 
focuses on identifying the requirements for doing risk assessments in the cyber-security 
domain. The identified cyber-security domain requirements are used to propose a 
framework for automatically generating risk scenarios, which describe the plan an 
attacker would use to compromise the system.  
This chapter surveys the current state of cyber-security, and identifies the domain 
characteristics that influence cyber-security risk assessment. Section 2.2 describes the 
current state of cyber-security. Section 2.3 describes the state of cyber-security risk 
assessment. Section 2.4 introduces the impact of cyber-security domain characteristics on 
the risk assessment.  
2.2 State of Security 
One of the cyber-security industry’s primary goals during past decade has been to 
produce more secure software, and notable improvements have occurred. A large amount 
of research has been done to 1) identify and improve coding techniques that reduce 
vulnerabilities and 2) discover and patch vulnerabilities more efficiently. According to 
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software manufactures, the cyber-security of software is improving. It is difficult to say 
the same about overall state of the cyber-security. In last decade, the number of reported 
vulnerabilities increased significantly from 1999 to 2007, with a slow decreasing trend in 
the last 3 years. The total number of vulnerabilities published in the National 
Vulnerability Database [5] in the past decade are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Number of reported vulnerabilities in last decade- source of data [5] 
Despite the efforts to make software more secure, all types of vulnerabilities 
continue to exist [6]. Figure 2 compares the number of vulnerabilities reported in 2010 
(for each type of vulnerability identified by the National Vulnerability Database [5]) and 
the total number of vulnerabilities of that type reported in the last decade.   
One of the reasons behind the failure to eradicate a single type of vulnerability 
may be that the attackers are adapting to software security improvements. As a result, 
new sub-categories of the same type of attacks are often discovered. Another reason is 















Figure 2: Comparison of number of vulnerabilities reported in 2010 with total number of 
vulnerabilities reported in past decade - source of data [5] 
 
According to a study conducted by Carnegie Mellon University's Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT), the availability of automated tools capable of 
launching sophisticated attacks is increasing [7]. As a result, the level of technical 
knowledge needed by the attacker to launch the attacks does not need to be as high. 
According to [8] the defender’s capabilities have also increased due to the availability of 
better tools. Despite this increase in defender capability, the Global State of Security 
Survey showed an increase in financial losses caused by cyber-security breaches, from 
6% in 2007 to 20% in 2010[9]. Respondents indicated that the theft of intellectual 
property increased from 5% in 2007 to 15% in 2010 [9]. The percentage of respondents 
suffering a brand or reputation compromise also increased from 5% in 2007 to 14% in 
2010 [9]. The Global State of Security Survey showed also indicates that [9] 23% of its 















year. This is down from 40% in 2007. The number of respondents who were not aware of 
the type of incidents that they encountered also decreased, from 45% in 2007 to 33% in 
2010[9]. This information is shown in Figure 3. The trend suggests that the increase in 
defensive capabilities is not necessarily making organizations more secure.  
 
Figure 3  State of cyber-security 2011 -  source of data [9] 
 
2.3 State of Cyber-security Risk Assessment and Risk-based Decision  
According to [9] only 30% of respondents used risk reduction to justify cyber-





































Factors justifying cyber-security investment 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Legal/regulatory environment  58%    47%    43%    43%   
Client requirement  34%    31%    34%    41%   
Professional judgment  45%    46%    40%    40%   
Potential liability/exposure  49%    40%    37%    38%   
Common industry practice  42%    37%    34%    38%   
Risk reduction score  36%    31%    31%    30%   
Potential revenue impact  30%    27%    26%    27%   
Table 1 Factor’s used to justify cyber-security investment- source of data [9] 
A case has also been made for replacing risk-driven cyber-security approach with 
due-diligence driven approach [10, 11]. One of the reasons behind this viewpoint is that 
current expert driven cyber-security risk assessment methods are often considered as 
“folk art”, leading to inconsistent, non-repeatable outcomes. The Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) no longer requires the preparation of formal risk analyses [3]. 
According to the OMB [3], “In the past, substantial resources have been expended doing 
complex analyses of specific risks to systems, with limited tangible benefit in terms of 
improved security for the systems. Rather than continue to try to precisely measure risk, 
security efforts are better served by generally assessing risks and taking actions to 
manage them.”  
This dissertation agrees that the current cyber-security risk assessment 
methodology does need to be improved. However, the lack of improved cyber-security in 
the system is not only because of the limitation of current risk assessment methods, but is 
caused by a failure to understand the characteristics of the cyber-security domain. A lack 
of understanding of cyber-security domain characteristics affects all cyber-security 
methodologies, including the cyber-security risk assessment methods. The risk 
assessment can also be accurate without being complex.  
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In addition, there is an emerging trend towards integrating cyber-security with the 
central risk management framework of an organization. For example, there is a 
progressive move to combine physical security with cyber-security [12]. On national 
level, there is increasing focus on integrating the nation’s civil infrastructure with the 
technology infrastructure connected to internet. An example of this is the ultra-
interconnected US power grid [13, 14]. This exposes the critical infrastructure to a new 
type of threat. This threat can be addressed by integrating the cyber-security risk 
assessment with the critical infrastructure risk assessment.  
Despite these efforts, there is a fundamental misalignment between the 
characteristics of the domains whose risk assessment methods are to be integrated. Risk 
assessment techniques developed for a mature domain are often applied to other 
developing domains without understanding why these techniques were used in a specific 
way in the first domain. To efficiently integrate these different domains under a central 
risk management framework, the common risk assessment techniques need to be tailored 
to the specific domain requirements. 
2.4 Security Domain Characteristics and Impact on Risk Assessment 
Current cyber-security risk assessment focuses on identifying vulnerabilities, and 
corresponding security controls. Consequently, the risk scenario generation mainly 
focuses on vulnerability identification. Often these scenarios are reduced to capturing 
only the presence of a single vulnerability and how it can be exploited. This type of risk 




This section introduces the impact of cyber-security domain characteristics on the 
risk assessment process.  
2.4.1 Expert Theories 
Current cyber-security risk assessment is mainly driven by expert knowledge and 
judgment. Experts are asked to identify and rank the risks. The risk scenarios are often 
generated by performing a security/penetration testing. This penetration testing is carried 
out by a “red-team” that attacks the system to discover vulnerabilities. The red-team 
consists of a group of “ethical hackers” that compromises the system to uncover 
vulnerabilities [15]. The outcomes of current expert-driven risk assessments are 
subjective, and lead to inconsistencies and non-repeatable outcomes.  
This dissertation proposes a framework for automatically generating risk 
scenarios. The framework elicits the cyber-security theories from experts. It then uses 
these theories to automatically generate risk scenarios. The framework can also be used 
to validate and calibrate the expert theories. Validation can be done by using logical 
reasoning and calibration can be done by using empirical data. 
2.4.2 Domain Dynamicity 
Cyber-security domain is inherently dynamic. In this domain, the system to be 
protected changes with new versions and frequent updates. At the same time, new 
vulnerabilities and attacks are also discovered.  
Computer hardware trends are addressed by Moore's law [16]. This law suggests 
that the number of transistors that can be placed inexpensively on an integrated circuit 
increases exponentially. This number doubles approximately every two years. Software 
trails behind the Moore’s law. A complete reengineering of a typical software application 
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occurs on average 3-5 years. However, there is a drive for software to follow Moore’s 
law to take advantage of the availability of faster processing. That being said, software is 
more dynamic than hardware. Even though a complete redesign of software takes longer, 
patches and updates are released periodically. For example, Microsoft releases security 
patches and updates every alternate Tuesday. This is commonly known as “Patch 
Tuesday”. Unlike hardware maintenance, these patches and updates may change the 
system’s behavior. This dynamic nature of software also affects the risk scenarios.  
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the OMB no longer requires the preparation of 
formal risk analyses [3]. According to the OMB [3], “While formal risk analyses need not 
be performed, the need to determine adequate security will require that a risk-based 
approach be used.” The OMB recommends [3] reviewing the security controls when 
significant modifications are made to the system, but at least every three years. This 
recommendation assumes that the risks and the corresponding risk-based controls are 
impacted only by significant change in the system. This does not take into consideration 
the impact of frequent software updates. It also ignores the change in risk levels due to 
discovery of new vulnerabilities, or attacks.   
Due to the domain dynamicity, the risk scenarios should be updated, whenever 
new knowledge about the system, vulnerability and attack is available (or if current 
knowledge changes). 
2.4.3 Intelligent Threat 
In traditional risk assessment (for example, engineering system risk assessment), 
the threat agent (failure mode) is considered static, adhering to certain laws or rules. The 
field of study to determine this type of threat of failure is often called the “physics of 
12 
 
failure” [17]. However, in the case of cyber-security, the threat is reactive and intelligent 
in nature. One of the consequences is that the implementation of countermeasures may 
not decrease the overall risk, even though it efficiently reduces the probability of a high 
priority risk scenario. This is because the adaptive threat agent can change its strategy, 
increasing the probability of another low priority risk scenario. Apart from adapting to 
the implemented countermeasures, the attacker also adapts and reacts to the target 
system’s environment.  
The human attacker behavior is also driven by strategy and preferences. For 
example, attacker behavior research [18, 19] suggests that individual attackers prefer 
certain type of vulnerabilities to others. Just because vulnerability is present does not 
necessarily mean that it will be exploited. Hence, it is crucial to take into consideration 
attacker behavior when performing cyber-security risk assessments. 
The proposed framework automates the cyber-security risk scenario generation by 
capturing attacker behavior. The theories about attacker behavior can be elicited from 
cyber-security experts. The proposed framework supports validation and calibration of 
expert theories. Validated theories are used as an input in the automatic generation of risk 
scenarios. The proposed framework also captures the domain dynamicity, and the 





3 Requirements of Risk Assessment Methodology  
3.1 Introduction  
Cyber-security risk assessment techniques are often adapted from mature domains 
(for example, engineering risk assessment domain) in which quantitative risk assessment 
methods are used. However, the risk assessment methods used in one domain may not 
directly apply to another. In order to accurately adapt these risk assessment methods, it is 
necessary to understand how domain characteristics influence the selection and 
development of the methods.   
This chapter describes the relationship between the risk assessment process and the 
characteristics of the domain in which the assessment is done. It identifies the cyber-
security domain characteristics that can be used as the requirements for developing cyber-
security assessment methods (or adapting methods from other domain). The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of current cyber-security risk scenario generation methods, 
their limitations, and the proposed framework that overcomes these limitations.    
3.2 Risk Assessment Process of Different Domains 
Risk assessment is used in many domains, ranging from financial systems to 
political science. This section describes the domains that lead in the development and use 
of risk assessment methods. It describes their domain background, risk assessment 
process, and their domain characteristics. Section 3.2.1 focuses on engineering systems 
risk assessment, illustrating its use by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Section 3.2.2 describes 
environmental risk assessment performed by the Environmental Protection Agency 
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(EPA). Section 3.2.3 covers infrastructure-security risk assessment performed by the 
Department of Homeland Security. Finally, Section 3.2.4 describes current cyber-security 
risk assessment. 
Section 3.3 identifies how the domain characteristics influence the risk assessment 
methods. Section 3.3 also describes how the cyber-security domain characteristics differ 
from the domains in which risk assessment is used predominantly. This dissertation 
proposes that the cyber-security risk assessment methods can be adopted from other 
domains only if they are tailored to meet the unique cyber-security domain requirements. 
Section 3.4 identifies these cyber-security domain requirements.  
3.2.1 Engineering System Risk Assessment 
3.2.1.1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
 A nuclear power plant produces a controlled nuclear reaction. The nuclear 
reactions take place in reactor core, which contains the nuclear fuel. One of the primary 
objectives in the operation of nuclear reactors is to prevent damage to the core. Therefore, 
one of the primary objectives of the risk assessment is to prevent this core damage. “The 
NRC regulates commercial nuclear power plants and other uses of nuclear materials 
through licensing, inspection, and enforcement of its requirements” [20]. NRC uses risk 
assessment to support decision making throughout the regulatory process [21]. 
Background of Risk Assessment 
According to [22], “The NRC initially developed many of its regulations without 
considering numerical estimates of risk. Rather, those prescriptive, deterministic 
regulatory requirements were primarily based on experience, test results, and expert 
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judgment. In developing those requirements, the NRC considered factors such as 
engineering margins and the principle of defense-in-depth.” This approach involved 
asking only “What can go wrong?” and “What are the consequences?” [22].  
According to  [23], “An early study released in 1957 focused on three scenarios of 
radioactive releases from a 200-megawatt nuclear power plant operating 30 miles from a 
large population center. Regarding the probability of such releases, the study concluded 
that no one knows how or when we will ever know the exact magnitude of this low 
probability.” 
In 1975, the agency published the Reactor Safety Study [24], based on Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA) [22]. This resulted in asking the additional question, “How likely 
it is that something will go wrong?” [22]. 
According to [23], “Shortly after the Three Mile Island accident, a new generation of 
PRAs appeared in which some of the methodological defects of the Reactor Safety Study 
were avoided. The NRC released the Fault Tree Handbook in 1981 and the PRA 
Procedures Guide in 1983, which shored up and standardized much of the risk assessment 
methodology.” In NUREG 1150, released in 1991, NRC used structured expert judgment 
to quantify uncertainty [23]. According to [22] the agency developed the PRA 
Implementation Plan in 1994. By 2000, this plan was replaced by the Risk-Informed 
Regulation Implementation Plan (RIRIP), which in turn was superseded in April 2007 by 
the Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Plan (RPP) [22].  
NRC is moving toward a risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework. 
According to [22], “Many of the present regulations are based on deterministic and 
prescriptive requirements that cannot be quickly replaced. Therefore, the current 
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requirements are being maintained, while risk-informed and/or performance-based 
regulations are being developed and implemented.” 
Risk Assessment Methodology 
The NRC uses the probabilistic risk assessment approach. PRA is used to estimate 
risk by quantifying 1) what can go wrong, 2) how likely it is, and 3) what are its 
consequences. PRA also provides insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the design 
and operation of the nuclear plant. According to [25], the NRC uses PRA to perform a 
layered risk assessment, “A Level 1 PRA estimates the frequency of accidents that cause 
damage to the nuclear reactor core. This is commonly called core damage frequency 
(CDF).” Second level is defined as [25], “A Level 2 PRA, which starts with the Level 1 
core damage accidents, estimates the frequency of accidents that release radioactivity 
from the nuclear power plant.” Finally [25], “A Level 3 PRA, which starts with the Level 
2 radioactivity release accidents, estimates the consequences in terms of injury to the 
public and damage to the environment.”  
The steps taken to perform the PRA are as follows [25, 26]: 
Step 1 Specify the hazard:  This step identifies the outcome to be prevented or 
reduced. The core damage is usually the outcome to be prevented [25, 26]. 
Step 2 Identify initiating events:  In this step, the analyst identifies initiating events 
that could lead to identified hazards (for example, breakage of a pipe carrying reactor 
coolant) [25, 26].  
Step 3 Frequency estimation:  The frequency of occurrence of each initiating event 
is identified in this step (for example, how often do we expect a pipe of this size to 
break?) [25, 26].  
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Step 4 Scenario Identification: In this step, the analyst identifies each combination 
of failures leading to the identified consequence (for example, pump failure and valve 
failure) [25, 26].  
Step 5 Scenario Quantification: The likelihood of each event sequences is computed 
and the probabilities of all sequences leading to the same outcome are combined [25, 26]. 
These probabilities are then multiplied by the frequency of the initiating event(s) [25, 26].  
3.2.1.2 National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Background of Risk Assessment 
Before the Apollo accident in 1967, “NASA relied on its contractors to apply good 
engineering practices to provide quality assurance and quality control” [23]. At the onset 
of the Apollo program, NASA generally accepted the notion of using risk analysis, but 
during the program, pessimistic estimates discouraged the adoption of quantitative risk 
analysis[27]. This initial risk analysis used conservative values of failure frequencies, 
instead of a full uncertainty analysis[27]. Furthermore, according to [27] the risk 
assessment methods at that time were in infancy and software needed did not exist.  
In 1969, NASA’s Office of Manned Space Flight initiated the development of 
quantitative safety goals, but they were not adopted [23]. According to [23], “The reason 
given at the time was that managers would not appreciate the uncertainty in risk 
calculations. Following the inquiry into the Challenger accident of January 1986, we 
learned that distrust of reassuring risk numbers was not the only reason that PRA was 
abandoned. Rather, initial estimates of catastrophic failure probabilities were so high that 




Throughout the Apollo program and until the Challenger accident, NASA relied 
heavily on failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for safety assessment[28]. FMEA 
is a qualitative process in which a group of experts identifies potential modes of failure 
and their effects. These failure modes are assigned a severity and likelihood ranking, 
which are used to calculate the priority ranking of the corresponding failure. 
After the Challenger accident, the National Research Council committee, in Post-
Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management, [29] found 
that previous quantification of shuttle risks were based almost exclusively on subjective 
judgments and qualitative rationales[27]. This committee [29], recommended using that 
probabilistic risk assessment approaches at the earliest possible date. The Committee on 
Science and Technology of the House of Representatives [30] recommended estimating 
the probability of failure of the Shuttle elements. According to [27], yet there was still 
strong resistance within NASA. One of the reasons for this resistance was because the 
cost to complete a PRA seemed high. 
In 1995, the first attempt at a comprehensive risk assessment was taken by NASA 
using the method similar to the risk assessment framework developed by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission [27]. Currently PRA has been adopted as one of the decision 
supporters for the management of the space shuttle, space station and some unmanned 
space missions [27].  
Risk Assessment Methodology 
NASA’s risk assessment process is similar to NRC’s process. This process consists 
of the following steps [31].  
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Step 1 Objectives Definition:  This step identifies the objectives of risk assessment 
and the undesired consequences to be evaluated [31].   
Step 2 System Familiarization:  In this step, analyst familiarizes himself with the 
system to be evaluated. The operations, maintenance and design documents are used for 
obtaining information about the system. System familiarization is a prerequisite for 
development of the system model  [31], which is used for the risk analysis.   
Step 3 Identification of initiating events (IEs):  In this step, analysts identify the 
events that trigger the accident scenario. Methods like Mater Logic Diagram (MLD) and 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) are used to identify these events[31]. For 
further information about this tools refer to  [31, 32]. 
Step 4 Scenario Modeling: According to [31], “The modeling of each accident 
scenario proceeds with inductive logic and probabilistic tools called event trees (ETs). An 
ET starts with the initiating event and progresses through the scenario, a series of 
successes or failures of intermediate events called pivotal events, until an end state is 
reached.” 
Step 5 Failure Modeling:  According to [31], “Each failure (or its complement, 
success) of a pivotal event in an accident scenario is usually modeled with deductive 
logic and probabilistic tools called fault trees (FTs).” The Fault Trees represent the 
hierarchical logic behind how a combination of low-level events leads to the undesirable 
event [32]. 
Step 6 Data Collection, Analysis, and Development: In this step, data is collected to 
quantify the accident scenarios [31].  
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Step 7 Quantification and Integration: This step quantifies the event tree and fault 
tree models. The risk scenarios are also grouped by their consequences[31].  
Step 8 Uncertainty Analysis:  Uncertainty analysis is used to determine confidence 
in quantitative results [31].  
Step 9 Sensitivity Analysis: Sensitivity analysis is performed to identify elements 
that most strongly affect the risk outcome[31].  
Step 10 Importance Ranking: According to [31] , “In some PRA applications, 
special techniques are used to identify the lead, or dominant, contributors to risk in 
accident sequences or scenarios. The identification of lead contributors in decreasing 
order of importance is called importance ranking.” 
3.2.1.3 Engineering System Domain Characteristics and Impact on Risk 
Assessment 
This section describes the engineering system domain characteristics. These domain 
characteristics influence why and how the risk assessment is performed in the 
engineering domain.  
1. System Laws: In order to conduct the risk assessment, it is assumed that the 
system is characterized by well-understood rules or scientific laws (for example, 
natural or defined laws like the laws of physics). The scientific law is defined as a 
[33], “phenomenon of nature that has been proven to invariably occur whenever 
certain conditions exist or are met”.  These laws drive the system models and 
failure modes used for risk assessment.  
2. System Dynamics:  According to [34], “An important characteristic of many 
engineering system is that they behave dynamically, i.e., their response to an 
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initial perturbation evolves over time as system components interact with each 
other and with the environment.” This dynamic phenomenon significantly 
impacts systems like nuclear power plants. Traditional risk assessment methods 
do not address such dynamics, and special techniques like dynamic reliability 
analysis or simulation are used in assessment. The dynamic reliability analysis 
methods include dynamic event tree and discrete state transition modeling [34]. In 
both these methodologies, the analyst identifies the discrete system states and 
possible transitions between the states [34]. The simulation driven methods 
develop system models representing its elements and events [34].  Nejad-
Hosseinian [35]proposes a framework for capturing different types of engineering 
knowledge for automatically generating event sequence diagram for dynamic 
systems. This framework is described in detail in Appendix VII. 
3. High reliability system:  Critical engineering systems like nuclear plants and the 
space shuttle are designed for high reliability. As a result, the failure data about 
the system is not readily available. In this case, the risk assessment is often 
conducted by taking into account the condition of the system’s failure precursor 
state (degradation state) or by using expert judgment.  
Expert judgment is often used to determine the probability of failure when data is 
unavailable. The techniques used to extract this probability are studied under the 
title of expert elicitation. Present day engineering risk assessment is also 
dependent on the risk analyst’s ability to identify risk scenarios. The quality of 
risk assessment is directly tied to the expertise of the analyst, which raises 
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questions about the completeness of the risk scenarios identified. This concern 
was addressed by automatically generating event sequence diagrams [35]. 
4. Threat Agent:  The leading sources of threat in the engineering domain are failure 
mechanisms. These failure mechanisms are studied under the field of the physics 
of failure analysis [17], which identifies the physical mechanisms leading to the 
failure. Another area of concern is human error. The field of human reliability 
studies the potential human performance indicators and causes of unintentional 
human errors. This type of threat does not adapt to the preventative 
countermeasures, or to the change in system environment. 
5. Change in system:  Once built, the system configuration remains mostly stable. 
As a result, the system familiarization step does not need to be repeated 
frequently. System models once build remains stable. System maintenance is done 
to restore the original intended configuration of the system. Hence, the risk 
assessment performed for original system configuration may remain valid for the 
majority of useful life of the system. Due to stability of the system model and 
non-adaptive nature of the threat, risk scenarios once identified does not change. 
3.2.2 Environmental risk assessment   
3.2.2.1 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
According to [36], “The mission of the EPA is to protect human health and to 
safeguard the natural environment — air, water, and land — upon which life depends. 
EPA fulfills this mission by, among other things, developing and enforcing regulations 
that implement environmental laws enacted by Congress.”   
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The EPA uses risk assessment to provide the best possible scientific characterization 
of risks [36]. The scientific implications of risks, identified as outcomes of the risk 
assessment, are used by the decision maker to optimally mitigate the environmental 
risks[36]. 
Background of Risk Assessment 
According to [37], “Procedures for analyzing hazards and measuring risks existed 
prior to 1970, but had been developed for purposes other than environmental protection 
(for example, to determine life insurance rates or the likelihood of flooding) and had not 
been widely applied to more complex environmental hazards.” Since EPA urgently 
needed suitable tools to carry out its mission, it supported the development of the newly 
consolidated field of risk analysis and helped to found the Society for Risk Analysis [37]. 
According to [37], “The Agency was among the first to apply the methods of risk 
analysis to problems in environmental protection. EPA developed new procedures and 
adapted methods from such disciplines as sanitary and industrial engineering, 
psychology, economics, sociology, statistics, and operations research. By the mid 1970s, 
EPA was conducting risk analyses to support some of its decisions.” 
The EPA’s initial risk assessment studies were documented in 1975 [36]. According 
to [36], these documents reflected EPA’s intent to use rigorous assessments of health risk 
and economic impact as part of the regulatory process. The first EPA document, [36] 
describing application quantitative procedures used in risk assessment, was published in 
1980 [36]. EPA adapted their risk assessment principles from the National Academy of 
Science (NAS)’s 1983 publication of “Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: 
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Managing the Process” [38] commonly referred to as the “Red Book” [36]. In 1984, the 
EPA published [36] “Risk Assessment and Management: Framework for Decision 
Making” [39], which “…emphasizes making the risk assessment process transparent, 
describing the assessment’s strengths and weaknesses more fully, and providing plausible 
alternatives within the assessment” [36].  
The EPA’s risk assessment practices evolved [36] with the risk assessment principles 
documented in publications like the “Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment”[40] and 
“Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society” [41]. These 
principles were developed to ensure that the assessments meet the intended objectives 
and are understandable [36]. 
According to [42], “Although EPA efforts focused initially on human health risk 
assessment, the basic model was adapted to ecological risk assessment in the 1990s to 
deal with risks to plants, animals and whole ecosystems.” 
According to [36], EPA’s risk assessment principles and practices were built on their 
own risk assessment guidance’s and policies  such as the Risk Characterization Policy 
[43], Guidance for Cumulative Assessment, Part 1: Planning and Scoping [44],  the Risk 
Assessment Guidance for Superfund [45],  EPA’s Information Quality Guidelines [46], 
and  A Summary of General Assessment Factors for Evaluating Quality of Scientific and 
Technical Information [47]. 
Risk Assessment Methodology 
The EPA [48] considers risk to be, “the chance of harmful effects to human health 
or to ecological systems resulting from exposure to an environmental stressor”. A stressor 
is defined [48] as, “any physical, chemical, or biological entity that can induce an adverse 
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response”. According to [48], risk assessment is a scientific process and the risk depends 
on three factors: 1) how much of a chemical is present in an environmental medium, 2) 
how much contact or exposure a person, or ecological receptor has with the contaminated 
environmental medium, and 3) the toxicity of the chemical. The risk assessments 
performed by EPA are classified in two categories: the human health risk assessment and 
the ecological risk assessment.  
Human Health Risk Assessment   
This assessment estimates the type and probability of adverse health effects in 
humans who may be exposed to chemicals in contaminated environmental [49]. 
According to [49], the human health risk assessment includes four basic steps. 
Step 1 Hazard Identification: This step evaluates whether or not a stressor has the 
potential to cause harm to humans and/or ecological systems[49]. The data regarding the 
clinical studies on humans provide the most accurate evaluation, but these are difficult to 
gather[50]. Hence, statistical methods are used to calculate the harm potential from 
epidemiological or animal studies[50].  
Step 2 Dose-Response Assessment:  This assessment examines the relationship 
between exposure and effects [49]. Data availability is also an issue in this step. When 
data are available, they often cover only a portion of the possible range of the dose-
response relationships [51]. This issue is addressed by using extrapolation techniques. 
Similar to the concept of “failure mode” in engineering risk assessment, in this case the 
understanding of how the toxicity is caused is called the “mode of action”. This is defined 
as a [51] “sequence of key events and processes, starting with interaction of an agent with 
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a cell, proceeding through operational and anatomical changes, and resulting in the effect, 
for example, cancer formation.” 
Step 3 Exposure Assessment: According to [52], “Exposure assessment is the 
process of measuring or estimating the magnitude, frequency, and duration of human 
exposure to an agent in the environment, or estimating future exposures for an agent that 
has not yet been released”. 
Step 4 Risk Characterization:  This is the communication part of the process. It 
examines how well the data support conclusions about the nature and extent of the risk 
from exposure to environmental stressors [49]. According to [53], “A risk 
characterization conveys the risk assessor's judgment as to the nature and presence or 
absence of risks, along with information about how the risk was assessed, where 
assumptions and uncertainties still exist, and where policy choices will need to be made.” 
Ecological Risk Assessment   
Similar to human health risk assessment, ecological risk assessment is the process for 
evaluating the likely impact of the exposure of stressors on the environment. 
Environmental stressors include chemicals, land change, disease, invasive species, and 
climate change [54]. 
The ecological risk assessment [54] includes three phases: 
Phase 1 Problem formulation:  This step determines what is at risk and what needs 
to be protected [54]. 
Phase 2 Analysis: In this step, the analyst determines 1) what plants and animals are 
exposed, 2) what is the degree of exposure, and 3) the likelihood of exposure causing 
harmful ecological effects [54]. 
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Phase 3 Risk characterization: According to [54], this step is divided into two major 
components: risk estimation and risk description. Risk estimation combines exposure 
profiles and exposure effects [54]. Risk description aides in interpreting the risk results 
and determines a level for harmful effects on the plants and animals[54]. 
3.2.2.2 Environmental Domain Characteristics  
The environmental risk assessment is driven by the following domain characteristics.  
1. System Laws:  Similar to the engineering domain, in the environmental domain 
the system model and risk assessment rely on underlying scientific laws 
(biological and chemical). These are supplemented by scientific theories. The 
scientific theory [55] explains empirical observations. Scientific theories must be 
falsifiable. These scientific theories are derived by empirical causal analysis 
indicating the impact of stressors on humans and the environment. 
2. Risk Exposure:  Risk exposure adds a probabilistic factor between the occurrence 
of the risk factor and the impact of risk. In the environmental risk assessment, the 
realization of consequence depends on the occurrence of risk, as well as the 
exposure to the risk. In other words, lack of exposure can mask the occurrence of 
risk.  
3. Threat: The threat in this domain is any physical, chemical, or biological entity 
that can induce an adverse response to the environment or human health. Similar 
to the engineering domain the threat does not adapt to the preventative 
countermeasures, or to the change in system environment 
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3.2.3 Infrastructure Security Risk Assessment 
3.2.3.1 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Background of Risk Assessment 
According to the National Academy of Science (NAS)  review of the DHS’s 
approach to risk assessment [56] ,“The scope of responsibilities of DHS is large, ranging 
over most, if not all, aspects of homeland security and supporting in principle all 
government and private entities that contribute to homeland security. For some functions, 
DHS is responsible for all of the elements of risk analysis. For other functions for which 
the responsibility is shared, effective coordination is required with owners and operators 
of private facilities; with state, territorial, and local departments of homeland security and 
emergency management; and with other federal agencies such as the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection Agency, or the Department of 
Agriculture.”   
The NAS review committee [56] evaluated six risk assessment models and 
processes. These models included the natural hazards, critical infrastructure protection, 
and homeland security grants risk models, as well as the Terrorism Risk Assessment and 
Management (TRAM) model, the Biological Threat Risk Assessment (BTRA) model and 
the DHS’s Integrated Risk Management Framework. The conclusion [56] of this review 
was as follows.  
 “Conclusion: DHS has established a conceptual framework for risk analysis (risk is 
a function of threat (T), vulnerability (V), and consequence (C), or R = f(T,V,C) ) that, 
generally speaking, appears appropriate for decomposing risk and organizing 
information, and it has built models, data streams, and processes for executing risk 
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analyses for some of its various missions. However, with the exception of risk analysis 
for natural disaster preparedness, the committee did not find any DHS risk analysis 
capabilities and methods that are yet adequate for supporting DHS decision making, 
because their validity and reliability are untested. Moreover, it is not yet clear that DHS is 
on a trajectory for development of methods and capability.” [56] 
The detailed review of these risk assessment methods is mentioned in [56]. In this 
dissertation, an example of infrastructure security risk assessment is described by the risk 
assessment done for the Homeland Security Grant Program. The purpose of this program 
[57] is to invest in the development of protection capabilities across the United States 
based on the assessed terrorism risk. According to [57], “At DHS, the State Homeland 
Security Grant Program is the primary tool the agency has to influence the behavior of 
State and local partners to take actions that reduce what both parties agree are the risks of 
a terrorist attack and to respond effectively to such an attack, or other catastrophe”. 
Risk Assessment Methodology- Homeland Security Grant Program  
The State Homeland Security Grant Program is established to allocate funds to state 
and local partners in order to reduce risk of terrorist attack and to better prepare the state 
if such attacks should occur. A risk-based approach is used to make the fund allocation 
decision. This risk-based approach has evolved over the period as described below [57].   
R=P formula used during 2001-2003: From 2001-2003 (during the transition of 
responsibility of conducting risk assessment from DOJ to DHS) this risk was considered 
to be equal to population count [57].  
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R=T+CI+PD formula used during 2004-2005: Risk was considered as weighted 
summation of the threat, critical infrastructure, and the population density of the area 
[57]. Probabilities were not considered during this period.  
R=T*V*C formula used during 2006-2007: From 2006 onwards, probability of 
occurrence of an event was incorporated in the risk assessment[57]. In this case, risk was 
defined as multiplication of the threat, vulnerability, and consequences. Threat was 
defined as the likelihood of an attack occurring and the product of vulnerability and 
consequence considered together represent the relative exposure and expected impact of 
an attack. According to [57], the DHS is treating vulnerability (V) and consequence (C) 
as an amalgamated, single variable. According to [57], the DHS assigns the probability of 
one to a vulnerability being present, meaning it assumes the presence of vulnerability. 
This is because of the difficulties associated with differentiating vulnerability values 
across areas and states. 
R=T*(V&C) formula used from 2007-Current: According to GAO [58], from 
2007 onwards, DHS’ presentation of the risk calculation formula used the variable 
(V&C), but the combination of vulnerability and consequence is still calculated as the 
product of V times C. 
3.2.3.2 Infrastructure Security Domain Characteristics  
Risk assessment techniques are not well developed in the infrastructure security 
domain [56]. This domain has the following characteristics:  
1. Adaptive Threat Agent:  The risk scenarios are driven by the dynamic nature of 




2. Analyst Dependence:  Risk assessments in this domain are heavily driven by the 
intelligence analyst’s knowledge and judgment [57]. One of the reasons behind 
this reliance on experts is lack of available data. According to [57], this lack of a 
rich historical database of terrorist attacks “necessitates a reliance on intelligence 
and terrorist experts for probabilistic assessments of types of terrorist attacks 
against critical assets and/or regions”. According to [56],  “DHS has employed a 
variety of methods to compensate for this lack of data, including game theory, 
“red-team” analysis, scenario construction, and subjective estimates of both risks 
and consequences.” However, these methods have often failed to use state-of-the-
art approach [56]. 
3. Lack of governing law:  Unlike the engineering and environmental domains, the 
system and risk models in the infrastructure security risk domain are based on 
subjective analyst assessment. This assessment is driven by using expert theories, 
which (unlike scientific laws or principles) may or may not hold true for present 
and future assessment. Different experts can also form different theories based on 
the same evidential data. 
3.2.4 Cyber-security risk assessment 
Background of Risk Assessment 
Cyber-security risk assessment is currently driven by regulations. The importance of 
cyber-security was emphasized in the  “Presidential Decision Directives (PDD)” 62 [59] 
and 63 [60], the executive order 13231 entitled “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the 
Information Age” [61], the “Homeland Security Act of 2002” [62], the “Office of 
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Management and Budget (OMB), Circular A-130” [3], “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” [63], and 
the “Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002” (FISMA)  [64].  
“Presidential Decision Directives (PDD)” 62 [59] and 63 [60], released in 1998 by 
President Clinton address the new and nontraditional cyber-security threats against 
critical infrastructure. PDD 63 [60] focuses on critical infrastructure protection from both 
the physical and cyber security perspective. On October 16, 2001, President Bush 
announced Executive Order 13231, entitled “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the 
Information Age” [61].  
OMB Circular A-130 titled “Management of Federal Information Resources” [3] 
establishes policy for the management of federal information resources. The Appendix III 
of this circular called “Security of Federal Automated Information Resources” 
establishes a minimum set of controls to be included in federal automated information 
security programs [3]. According to the OMB Circular A-130 [3] Appendix III, “The 
Appendix no longer requires the preparation of formal risk analyses. In the past, 
substantial resources have been expended doing complex analyses of specific risks to 
systems, with limited tangible benefit in terms of improved security for the systems. 
Rather than continue to try to precisely measure risk, security efforts are better served by 
generally assessing risks and taking actions to manage them. While formal risk analyses 
need not be performed, the need to determine adequate security will require that a risk-
based approach be used. This risk assessment approach should include a consideration of 
the major factors in risk management: the value of the system or application, threats, 
vulnerabilities, and the effectiveness of current or proposed safeguards.” In summary, 
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OMB does not require formal risk assessment, but recommends using a simplified risk-
based approach for control evaluation.  
FISMA requires each federal agency to develop, document, and implement an 
agency-wide program to provide information security[65]. FISMA applies to both 
information and information systems used by the agency, contractors, and other 
organizations and sources, so it has somewhat broader applicability [64]. The Federal 
cyber-security requirements mentioned in OMB Circular A-130  continue to apply under 
FISMA, and the agency is responsible for ensuring appropriate cyber-security controls in 
accordance with the OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III, “Security of Federal Automated 
Information Resources” [3]. 
The criticism of FISMA has been that the law focuses on the process as opposed to 
the outcome i.e. it requires reporting of whether the security process were followed as 
opposed to measuring if the security was improved. According to GAO [66], the FISMA 
metrics do not measure how effectively agencies are performing activities. “For example, 
agencies report on the number of systems undergoing test and evaluation in the past year, 
but there is no measure of the quality of agencies' test and evaluation processes. 
Additionally, there are no requirements to report on certain key activities such as patch 
management.” [66] 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) were assigned the 
responsibility to create a framework for FISMA implementation. The OMB Circular A-
130 also suggests using NIST’s risk assessment guidance. NIST produced a series of 
guidelines of general interest to the cyber-security community called 800 series Special 
Publications [67]. This 800 series includes the risk management guidance [68] to satisfy 
34 
 
the requirement of FISMA and OMB Circular A-130. The 800 series are the key 
publications that drive today’s federal and private sector information cyber-security 
initiatives. 
Risk Assessment Method – National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) 
This risk assessment process contains the following steps [68]: 
Step 1- System Characterization: This is similar to NASA’s PRA System 
Familiarization (Step 2), in which detailed information about the system is identified. In 
this phase, the risk analyst develops an understanding of the technology infrastructure to 
be assessed [68]. 
Step 2- Threat Identification: In this step, a comprehensive list of potential threat 
sources (for example, Natural Threats, Environmental Threats, and Human Threats) is 
created. Once identified, a list of threat motivation and actions is created. According to 
NIST [68], “Motivation and the resources for carrying out an attack make humans 
potentially dangerous threat-sources.” The estimate of motivation, capability, and 
resources may be required to determine the likelihood that a threat agent may exploit 









Table 2:  Threat source to action mapping – source of data [68] 
Step 3- Vulnerability Identification:  In this step, a list of vulnerabilities is identified 
and is mapped to potential threat sources that can exploit them [68]. An example[68] 
given by NIST is shown in Table 3.  
Vulnerability Threat-Source Threat Action 
Terminated employees’ system 
identifiers (ID) are not removed [68] 
Terminated employees [68] Dialing into the company’s 
network and accessing  
proprietary data [68] 
Company firewall allows inbound telnet, 
and guest ID is enabled on ABC server 
[68] 




criminals, terrorists) [68] 
Using telnet to ABC server  
and browsing system files  
with the guest ID [68] 
Table 3: Vulnerability to threat action mapping - source of data [68] 
NIST’s [68] recommended methods for vulnerability identification are 1) using 
published vulnerability information, 2) performing system cyber-security testing, and 3) 
developing a cyber-security requirements checklist. 
The published vulnerability information can be collected from sources such as 
previous risk assessment documentation, audit reports, vulnerability databases (for 
example, national vulnerability database)[68]. 
Security testing involves vulnerability scanning, cyber-security test and evaluation, 
or penetration testing [68]. The penetration testing is often performed by a red-team.    
Threat-Source  Motivation  Threat Actions  
Hacker/Cracker Challenge, Ego, Rebellion  
Hacking, Social engineering, System intrusion, 
break-ins, Unauthorized system access [68] 
Cyber criminal 
Destruction of information, 
Illegal information, 
disclosure, Monetary gain, 
Unauthorized data alteration  
Computer crime (for example, cyber stalking), 
Fraudulent act (for example, replay, 
impersonation, interception), Information bribery, 
Spoofing, System intrusion [68] 
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In this step, the analyst also identifies the organizational or federal cyber-security 
requirements [68]. These cyber-security requirements are documented in the form of a 
checklist.  
Step 4- Control Analysis: During this step, the risk analyst determines whether the 
identified vulnerabilities and cyber-security requirements are being addressed by existing 
or planned cyber-security controls[68]. 
Step 5- Likelihood Determination:  Likelihood of the threat source exploiting 
vulnerability is described [68] using likelihood levels (high, medium, or low). Table 4 
below shows the likelihood levels described in [68].  
Likelihood Level Definition of Likelihood 
High  
"The threat-source is highly motivated and sufficiently capable, and 
controls to prevent the vulnerability from being exercised are 
ineffective.” [68]   
Medium  
“The threat-source is motivated and capable, but controls are in place 
that may impede successful exercise of the vulnerability .” [68]   
Low  
“The threat-source lacks motivation or capability, or controls are in place 
to prevent, or at least significantly impede, the vulnerability from being 
exercised .” [68]   
Table 4: Likelihood of vulnerability exploit - source of data [68] 
Step 6- Impact Analysis:  Impact of threat exploiting vulnerability results in loss of 
criticality, integrity, and availability[68]. The qualitative magnitude of impact is 
identified in Table 5 below. According to [68], some tangible impacts (for example, loss 








Definition of Impact 
High  “Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in highly costly loss of major 
tangible assets or resources; (2) may significantly violate, harm, or impede an 
organization’s mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human death or 
serious injury. ” [68] 
Medium  “Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the costly loss of tangible assets or 
resources; (2) may violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, reputation, 
or interest; or (3) may result in human injury. ” [68] 
Low  “Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the loss of some tangible assets or 
resources or (2) may noticeably affect an organization’s mission, reputation, or 
interest. ” [68] 
Table 5: Impact of vulnerability exploit – source of data [68] 
Step 7- Risk Determination: The level of risk to the system is identified [68] by 




Low (10) Medium (50) High (100) 
High (1.0)  Low 10 X 1.0 = 10  Medium 50 X 1.0 = 50  High 100 X 1.0 = 100  
Medium (0.5)  Low  10 X 0.5 = 5  Medium  50 X 0.5 = 25  Medium  100 X 0.5 = 50  
Low (0.1)  Low 10 X 0.1 = 1  Low 50 X 0.1 = 5  Low 100 X 0.1 = 10  
Table 6:  System risk caculation - source of data [68] 
The resulting risk levels can be interpreted as below: 
High: According to  [68],  “If an observation or finding is evaluated as a high risk, 
there is a strong need for corrective measures. An existing system may continue to 
operate, but a corrective action plan must be put in place as soon as possible” 
Medium: According to  [68], “If an observation is rated as medium risk, corrective 
actions are needed and a plan must be developed to incorporate these actions within a 
reasonable period of time.”  
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Low: If an observation is described as low risk, a determine needs to be made to 
either take  corrective actions or to decide to accept the risk [68]. 
Step 8- Control Recommendation: The controls that can mitigate or eliminate the 
identified risks are determined in this step [68]. Appropriate identified controls are 
implemented to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 
Step 9- Results Documentation: A report describing the threats, vulnerabilities, risk, 
and control recommendations is created in this step [68]. 
 
The risk assessment process, however, is often reduced to the three-step process 
described below: 
Reduced Step 1 – System Classification:  FIPS Publication 199 allows classification 
of the information or system (called assets in the FISMA guidance) in high, medium, or 
low categories based on the potential impact on organizations or individuals should there 
be a breach of cyber-security [69]. FIPS Publication 199 [69] Standards for Security 
Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems describes these system 
classification criteria in detail. As an example [69], the definition of high impact 
according to FIPS Publication 199 is indicated below: 
“The potential impact is HIGH if-  
− The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a 
severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, 
or individuals.”  
FIPS Publication 199 [69]  further mentions, “A severe or catastrophic adverse effect 
means that, for example, the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability might: (i) 
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cause a severe degradation in or loss of mission capability to an extent and duration that 
the organization is not able to perform one or more of its primary functions; (ii) result in 
major damage to organizational assets; (iii) result in major financial loss; or (iv) result in 
severe or catastrophic harm to individuals involving loss of life or serious life threatening 
injuries.” 
Reduced Step 2- Minimum Security Requirements Identification: A second 
mandatory cyber-security standard, FIPS 200 [70] Minimum Security Requirements for 
Federal Information and Information Systems, identifies a set of 17 cyber-security 
requirements that should be met by the systems at minimum[70]. Examples of these 
requirements[70] are access control, awareness and training, audit and accountability. 
Reduced Step 3- Control Selection: A third standard NIST 800-53 [71] 
Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems can be used to identify 
controls whose implementation satisfies the minimum requirements identified in FIPS 
200. NIST 800-53 identifies [71] controls that can be used for each system classification 
(high, medium, or low). 
In summary, in reduced assessment, the system classification level and cyber-
security requirements are used to determine the controls to be used. 
3.2.4.1 Cyber-Security Domain Characteristics  
The cyber-security domain characteristics are explained below. 
1. Lack of governing law:  In the cyber-security domain, the risk assessment is 
qualitative in nature and driven by the cyber-security experts. Expert theories, 
unlike system laws, may or may not hold true for present and future assessments. 
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In addition, different experts may form different theories based on the same 
evidential data. 
2. Adaptive threat:  Similar to the threat [56, 57] described in infrastructure risk 
assessment domain, the threat agent in cyber-security domain is human and 
considered reactive and intelligent in nature. This human threat adapts to the 
system environment and the countermeasures implemented. The human attacker 
actively searches for the opportunities provided by the system, and determines, or 
changes the attack goal given the availability of these opportunities. The cyber-
security risk scenario should take into consideration this adaptive and exploratory 
nature of the attacker. 
3. Domain Dynamicity:  Cyber-security domain is inherently dynamic. The system 
to be protected changes frequently with new versions and updates. At the same 
time, new vulnerabilities and attacks are also discovered frequently. 
4. Analyst dependence:   Current cyber-security risk assessment is heavily 
dependent on the analyst. The expert opinion is used to identify threat sources and 
vulnerabilities, to assess the likelihood and impact of the threat-vulnerability 
pairs, and finally to select the controls mitigating the identified risks. This analyst 




3.3 Domain Characteristic Comparison and Limitation of Cyber-
security Risk Assessment 
 This section compares the characteristics of the domains described in Section 3.2. 
Six domain characteristics were selected for this comparison. These are shown in Figure 
4, and are explained below. 
1. Rate of System Evolution: This describes the rate at which the system 
configuration changes. It is characterized as high (H), medium (M) or low (L) for 
the comparison shown in Figure 4.   
2. Rate of Vulnerability Evolution: This describes the rate at which new 
vulnerabilities in the system are identified. It is also characterized as high (H), 
medium (M) or low (L) for the comparison of different domains.  
3. System Dynamics: Dynamics refers to the time evolution of physical process, 
and system dynamics[34] refers to the behavior of complex systems guided by the 
dynamics . There is a difference between system dynamics and the dynamicity of 
domain. System dynamics is a behavior of the system (for example, nuclear 
reaction), while domain dynamicity describes the frequent changes in system, and 
threat. The system dynamics is characterized as high (H), medium (M) or low (L) 
for the comparison of different domains. 
4. Adversary Intelligence:  The adversary or threat against the system varies from 
domain to domain. In engineering systems, the threat is natural phenomenon that 
may lead to failure of the system. The behavior of this threat, characterized as 
failure modes, may be predictable. The natural phenomenon threat does not 
change its behavior to adapt to the implemented countermeasures or target 
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environment. The threat behavior is also not guided by the adversary’s strategy or 
preferences. This type of behavior is described as low adversary intelligence.   
As described in Section 3.2.2, in environmental risk assessment, the threat may be 
biological or chemical agents. In some cases, this threat may change its behavior 
to adapt to the environment. This is described as medium adversary intelligence. 
 In cyber-security and infrastructure security risk assessment domains, the human 
attacker is characterized by high adversary intelligence. The behavior of this type 
of threat may change to adapt to the situation [56, 57], target environment, and 
countermeasures implemented. Human behavior may also be guided by attacker 
strategy or preferences.  
5. Modeling Theories: Modeling theories describe the foundation on which system 
and risk assessment models are built. Modeling theories can be scientific law[33], 
scientific theories, or human theories. A scientific law is defined as a [33], 
“phenomenon of nature that has been proven to invariably occur whenever certain 
conditions exist or are met”. Scientific laws are described using a formal 
statement about such a phenomenon. A scientific theory [55] explains empirical 
observations. These theories must be falsifiable. Unlike scientific laws, scientific 
theories are driven by empirical observations. Finally, human theory presented 
here is defined as beliefs formed by experts. This belief may be formed by an 
expert’s experience and observations. Human theory may not be repeatable and 
may contradict other human theories.  
6. System Value:  System value represents the criticality of the system or the impact 
of the failure of the system. This is encoded as high, medium, or low.  
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The pink line in Figure 4 describes the engineering domain, the green line describes 
environmental risk assessment domain, the yellow line describes the infrastructure 
security risk assessment domain, and red line describes the cyber-security domain.   
 
Figure 4: Risk assessment domain comparision 
 
3.3.1 Engineering System Domain and Risk Assessment Method 
The engineering system domain is characterized by a low rate of system evolution 
and a low rate of vulnerability evolution. In this domain, the system and hazards once 
identified accurately does not change frequently.  
The adversary intelligence is low, which means that the threat does not react or adapt 
to the situation, target environment, or the countermeasure implemented. Nor does it act 
according to a strategy or preference. The modeling theories are driven by observable and 
repeatable scientific laws.  
The identification of risk scenarios is dependent on the analyst’s skills. The risk 
scenarios, however, are driven by the system laws and not by expert judgment. Since the 
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value of the system is high, appropriate time and resources may be allocated to develop 
and mitigate risk scenarios.  
3.3.2 Environmental Risk Assessment 
The risk assessment process used by the environmental domain is similar to the 
process used by the engineering domain. The risk assessments in this domain are often 
driven by scientific theories based on observed causal evidence. As described in Section 
3.2.2, in this domain the cause-effect relationship between a stressor and consequence is 
determined using empirical studies.  
The threat in this domain is any physical, chemical, or biological entity that can 
induce an adverse response to the environment or human health[48]. The adversary 
intelligence is considered medium for this domain.  
The system rate of evolution is considered medium in this dissertation as the 
environment and eco-system may change even if it is at a slow pace. The rate of 
vulnerability evolution is considered low, and the system dynamics are considered 
medium in this domain.  
The system value is considered high for the environmental domain in this 
dissertation. As a result, appropriate time and resources may be allocated to develop and 
mitigate risk scenarios.  
3.3.3 Infrastructure Security Domain and Risk Assessment Method 
In the infrastructure security risk assessment domain, the system rate of evolution is 
considered as medium. This is because the civil infrastructure changes, but not as often as 
the technology infrastructure.  
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The threat is human in nature and adapts [56, 57] to the situation and implemented 
countermeasures. The human threat also acts in accordance with his/her strategy and 
preferences.  
The rate of vulnerability evolution is also considered medium, as the change in the 
system provides new vulnerabilities or the adaptive threat uncovers new vulnerabilities 
that can be exploited to attack the system. 
The system dynamics is considered medium. The value of the system is high, so 
appropriate time and resources may be allocated to develop and mitigate risk scenarios.  
The modeling theories in this domain are driven by human expert theories. Expert 
theories introduce subjectivity, and corresponding inconsistencies and non-
reproducibility in the risk assessment outcome.  
3.3.4 Cyber-security Domain and Risk Assessment Method 
The cyber-security domain is characterized by a high rate of vulnerability and system 
evolution. The system configuration evolves periodically and new vulnerabilities are 
often identified. New attacks are also often identified, which may enable execution of 
risk scenarios previously deemed non-executable. These frequent changes make the 
cyber-security domain dynamic. This domain dynamicity is different from system 
dynamics, which refers to the characteristics of complex systems. 
Similar to the infrastructure security domain [56, 57], the threat in cyber-security 
domain is intelligent in nature. This means that the attacker has a strategy and preferences 
for how to carry out an attack. The attacker also adapts to the situation, target 
environment, or the implemented countermeasures.  
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Human theories are used to model cyber-security risks. Different experts may form 
different theories, even if they are formed from the same observed evidence. These 
theories may also conflict with each other. As a result, the risk scenarios generated by 
two analysts may be different.  
The value of the system can be medium to high. If the value of the system is 
medium, then it may not be beneficial to spend a large amount of time and resources 
doing manual risk assessment. An automated system can be used to address this issue. 
Even if the value of the system were high, in order to incorporate the scale and 
dynamicity of modern day technology infrastructure, the cyber-security risk assessment 
needs to be automated.  
Despite these differences, the current cyber-security risk assessment process is very 
similar to the engineering domain. The challenge with this process is that, by the time 
risk assessment is done and controls are identified (or implemented), the system 
configuration may have changed or new vulnerabilities and/or attacks may have been 
identified. These frequent changes shorten the usable lifespan of the risk assessment 
outcome.    
Cyber-security assessment techniques and processes are often adapted from other 
mature risk assessment domains. Some examples of these extensions are as follows: 
 There have been attempts to extend the fault tree, event tree, and failure mode and 
effect analysis (FMEA) methods to model cyber-security scenarios. Event trees 
are adopted as attack trees [72] for cyber-security assessment.  
 A cyber-security risk assessment called Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) [73] 
uses the concept of exposure factor similar to the EPA’s use of risk exposure. 
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This technique uses the analyst’s opinion for evaluating the exposure instead of 
using the scientific or empirical quantification methods employed by agencies like 
the EPA.  
This dissertation proposes a framework to automatically generate risk scenarios 
given the unique challenges of the cyber-security domain. The cyber-security risk 
scenarios are further examined in Section 3.5 and cyber-security domain requirements are 
detailed in Section 3.4. 
3.4 Detailed Cyber-Security Domain Requirements 
This dissertation uses the unique cyber-security domain characteristics as the 
requirements for developing more effective cyber-security risk assessment tools. This 
section details these requirements.  
3.4.1 Domain Dynamicity  
The cyber-security domain is inherently dynamic. This dynamicity manifests at three 
different interconnected levels. These levels are described below:  
1. System Dynamicity: The system to be protected changes as new software 
versions and updates become available, and as the system configuration and 
architecture changes. Consequently, one of the cyber-security countermeasures is 
to control the changes made to hardware, software, and firmware throughout the 
lifecycle of the system. This countermeasure is called “configuration 
management” or “baseline management”. However, according to NIST [74], a 
“reset of the baseline” occurs with frequent software updates and patches. This 
makes the exact understanding of the initial baseline obscure and more difficult to 
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track over time [74] . As a result, revising cyber-security assessments becomes 
impractical [74]. According to [74], the presumed state of security of the initial 
baseline is never updated in light of increased understanding, potentially giving a 
false sense of security.  
These changes in the system provide new opportunities to attackers. The cyber-
security risk scenario generation framework cannot assume that the system will 
remain static throughout the timeframe in which these risk scenarios are used. 
Yet, this assumption is made frequently in current risk assessment. 
2. Vulnerability Dynamicity: In addition to system configuration changes 
introducing more vulnerabilities, new vulnerabilities in existing systems are also 
discovered frequently.    
3. Attack Dynamicity: New attack methods exploiting vulnerabilities are also 
discovered frequently. These new attack methods may allow execution of risk 
scenarios previously deemed non-executable. According to a study done by 
CERT [7], the availability of automated tools capable of launching sophisticated 
attacks is increasing. Consequently, the technical knowledge required by the 
attacker to launch the attacks is decreasing. 
This dynamicity influences the design of cyber-security risk scenario generation 
framework, and the choice of knowledge representation methods capturing the 
information needed for generating the risk scenarios.  
1. Risk Scenario Generation Framework Requirements: The automated cyber-
security risk scenario generation framework should assume that information is 
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incomplete and new information may be available at any time. It should be able 
to update the risk scenarios efficiently when new knowledge becomes available.   
2. Domain Knowledge Representation Requirements: Risk scenario generation 
should function by assuming that information is dynamic. The knowledgebase 
used by the risk scenario generation framework may capture this dynamic 
information. The domain dynamicity adds more requirements for the 
knowledgebase storing this dynamic information. These requirements are 
described below. 
a. Dispersed Information Sources: The cyber-security domain information 
can be generated by sources dispersed in space and time. The 
knowledgebase should be able to capture the information from these 
dispersed sources. 
b. Dynamic Knowledgebase: Since the cyber-security domain information 
can be available at any time, the knowledgebase should be able to 
dynamically and efficiently capture the change in information or 
availability of new information. 
c. Incomplete Information: Traditional knowledgebase are designed using 
the assumption that whatever information is not explicitly stated is false 
[75]1. For example, if information about vulnerability is not stored in the 
knowledgebase then it assumes that such vulnerability does not exist. In 
the cyber-security domain, new vulnerabilities can emerge at any time. It 
is also possible that vulnerabilities exist, but the analyst encoding the 
                                                 
1  The reference paper makes these statements about closed world databases. Here the term 
knowledgebase is used a general form of database. 
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information does not know about them. There are also known unknown 
attacks and vulnerabilities. Because of these reasons, it cannot be 
assumed that whatever information is not encoded is false. The 
knowledgebase should be able to store the cyber-security domain 
information without making any assumption about the completeness of 
the information. 
3.4.2 Attacker Behavior 
Automated cyber-security risk scenario generation should incorporate the attacker 
behavior driving these scenarios. This behavior is studied by empirical attacker behavior 
research and by attacker interviews. Examples of the attacker interviews are illustrated in 
Appendix I.   
This dissertation defines three core characteristics of attacker behavior as:  
1. The attacker treats the cyber-security breach as an intellectually stimulating 
problem to be solved.  
2. The method used in compromising a system is exploratory in nature and often 
does not follow a predetermined guideline. In other words, the attack is not 
necessarily a pre-planned activity.  
3. The attack goal may be determined or changed based on the information gathered 
during this exploratory phase. Here the goal refers to high-level direction or 
intention of the attacker. These goals are achieved by gathering the information 
about the system, and launching attacks based on the attacker’s motivation, 
strategy, preferences, and knowledge.  
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3.4.3 Expert Theory 
Cyber-security risk assessment is driven by expert theories about attacker behavior. 
This is in accordance with the prevalent cyber-security strategy termed as “think like the 
attacker”. An example of expert theory is illustrated in the following email instruction by 
the security office of a University 2, “The machine located at x.x.x.x has been having 
interesting IRC conversations with Romanians. We regard this behavior with deep 
suspicion and recommend you sanitize the machine and reinstall.” Expert theories can 
also be about software’s security behavior. For example, expert theory can be about how 
the design of software leads to vulnerabilities. 
Expert theories are often formed from observed evidence. These theories, once 
formed, are used by experts to explain the new observations and to make predictions. 
According to [76], a theory makes predictions about a wide range of evidence, including 
the evidence that played no role in the construction of the theory. This can lead to a wide 
variety of unexpected predictions. Consequently, some theories will accurately predict 
future events. On the other hand, some theories would be incorrect[76]. 
Current attack risk scenarios are generated by experts using their theories of attacker 
behavior. This output (in the form of risk scenarios) abstracts the expert’s attacker 
behavior theories, while summarizing only the actions that the attacker may take in the 
risk scenario. If the risk scenarios are generated without explicitly stated underlying 
theories, then the opportunity to validate and re-use accurate theories, or to update 
inaccurate theories is lost. 
                                                 
2 To protect the identity of the security team the name of the University is not mentioned here. 
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The automated risk scenario generation framework should be able to capture these 
expert theories (and assumptions behind these theories) explicitly for generating attack 
risk scenarios.  
3.4.4 Automation 
Given the scale of today’s technology infrastructure and its dynamicity, the cyber-
security risk scenario generation should be automated to generate timely and accurate 
scenarios. This automation requirement imposes the following sub-requirements on the 
cyber-security risk scenario generation framework.  
1. Completeness: The automated cyber-security risk scenario generation 
framework should calculate all possible ways the attacker goal can be 
achieved.  
2. Repeatability: The automated cyber-security risk scenario generation should 
produce repeatable output given the same input. 
3. Scalability: The automated framework should be scalable.   
4. Analyst dependence: The automated framework should have limited analyst 
(or expert) dependence. 
3.5 Risk Scenario Generation 
This section introduces the current and proposed cyber-security risk scenario 
generation frameworks.  
3.5.1 Current Focus of Risk Scenarios 
The primary focus of cyber-security risk management has been identification and 
mitigation of vulnerabilities in the system. Consequently, current risk scenario generation 
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mainly focuses on vulnerability identification. Often these scenarios are reduced to 
capturing only the presence of a single vulnerability and how it can be exploited.   
A large number of vulnerabilities currently exist, but new vulnerabilities can be 
discovered at any time, which requires continuously gathering information and updating 
the risk scenarios. 
The use of risk scenarios to identify the presence of vulnerabilities supports the 
current reactive strategy called “penetrate and patch”. This strategy suggests patching all 
vulnerabilities that are present in the system. According to [77], “At the 1998 Security 
and Privacy conference, a panel session discussed the advances in cyber-security 
technology over the last 25 years. One dramatic conclusion of the session was that the 
current state of the art in computer cyber-security was “penetrate and patch”.” A decade 
later, the situation is still the same.  
The challenge with penetrate and patch is that new types of vulnerabilities are 
continuously identified. As indicated in Chapter 2 and emphasized by a prominent cyber-
security vulnerabilities researcher [6], “it’s safe to say that there has not been a single 
category of vulnerabilities that has been definitively eradicated”. Due to the large number 
of available vulnerabilities and limited resources, it may not be possible to patch all 
vulnerabilities. This patching effort needs to be prioritized.  
The challenge of focusing only on presence of vulnerabilities is that according to 
attacker behavior research, it is not necessary that the attacker will exploit vulnerabilities 
just because they are available. The attacker behavior research indicates that the attacker 
may prefer a certain set of vulnerabilities or attacks over others [18, 19]. The attacker 
also may choose to discover a new vulnerability then to exploit existing vulnerabilities. In 
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order to prioritize the remediation efforts, it is important to understand and use this 
attacker behavior in the risk scenario generation. Understanding attacker behavior also 
allows development of new types of countermeasures utilizing this information. These 
countermeasures are called “behavior-driven” countermeasure. These countermeasures 
use the information about attacker behavior to lead the attacker away from the protected 
information. An example of this is described in Section 10.2.2.2.    
  Vulnerabilities form a critical part of cyber-security risk scenarios, but these 
scenarios also depend on the dynamic interaction between other opportunities provided 
by the system (for example, opportunity to fingerprint, or decompose the attack goal 
etc.), the attacker (or encoded attacker behavior in the form of goals, strategy and 
preferences), and tools available to discover and exploit these opportunities. This 
dissertation proposes a framework for automatically generating the risk scenarios by 
taking into consideration this dynamic interaction and the unique requirements of the 
cyber-security domain. Section 3.5.2 describes the current manual and automated 
methods for generating cyber-security risk scenarios and their limitations. Section 3.5.3 
introduces the proposed approach. 
3.5.2 Current Methods for Generating Cyber-security Risk Scenario 
Current cyber-security risk scenarios are either generated in the form of a tree (called 
attack tree), or graph (attack graph, privilege graph, or access graph). Attack trees[72] 
capture how the attack goal can be decomposed into different ways of achieving it. The 
attack graph captures how the attacker can exploit a series of vulnerabilities to gain 
restricted privilege on the target software system [1](or can circumvent a security feature 
of the software). The access graph and privilege graph are variations of the attack graphs. 
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This section introduces these methods and describes their limitation. The proposed 
framework overcomes the limitations of these methods.  
3.5.2.1 Attack Tree Generation  
Currently attack trees are generated manually by red-team. Attack trees [72] were 
introduced in 1999 by Bruce Schneier, a renowned name in cyber-security. These are 
conceptually similar to the fault tree and event tree used in engineering risk assessment. 
According to [72] - “Basically, you represent attacks against a system in a tree structure, 
with the goal as the root node and different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes.” 
The process of generating the attack tree follows this progression:  [72], “First, you 
identify the possible attack goals. Each goal forms a separate tree, although they might 
share sub-trees and nodes. Then, try to think of all attacks against each goal. Add them to 
the tree. Repeat this process down the tree until you are done. Give the tree to someone 
else, and have him think about the process and add any nodes he thinks of. Repeat as 
necessary, possibly over the course of several months. Of course there's always the 
chance that you forgot about an attack, but you'll get better with time. Like any security 
analysis, creating attack trees requires a certain mindset and takes practice.” 
This method of manual attack tree generation is widely used. An example of the 




Figure 5: Attack tree - graphical example 
The branches of the attack tree can also be annotated with boolean values such as 
possible or impossible, easy or difficult, expensive or inexpensive, intrusive or 
nonintrusive, legal or illegal, special equipment required versus no special equipment 
[72]. This annotation can be used for manual encoding of the attacker behavior (using 
binary variables) on the branches of the tree. 
The limitation of this manual approach is that its quality and completeness depend on 
the analyst’s skills. 
3.5.2.2 Vulnerability Graph (Attack Graph, Access Graph, or Privilege Graph) 
Generation 
Currently “attack graph”, “access graph” or “privilege graph” can be generated 
automatically or manually [1]. These graphs represent how the known vulnerabilities of a 
software system can be exploited in a sequence to take the system from a secure state to 
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an unsecure state. Unsecure state is defined as the system state in which software’s 
security feature is circumvented. Security features are implemented to make sure that the 
software cannot be attacked. Current attack graphs (and its variations) represent scenarios 
in which security features that prevent the attackers gaining restricted privileges are 
circumvented. In other words the goal of the attack graphs is to describe how an attacker 
may obtain  normally restricted privileges on one or more target hosts  [1].  Attack graphs 
(and its variations) reflect the software developer’s point of view, who would like to 
eliminate all known vulnerabilities, whose exploitation allows the attacker to gain 
restricted privileges. To avoid confusion between terminologies, these graphs are called 
“vulnerability graph” in this dissertation. 
Current vulnerability graph generation frameworks uses automated planning 
algorithm. Automated planning [78] is a branch of artificial intelligence and is defined as 
the task of coming up with a sequence of actions that will achieve a defined goal. 
Automated planning algorithm [79, 80] uses a system model and an action model as 
input. System model defines different states of the system. Action model encodes 
planning algorithm’s actions using pre-requisite, defined by the system state in which the 
action is applicable, and effects, defined by the system state after the execution of action. 
The planning algorithms search for series of applicable actions, whose execution achieves 
the planning goal. Typical pre-requisites of vulnerability graph generation framework’s 
actions are encoded using presence of vulnerabilities, connectivity between software 




Currently different vulnerability graph generation methods are available [1]. One of 
the primary differences (from risk scenario generation point of view) among the 
vulnerability graph generation methods is their algorithms. These algorithms search for 
applicable actions differently, or use different language to encode action’s pre-requisites 
and effects. These algorithms also have different scalability and complexity. Improving 
the scalability has been one of the primary focuses of current vulnerability graph research 
as shown in the Table 7 below. Some methods also generate the vulnerability graph 
manually by using the information about action pre-requisites and effects. Lippmann et al 
[1] describes a detailed review of current vulnerability graph generation methods. The 
major automated vulnerability graph generation methods are described in Table 7 below. 
Despite of these differences the current vulnerability graph generation methods have 
same limitations.   
Source Type of algorithm Description of algorithm 




According to [2], “Model checking is a technique for 
determining whether a formal model of a system satisfies a 
given property. If the property is false in the model, model 
checkers typically produce a single counterexample. The 
developer uses this counterexample to revise the model (or the 
property), which often means fixing a bug in the design of the 
system.” Sheyner’s algorithm [81, 82] uses the formal software 
system model to generate the attack graph representing all 






This approach is similar to [81, 82] but it produces only one 





Shortest path (near 
optimal) using 
matching algorithm 
Phillips and Swiler [84] generates near optimal shortest paths, 
by matching the information about attack templates 
(representing a generic attack step that includes necessary and 
acquired state attributes), the target configuration, and assumed 
attacker capabilities  (for example, attacker possessing a 
toolkit) [84]. The edges of the attack graph are weighted using 
some metric (for example, attacker effort or time to succeed). 
This weight has to be provided by the user[84]. The framework 




Uses combination of 
algorithms that 
includes a breadth 




This paper [85] introduces the monotonicity assumption. Under 
this assumption 1) the precondition of an exploit, once 
satisfied, never becomes unsatisfied and 2) the negation 
operator cannot used to express the precondition[85]. Simply 
put monotonicity assumes that the attacker never 
backtracks[85]. This algorithm improves the scalability (from 
exponential time to a polynomial time) [85], but adds the 
restrictive assumption of monotonicity. The algorithm assigns 
the pre-conditions to different layers using a breadth-first 
search algorithm[85]. Each layer is numbered indicating the 
number of exploits required to satisfy the pre-requisites. These 
pre-requisites are then marked with step number corresponding 








This paper[86] proposes an alternative way to represent the 
attack graph structure. This approach calculates the maximal 
level of penetration possible in terms of the maximum level of 
access that can be achieved by the attacker[86]. The edges 
between nodes represent maximum level of access. The 
downside of this approach is that analyst is not presented with 
complete information about possible damage and hence may 
make sub-optimal choices when “repairing” the network [86]. 
Jajodia et al 
[87] 
According to [1]  
uses algorithm 
described in [85] 
According to Lippmann et al [1], it is one of the most 
comprehensive tools for building and analyzing attack graphs. 
This tool requires input, about connectivity and presence of 





algorithm with depth 
to stop. 
The breadth first algorithm starts from initial state; it then 
searches for all the states that can be reached from this initial 
state. It continues searching all immediate neighboring states 
until the goal state is reached. Dawkins and Hale [88] used a 
breadth-first search approach, which stops after a given number 
of vulnerabilities have been exploited in sequence in each path 
[1, 88]. These paths are then analyzed to identify attack paths 
that end in specific top-level goals and to find the minimum 





Uses a recursive 
depth first search 
algorithm 
It describes the first version of the NetSPA (Network Security 
Planning Architecture) system. This approach computes the 
connectivity between all hosts using network topology 
information and firewall rules[1]. Attack graphs are built, using 
a depth limited forward chaining depth first search[1]. Unlike 
breadth first algorithm, depth first selects one of the states that 
can be reached from initial state; it then explores all the states 
one by one in this path as far as possible. If the goal state is not 
reached at end of exploration, it backtracks and repeats this 
search. Artz [89] [1] developed an attack definition language to 
encode the attacker actions used for generating the 
vulnerability graph. 
Dantu et al[90]  Manual generation of 
vulnerability graph 
Dantu et al [90] labels the output of the vulnerability graph 
using weighted attributes such as attacker skills, tenacity, cost 
etc. However, this information was not used as input for 
generating the vulnerability graph. Unlike proposed 
framework, this approach does not take into consideration the 
attacker’s exploratory nature, motivation, strategy, or thought 
processes. 
Dacier et al [91, 
92] 
Uses a tool called 
Automatic Security 
Advisor[91, 92]. 
Dacier et al [91, 92] refers to the attack graphs as “privilege 
graphs”. Dacier et al [91, 92]developed a tool called Automatic 
Security Advisor, to generate the privilege graphs for Unix 
operating system. The privilege graphs are converted to 
Markov chain corresponding to all possible successful attack 
scenarios[91, 92]. 
 Ortalo et al [1, 
93] 
Compares breadth-
first, depth-first, and 
shortest-path 
algorithms  
This paper describes how to use privilege graphs introduced by 
Dacier [91, 92], to describe the cyber-security of a UNIX host 
[1]. Three different models are discussed corresponding to 
three assumptions called SP, TM, and ML[1, 93]. SP assumes 
that the attacker chooses the shortest path leading to the target. 
In TM, all the possibilities of attacks are considered at each 
stage of the attack. In ML, the attacker chooses one of the 
attacks that can be executed from that node only. Ortalo et al 
[93] compares three different algorithms generating 
vulnerability graph probing 13 UNIX vulnerabilities over a 
period of 21 months. For this comparison, a four-level 
classification scale (0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001) was used to rate 
vulnerabilities as a measure of effort required to exploit the 
vulnerability. Ortalo et al [93] concludes that the security 
measure associated with TM cannot always be computed due 
to the complexity of the algorithm, the computation of the 
measure related to ML is easier, in SP the number of 
vulnerabilities and the number of paths are not sufficient to 
characterize the operational security evolution[93]. 




Li et al [94] uses an association rule-mining algorithm to 
generate attack graphs from historical intrusion detection 
system (IDS) alert database. This algorithm uses empirical 
rules [94] (identified from the IDS logs) such as “if x → y were 
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present in a given sequence, then z was present as well”, to 
generate the attack graph.  
Zhang et al [95] Backward search 
algorithm 
Zhang et al [95] uses a backward (reverse) search algorithm to 
generate the attack graph. 
Xiao et al [96] Uses an approach 
similar to the one 
described in 
Ammann et al [86] 
Xiao et al [96] uses an approach similar to Ammann et al [86]. 
The edge between nodes not only represents the highest access 
level available but also the weakest preconditions[96]. This 
algorithm takes the transitive preconditions between hosts into 
account when handling the transitive aspect of exploits.  
Lee et al [97] Proposes an approach 
to divide and merge 
attack graph 
Most of the practical attack graphs are large. Lee et al  [97] 
proposes dividing the attack graphs into manageable sub-
graphs for conducting analysis. 




Xie et al [98], constructs a two tiered attack graph framework, 
which includes a host access graph and sub-attack graphs. A 
sub-attack graph describes risk scenarios from one source host 
to one target host. The host access graph describes the 
attacker’s privilege transition among hosts. 




In this bidirectional attack graphs generation algorithm, 
forward search and backward search are executed 
simultaneously using multithreading [99].  
Table 7: Current Vulnerability Graph Generation Methods 
The limitations of vulnerability graph methods are described below. The proposed 
framework overcomes these limitations. 
1. Different Type of Goal: In the cyber-security domain, it is widely accepted that 
the main objective of the attacker is to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability of information. Current vulnerability graph methods do not capture 
how the attacker can achieve his/her goal of compromising the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of the information. Gaining restricted privilege (or 




2. Difficulty Capturing Dynamic Knowledge: Current automated vulnerability 
graph generation methods (using traditional database and planning algorithms) 
assume that encoded knowledge is complete. It assumes that there are no 
unknowns in the domain, everything is known a priori, and whatever is not 
currently encoded is false. This assumption is not valid in the cyber-security 
domain. When new knowledge is available or if current knowledge change, the 
vulnerability graph generation methods need to re-encode actions and re-execute 
the planning algorithm.  
3. Use of Limited Knowledge: Vulnerability tree are generated by using limited 
knowledge. This knowledge is primarily about the presence of vulnerability, 
connectivity (reachability) between software systems, attacker’s initial privileges, 
and the privileges gained by exploiting the vulnerabilities. In real life, the 
attacker (or red-team acting as attacker) uses diverse knowledge to generate the 
risk scenarios. This knowledge can be about the software characteristics (design, 
implementation, or usage), detailed as well as abstract reasoning about the 
connectivity between software systems, known as well as potential attacks and 
vulnerabilities, theories about attacks etc. For example, the attacker (or red-team) 
may use the knowledge about the software’s design to infer that the software may 
be vulnerable to attack even if no vulnerability has yet been discovered. The 
attacker (or read-team) also uses their attack theories to discover and exploit any 
opportunity provided by the system. The connectivity between software systems 
can also be of different types, which can be used differently to launch the attack. 
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This diverse knowledge is not used by current automated vulnerability graph 
generation frameworks.  
4. Lack of Consideration of Attacker Behavior: The vulnerability graph 
generation method describes how the known vulnerabilities may be exploited, 
but it does not capture why the attacker may exploit these vulnerabilities, apart 
from the fact that they are available. These methods do not consider attacker’s 
motivation, strategy, preferences, or attacker thought process for generating risk 
scenarios.   
Attacker may also execute observation actions to gain knowledge about the target 
of the attack. This act of observation is called “fingerprinting” in cyber-security 
domain. In current vulnerability graph generation method, attacker’s 
fingerprinting action is encoded as boolean pre-requisites [81] to attack actions 
requiring fingerprinting. This encoding is done using knowledge of the target 
network. For example, if the attack action is for targeting the system inside the 
network, then fingerprinting pre-requisite is added for executing this action. This 
however, makes the actions useful only for a specific target network. Hence, the 
attack actions needs to be re-encoded if the network architecture changes. In 
addition, the current vulnerability tree generation framework use the fact that the 
fingerprinting was done, but do not explicitly capture and use the knowledge that 
was discovered (because of the fingerprinting) in the developing the attack 
scenarios.  
The execution of an attack action can have more than one effect. For example, 
buffer overflow vulnerability can be used to gain access to the system as well as 
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to crash the program against which it is executed. Attacker may choose one of 
these effects based on his/her goal. The current vulnerability graph generation 
framework assumes that execution of this multi-effect action results in both of 
these effects [81, 82]. This may be counter-intuitive from the attacker’s 
viewpoint who would not be interested in crashing the system that he/she is 
trying to access. Hence, it is important to take into consideration the attacker’s 
motivation and goal for generating risk scenarios. 
5. Lack of Consideration of Expert Theories: Cyber-security experts are a major 
source of attacker behavior information. Currently, expert uses their theories 
about attacker’s thought process and preferences to generate the risk scenarios 
manually. Current automated risk scenario generation frameworks do not use 
these expert theories to generate the risk scenarios.  
  The limitations of current manual and automated risk scenario generation 
frameworks are alleviated by the proposed framework described in next section.  
3.5.3 Proposed Cyber-security Risk Scenario Generation Framework 
This section introduces the proposed framework for generating cyber-security risk 
scenarios. The difference between the proposed framework and current risk scenario 
generation frameworks are: 
1. Goal of Compromising Information: It is widely accepted that the main 
objective of the attacker is to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of information. Unlike current vulnerability graph generation 
methods, the proposed framework’s risk scenarios describes all possible ways the 
attacker can compromise this confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
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information. It is important to note that the proposed framework is not limited to 
generating risk scenarios only for these goals. New types of intentional goals can 
be also be modeled using the proposed framework if needed. 
2. Captures Domain Dynamicity: The proposed framework does not assume that 
encoded knowledge is complete. It assumes that there are unknowns in the cyber-
security domain, and new knowledge is available frequently.  
This dissertation develops a new planning framework for generating the cyber-
security risk scenarios. This planning framework is divided into two components, 
the distributed logic, and the centralized algorithms. 
Instead of relying on traditional planning algorithms to search for applicable 
actions, the proposed framework uses a mathematical logic to instantly 
accommodate dynamic information. In the proposed framework, attacker goals 
are dynamically decomposed into situation specific attack sub-goals and actions. 
In this approach, the mathematical logic attempts to classify the knowledge (about 
software systems, attacks, vulnerabilities etc.), as it becomes available, into 
logical sets representing situation specific attack sub-goals and actions. This 
classification is done by using a series of logical inferences. Each inference adds 
more knowledge that can be used for classifying attack sub-goals and actions. In 
this dissertation, whenever the classified or inferred knowledge can be used for 
generating the risk scenarios, it (the knowledge) is considered triggered. This 




Given this distributed logic, the role of the centralized planning algorithm in 
proposed framework is changed to:  
a. Providing the information about attacker’s decisions (for example, 
selected goal and sub-goal), to the distributed logic that triggers the 
classification and inferences. 
b. Querying the triggered information (for example attack sub-goals and 
attacker actions) from distributed logic for graphically displaying the 
output. The order of this query is determined in real time by using the 
encoded attacker preferences and attacker’s situational decision points. 
c. Building the attacker’s knowledge state for generating risk scenarios. This 
knowledge state is used to control the knowledge that can be triggered by 
the distributed planning logic.  
3. Uses Diverse Knowledge: The proposed framework uses diverse knowledge (for 
example, the software’s use, the software’s design leading to potential 
vulnerabilities, availability of known vulnerabilities and attacks, the attacker 
behavior etc.) to generate risk scenarios. This knowledge can be generated by 
sources dispersed in time and space.  
4. Captures the Attacker Behavior: The proposed framework encodes the attacker 
thought process for decomposing goals, and discovering and exploiting 
opportunities provided by the target environment. The proposed framework also 
captures the attacker’s motivation, strategy, and preferences.  
In accordance with the attacker’s exploratory nature, the proposed framework 
assumes that the attacker may discover knowledge during the attack process. This 
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knowledge discovery not only guides the risk scenario but it also may change 
attacker’s initial goal. The type of knowledge discovered depends on the type of 
fingerprinting actions used by the attacker, and the location (in the target network) 
from which they are made. The proposed framework captures and uses the 
knowledge discovered because of fingerprinting for generating the risk scenario. 
The proposed framework uses attacker behavior, attack goal, attacker’s state of 
knowledge and decisions, to determine what fingerprinting actions the attacker 
may take. The proposed framework builds and uses the attacker’s knowledge state 
for generating the attack scenarios.  
5. Uses Expert Theories: The proposed framework also uses the red-team’s expert 
theories about attacker behavior (for example, attacker’s thought process, 
preferences etc.) for generating the risk scenarios. The proposed framework also 
supports validation and calibration of expert theories. 
The proposed framework generates two types of graphical outputs in the form of 
attack trees, and attack scenarios.  
1. Attack Tree:  Attack tree represents all possible ways the attacker’s goal can be 
achieved. The attack tree shows the goal, the decomposed sub-goals, and the 
executable attacks exploiting vulnerabilities that can accomplish these goals and 
sub-goals.  
2. Attack-scenario: The attacker may not act in the sequential order described in the 
attack tree, and may backtrack, abandon the scenario, or change the goals in 
accordance with the available opportunities. The attacker also has to acquire 
knowledge about the system in order to compromise it. This sequence of actual 
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steps taken by the attacker (or red-team acting as attacker) is called attack-
scenario in this dissertation. 
The proposed framework’s design is described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5-7 describes 
the implementation of this distributed logic and centralized algorithm. The modes of 
operations are explained further in Chapter 8. The manual and automated cyber-security 
risk scenario generation frameworks are compared using a case study in Chapter 9.
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4 Proposed Framework  
The current vulnerability graph generation framework uses traditional automated 
planning framework. The proposed framework is designed by combining the traditional 
automated planning framework, and a theory of human actions called “situated 
action”[100, 101].  
This chapter describes the design of the proposed framework. It also compares the 
proposed framework’s design with vulnerability graph generation frameworks that uses 
the traditional planning framework. This description and comparison is done by 
developing a conceptual planning framework, described in the next section.  
4.1 Conceptual Planning Framework 
The conceptual planning framework describes a generalized planning process and 
factors influencing the process. It provides a conceptual template for understanding how 
and what factors influence the functionality and design of the planning framework. The 
purpose of developing this conceptual planning framework is to describe why traditional 
planning frameworks, which include the current automated vulnerability graph generation 
frameworks, cannot be used directly to fulfill the cyber-security domain requirements. 
The conceptual planning framework is shown in Figure 6 below. Eight factors 
influence how a planning algorithm may generate the desired plan. In the context of 
automated planning terminology, the cyber-security risk scenario is the plan to be 
generated. To be consistent with the terminology of automated planning, the attack plan 
is used interchangeably to refer to cyber-security risk scenario when appropriate.  




Figure 6 Concepual planning framework 
In this conceptual framework, planning is described as a three-stage process. The 
stages are input characterization, planning, and output generation. The eight factors either 
participate in or influence these stages. The planning algorithm is the core of the 
framework that takes the system model, goal, and action model as inputs and generates 
the plans as output. The domain knowledge, dynamicity, and planning philosophy 
influence the way the inputs are encoded, and the way the planning algorithm uses these 
inputs. Finally, the planning framework classification and plan criticality influence the 






Figure 7: Conceptual framework factors  
The eight factors are used to compare the proposed planning framework to the 
traditional planning framework and a theory of human action. This comparison is done 
using a spider chart. The template of the spider chart is as shown in Figure 7 above. The 
factors of the conceptual planning framework form the axis of the spider chart.  
4.1.1 Goals 
The definition and dynamicity of the goals can be used to differentiate the planning 
frameworks. There are two types of goals: well-defined and undefined. Well-defined 
goals can be further divided in static and dynamic goals.  
1. Static Well-Defined Goals: The goals in this dissertation are considered static 
well-defined if they are well-defined, and they remain constant throughout the 
plan generation process. Here well-defined means that the goals provide clear 
understanding to the planning agent (human or machine) about how to possibly 
achieve them, and provide clear success criteria to determine if they are achieved.  
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2. Dynamic Well-Defined Goals: These goals are also well-defined goals, but they 
may change based on the information and opportunities encountered during the 
plan generation process.  
3. Undefined Goals: The undefined goals are not clear or do not provide clear 
success criteria to the planning agent (human or machine).  
The design of the planning algorithm is influenced by how the well-defined goals are 
encoded. This is explained by the system model encoding described in next section.  
4.1.2 System Model 
The majority of the planning frameworks are designed to perform a task (or to carry 
out an action). This task is defined and executed within the boundaries of the system. The 
major distinguishing aspects of the planning framework include how this system is 
represented computationally, and the amount of knowledge and effort required to create 
this system model.   
1. Stateful System: Traditional planning frameworks represent the system to be 
stateful (i.e., the system at any point in time can be described by a pre-defined 
state). Subsequently, the system behavior is modeled by a state transition system. 
In most cases, the planning goal is defined in terms of the state the system should 
reach after the plan is executed [80]. The traditional planning algorithm identifies 
which actions can be executed in what system state to achieve the planning goal 
[80]. The planning algorithm functions by searching for a path in a graph 
representing all possible states of the system. This presentation of all states of the 
system is called the search space of the algorithm. In case of a planning algorithm 
called the Hierarchical Task Network (HTN) [80] the goal is to perform tasks  . 
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Both the HTN algorithm and the proposed framework use the concept of 
hierarchical task analysis. In hierarchical task analysis, tasks are systematically 
decomposed into sub-tasks.   
2. Logical Model:  This model encodes the characteristics of the system using 
logical statements. For example, instead of encoding that the system is in a 
vulnerable state, it encodes the logic behind why the system may be in a 
vulnerable state.    
4.1.3 Action Model 
The action model defines how the actions are represented in the planning framework.  
1. Plan-driven Action: Traditionally, execution of actions leads to the system 
changing state. The role of the planning algorithm in this case is to search for 
applicable actions in each state that achieves favorable state transitions in order to 
accomplish the planning goal. The planning algorithm selects the action based on 
its applicability in the current state and its potential effects. Hence, the 
prerequisite for selecting the actions describes the system state in which they are 
applicable, and the effects describe the state the system will be in after action 
execution[79]. In traditional planning, the plan determines the sequence of actions 
to be taken.  
2. Situated Actions: A theory of human actions, known as “situated action” [102-
104]or “situated cognition”[105], suggests that all actions are ad-hoc and driven 
purely by the situation. According to this theory, the plan only weakly 
summarizes these actions [102-104]. 
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3. Opportunistic Actions: In the proposed framework, the attacker actions are 
described as opportunistic actions. This has the goal-driven characteristics of 
traditional planning framework and the situational aspect of the situated action 
theory.  
4.1.4 Planning Philosophy   
1. Tracking System States: Traditionally the system is considered stateful and is 
represented by a state transition model[80]. The objective of planning in this case 
is to track the system moving from state to state, and to determine which actions 
may be applicable in what state to achieve the planning goal. Modeling and 
tracking the system is called system-centric planning approach in this dissertation. 
2. Situational Planning: Modeling and tracking a system becomes a difficult 
problem in dynamic domains, where the system configuration changes frequently. 
The proposed framework uses situational planning. The proposed framework is 
not system-centric (i.e., it does not model or track the system states); it is attacker-
centric. The proposed framework encodes the logic behind what opportunities 
could be available due to dynamicity of the system, and the attacker thought 
process in perceiving and exploiting these opportunities. The plan in this case is 
the outcome of the attack situation, described by the dynamic interaction between 
the available opportunities, the attacker (or encoded attacker behavior in the form 
of goals, strategy and preferences), and the tools available to discover and exploit 
the opportunities. The attack situation (or plan) is built by emulating the attacker’s 
interaction with the target network. This is in accordance with the “situated 
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action”[102, 103] and “situated cognition”[105, 106] theory described in Section 
4.2.1.2. 
4.1.5 Planning Framework Classification  
The planning framework can be classified based what type of knowledge is used in 
the planning, and if planning framework observes the actual system states in order to 
execute the plans. 
4.1.5.1 Classification Based on Domain Knowledge Encoding 
Planning frameworks can be classified as domain-specific, domain-independent or 
domain-configurable[80].  
1. Domain-Independent Planning: The goal of domain-independent planning 
research is to create a general-purpose planning algorithm that is applicable to all 
planning domains. According to [80], “For nearly the entire time that automated 
planning has existed, it has been dominated by the research on domain independent 
planning.” To reduce the difficulty in devising a domain-independent planning 
framework that works well in all domains, most research assumes the system to be 
deterministic, static, and finite[80]. They also assumed that the planning framework 
has complete knowledge about the system[80], the goal is only specified as an 
explicit goal state, the plan contains a linearly ordered finite sequence of actions, and 
the actions have no durations. The planning algorithm in this case is not concerned 
with any change that may occur in the system while it is planning [80].  
2. Domain-Specific and Domain-Configurable Planning: Traditionally, states 
of the system are represented as search space, and planning is achieved by searching 
for a path in this space. The domain-specific and domain-configurable planning 
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frameworks use the knowledge about the domain to constraint the search to a small 
part of this search space [80]. This makes the planning algorithm more efficient and 
faster. In the domain-specific planning framework, domain knowledge is encoded in 
the planning algorithm [80]. In the domain-configurable planning framework, 
domain knowledge is taken as separate input[80].  
4.1.5.2 Classification Based on Ability to Observe the System 
This classification is based on how the planning framework’s ability to observe the 
system for executing the computed plans. 
1. Offline Planning Framework: The planning framework can be considered 
offline if it generates the plan using a formal model of the system, the initial state 
and the goal, and does not observe the actual system [78, 80]. Observing the 
system may be necessary because most of the time there are difference between 
the system model and the actual physical system it represents[78, 80]. 
2. Online Planning Framework: An online planning framework observes the 
system in order to identify the difference between the assumed (using a formal 
model) system state and the actual system state[78, 80]. If this difference is large, 
then corrective actions are taken or re-planning is done to get back to the original 
plan. The online planning framework observes the system, and updates the plan 
using an online controller and a scheduler mechanism with the planning 
algorithm[78, 80]. These controller and scheduler mechanisms add additional 
functional requirements to the planning algorithm.   
3. Real-Time Planning Framework: In this dissertation, a real time planning 
framework is described as a framework that can use real-time information about 
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the system to generate the plans. Instead of updating a plan generated by the 
offline planning framework using a formal system model, the real-time planning 
framework can generate the original plan itself using the information collected by 
observing the system. The proposed framework can generate plan using real-time 
planning and can also collect and use the information about the actions and 
system changes in real-time.  
4.1.6 Knowledge  
The domain can be knowledge-lean or knowledge-intensive. The effort and time 
required to develop the system model, the action model, and the planning algorithms are 
impacted by the knowledge requirements of the domain.   
1. Knowledge-Lean Domain: The domain is knowledge-lean if information 
required to generate the plan is limited and known a priori. This means that the 
information needed to generate the system model, state-transition tables and 
action models is known a priori. The knowledge-lean domain also assumes that 
this information, once encoded, does not change. This assumption holds true in 
static domains, in which the information does not change frequently. 
This is similar to the concept of the knowledge-lean problems described in 
context of problem solving. According to [106], “Most problems people face in 
daily life are not like knowledge-lean problems in which all relevant aspects of 
each problem can be given in a compact problem statement.” 
2. Knowledge Intensive Domain: The knowledge-intensive domain is defined as a 
domain in which the amount of information needed to generate the plan is not 
limited, and may not be available a priori. This requires acquisition of at least 
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some part of information during the planning. According to [80], the problem of 
knowledge acquisition is one of the most important but least appreciated problems 
in automated planning research.  According to [80], if there were good ways to 
acquire domain knowledge, planning frameworks could be much more useful for 
solving real-world problems.  This problem is further intensified in dynamic 
domains. In the knowledge-intensive planning framework, the information 
acquired during planning (in real-time) should be used for generating the plan.    
The concept of knowledge-intensive domain is adapted from the concept of the 
“knowledge-rich cognition” used for problem solving described in [106]. 
According to this [106] experts have extensive (rich) knowledge that can be used 
for problem solving. This is described as [106] , “Experts know a lot about their 
domains. Even if they cannot articulate their knowledge, they have built up 
methods for achieving their goals, dealing with hassles and breakdowns, finding 
workarounds, and more to make them effective at their tasks.” 
In summary, in the static knowledge-lean domain, the information about the system 
and the planning problem can be acquired in advance. However, in the case of the 
dynamic knowledge-intensive domain, at least some of the information acquisition has to 
occur in real time. The cyber-security domain is a dynamic knowledge-intensive domain.  
4.1.7 Dynamicity    
Section 4.1.6 described the domain from the point of view of amount of knowledge 
required to generate the plan, and if this knowledge is available a priori. Domain-
dynamicity influences the knowledge requirement of the domain. It is described by the 
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rate at which the knowledge about the system changes. It may be a reason why this 
knowledge in the knowledge-intensive domains may not be available a priori.  
1. Static Domain: In a static domain, the information needed to generate the plan 
remains static or does not change often. This allows encoding the system and 
action model a priori. 
2. Dynamic Domain:  In a dynamic domain, the information needed to generate a 
plan changes dynamically. New information relevant for planning may be 
generated frequently. This requires updating the system and action model 
correspondingly.  
4.1.8 Application of Planning for Critical Domain 
Unlike the seven factors described above, this factor is not shown on the spider 
diagram. It compares types of application of planning frameworks and not framework 
characteristics. However, it is addressed in this section because this application of 
planning frameworks influences the way the planning algorithm is designed or 
implemented. 
If the planning framework is used to generate a plan for time- or mission-critical 
operations, then it must generate the most effective plan, often in the first attempt. This 
would in turn require a priori preparation, which includes creating accurate system and 
action models. In this case, the planning framework may not be able to backtrack or 
change the course of action during the plan execution without a significant impact.  
In the cyber-security domain, the attacker often learns about the system on the go 
and has the option to backtrack and try different actions to accomplish the goal. This is 
the most commonly observed behavior of the attacker. Note that the attacker may also 
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pre-plan the attack, and may have the ability to fingerprint the system completely a priori. 
This type of attacker behavior can be incorporated as a special case of learn-as-you-go 
attacker behavior. 
4.2  Comparison of Planning Architectures 
The proposed planning architecture is compared with the traditional planning 
framework and a theory of human action using the spider diagram as shown in Figure 8. 
In this Figure, the traditional framework is shown in yellow, the proposed planning 
framework in red and situated action theory in green. 
 
 
Figure 8: Comparision of planning frameworks 
4.2.1.1 Traditional Planning 
The traditional planning framework characteristics were introduced with the 
description of the conceptual planning framework. Nearly all of the computational 
automated planning frameworks, including current vulnerability graph generation 
frameworks, are grouped together under this classification in this dissertation.   
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The planning frameworks within this classification vary considerably, but at an 
abstract level, they share the same characteristics described in this section. 
1. Static Defined Goals: Traditional planning frameworks have static, well-defined 
goals. Majority of goals are defined by a system state called goal-state [80]. The 
system should reach the goal-state after execution of all planned actions. In a type 
of domain-configurable planning algorithm called Hierarchical Task Network 
(HTN) the goal is to perform tasks[80].  
2. Tracking System State, Planning Philosophy: One of the main distinguishing 
factors among the planning frameworks is the planning philosophy. The 
traditional planning philosophy is to track the evolution of a system in the form of 
system states using a state transition model. The role of the planning algorithm is 
to determine which action can be executed in what state to achieve the desired 
outcome[80].  
3. Planning Framework Classification: The traditional planning framework 
generates the plan in offline mode or online mode[80]. The online planning 
framework observes the system to identify the difference between the assumed 
(using formal model) system state and the actual system state, and take corrective 
actions if this difference is large. The online planning framework observes the 
system by using a controller and a scheduler mechanism with the planning 
algorithm[80]. The planning framework can be domain specific, domain 
configurable, or domain independent[80].  
4. Stateful System and Plan Driven Action Model: The system is modeled as a 
stateful system and the actions are defined in terms of preconditions and effect. 
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Actions are applicable in states in which their pre-conditions are satisfied. The 
effect is defined in terms of the state that the system will be in after execution of 
the actions. 
5. Static and Knowledge-lean domain: The planning algorithm takes as input the 
system and action models, which are designed prior to planning. This requires 
acquiring the knowledge about the system a priori. According to [80], “In most 
automated planning research the information available is assumed to be static, and 
the planning framework starts with all of the information it needs.”  
4.2.1.2 Situated Action   
In contrast to traditional planning, situated cognition does not provide a 
computational planning method but suggests a theory of human actions. According to this 
theory, human actions are not necessarily driven by a preconceived plan [102-104]. This 
concept is presented under different names such as “Situated Action” [102-104] or 
“Situated Cognition”[105].  
According to[106], situated cognition does not have a theory of problem solving to 
compete with the classical view, “It offers no computational, neuropsychological, or 
mathematical account of internal processes underlying the problem cognition. Nor does it 
explain the nature of the control of external process related to problem solving." It further 
suggests that [106], “Each problem is tied to a concrete setting and is resolved by 




1. Situated Action Model: According to situated action theory [102-104], actions 
are situated (i.e., they are taken in context of particular, concrete circumstance) 
and situated actions are essentially ad-hoc.  
This theory [102-104] suggests that the plans are best viewed as a weak resource 
for what is primarily ad hoc activity. It is only when human agents are pressed to 
account for the rationality of their actions that they invoke the guidance of a plan 
[102-104]. According to this theory [102-104], the plans when formed in advance 
are vague, as they do not take into consideration the unforeseeable contingencies 
of particular situations. These plans when reconstructed in retrospect 
systematically filter out precisely the details that characterize situated actions in 
favor of those aspects of the actions that  can be seen to accord with the plan 
[102-104]. 
2. Dynamic and Knowledge-intensive Domain: According to [102-104], advance 
planning is inversely related to prior knowledge of the environment and the 
conditions that the environment is likely to present.   
Human actions behave in accordance with the situated cognition theory because 
the circumstances around human agents are continuously changing and are never 
fully anticipated [102-104]. Consequently, the actions, although systematic, are 
never planned in a strong sense. 
The current major implementations of situated action theory are two games. These 
are called ‘Pengi’ [107] and ‘Sonja’ [108]. In these games, the agent (for example, a 
Penguin called Pengi or an Indian called Sonja) perceives the situation of the game (for 
example, a bee coming towards the Penguin or a monster attacking the Indian) and 
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chooses the encoded situated actions (for example, run away from Bee, kill the monster 
etc.). The proposed framework uses the concept of deictic representation described in 
[109]. According to [109], “Deictic representations represent things in terms of their 
relationship with the agent.” The proposed framework uses this representation to label the 
goals and sub-goals. 
4.2.1.3 Proposed Framework 
This section describes characteristics of the proposed planning framework. 
As mentioned in Section 3.4.2, a cyber-security attack is an exploratory technique 
and is not necessarily a preplanned activity. Attacker behavior is more in accordance with 
the situated action theory. To capture this attacker behavior, the definition of planning in 
this dissertation is a combination of both the traditional planning framework and the 
situated action theory, but draws more from the later. 
The objective of this dissertation is not to propose a hybrid planning theory or a 
general-purpose planning theory, but to develop a domain specific framework that is best 
suited for cyber-security risk scenario generation.  
1. Dynamic Well-defined Goals: In the proposed planning framework, the goals 
are well-defined and dynamic in nature. This framework defines two types of 
goals, intentional goals, and situational sub-goals. The high-level attacker 
objectives are defined as intentional goals. The situational sub-goals can be 
accomplished to achieve the intentional goals. These sub-goals are called 
situational because achieving them depends on 1) contextual information of the 
intentional goal, 2) available opportunities, 3) attacker behavior, and 4) tools 
available to the attacker.  
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Once the high-level intentional goals are identified, the situational sub-goals are 
characterized by the cognitive tasks that the attacker may need to carry out to 
achieve the intentional goals. These are called cognitive domain specific tasks (or 
sub-goals) in this dissertation. The opportunities provided by the system and 
attacker behavior further constrain the availability of cognitive domain specific 
tasks. The searching for opportunities itself is characterized as a situational sub-
goal.  
These situational sub-goals, however, may also change the high-level intentional 
goals of the attacker. This may occur in the following scenarios:  
a. If there are no opportunities available to accomplish the goals and sub-
goals given the attacker’s knowledge state. 
b.  If the available opportunities may enable accomplishment of a goal 
deemed not possible before. 
c. If the actions taken to accomplish the goal fail. 
d. The available opportunities may enable accomplishment of another goal 
generating higher utility for the attacker.  
2. Opportunistic Actions: The attacker actions in the proposed framework are 
opportunistic in nature. Opportunistic actions are taken by the attacker to 
accomplish the sub-goals and goals, and are dependent on the opportunities 
available in the system.  
Opportunities exist at multiple levels. There may be opportunities to decompose 
the goal into sub-goals, to fingerprint the system, to discover new vulnerabilities 
and/or attacks, to exploit existing vulnerabilities, etc.  
86 
 
These opportunities themselves are discovered by executing fingerprinting sub-
goals. Fingerprinting of the current environment triggers 1) decomposition of 
intentional goals and situational sub-goals, and 2) the availability of attack actions 
to accomplish situational sub-goals or intentional goal. The fingerprinting sub-
goals themselves are triggered based on, the attacker behavior, attacker’s 
decisions (for example selection of goals and sub-goals) and attacker’s knowledge 
state (i.e., different fingerprinting actions may be used to collect information 
about different goals and sub-goals).   
3. Planning Philosophy - Situational Modeling: The traditional planning 
framework tracks the system states, and selects the actions that can be executed in 
these states to guide the system toward the goal state. The actions and system 
models are assumed to remain static and are encoded a priori. This assumption is 
not valid in cyber-security domain.   
The proposed framework neither tracks nor models the system evolution using a 
state transition model. Plans in the proposed framework are driven by attack 
situation, characterized by the dynamic interaction between the opportunities, the 
attacker (or encoded attacker behavior – goals, strategy and preferences), and the 
tools available to discover and exploit these opportunities. The main objective of 
the proposed planning framework is to 1) encode the opportunities provided by 
the system, 2) the attacker thought processes in decomposing goals, and 
discovering and exploiting these opportunities, 3) attacker preferences and 
strategies, and 4) the available attacks. Once encoded, this knowledge is used in 
logical reasoning to generate the attack plans given the situation. In summary, the 
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objective is to emulate the attacker behavior by mimicking how the attacker 
interacts with the target environment. This is in accordance with the “situated 
action”[102, 103] and “situated cognition”[105, 106] theory. 
4. Logical System Model: The system is modeled in the form of logical sets of 
domain objects and sets of relations between these objects. These domain objects 
and the relationships between them are encoded as logical statements.  
The logic encoded in the proposed framework is more detailed (or at a lower level 
of abstraction) than describing the states of the system. For example, instead of 
encoding that the system is in a vulnerable state, it encodes the logic behind why 
the system may be in a vulnerable state. The proposed framework uses a 
knowledgebase that can capture this type of logic. This is discussed in detail in 
Section 4.3. 
5. Dynamic and Knowledge-Intensive Domain: The cyber-security domain is an 
inherently dynamic and knowledge-intensive domain. This domain dynamicity is 
captured by 1) making the knowledgebase, used to capture domain logic, dynamic 
(i.e., capable of encoding new information when it becomes available), and 2) 
designing the planning algorithm to function with the assumption that information 
may be incomplete or changing.  
6. Planning Framework Classification: This section describes how the proposed 
planning framework is classified. 
a. Domain-Specific Planning Framework: The proposed framework can be 
considered a domain-specific planning framework, as it uses the logical 
encoding of the cyber-security domain for generating attack plans. 
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However, it does not use the state transition model and therefore does not 
use the domain information to reduce the search space of the planning 
algorithm.  
b. Offline or Real-time Planning Framework: The plans are generated 
using information about the system. This information can be pre-recorded 
or can be generated in real-time. The proposed framework can work in 
offline or real-time mode. 
4.3 Proposed Planning Framework 
Section 4.2.1.3 introduced the proposed planning framework using the conceptual 
planning framework elements. This section explains these elements in detail. 
4.3.1 Goals 
There are two types of goals in the proposed framework, intentional goals and 
situational sub-goals. Intentional goals represent high-level attacker objectives, and 
situational sub-goals represent the goals that must be accomplished in order to achieve 
intentional goals.  
4.3.1.1 Intentional Goals 
In the cyber-security domain, it is widely accepted that the main objective of the 
attacker is to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information. 
Correspondingly, the objective of the defender is to protect the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of the information. Security guidelines such as the NIST 800 series 
guidance  [67, 68], and regulations [69, 70] are based on this basic principle often called 
the “CIA principle”. In accordance with this, possible high-level attacker intentional 
goals in this dissertation are characterized as “information to be leaked”, “information to 
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be corrupted”, and “information to be made unavailable”. It is important to note that even 
though the intentional goals are currently characterized using the CIA principle, the 
framework is not limited to these goals. New types of intentional goals can be modeled 
using the proposed framework’s logic if needed. 
4.3.1.2 Situational Sub-Goal 
The situational sub-goals are driven by the cognitive domain-specific tasks the 
attacker has to execute to accomplish high-level intentional goals. The “cognitive task” 
aspect captures the attacker thought processes as they relate to compromising the system. 
These tasks are “domain-specific” because they are guided by the opportunities available 
in the cyber-security domain under consideration. There are three types of cognitive 
domain specific tasks. Similar to the intentional goals new types of situational sub-goals 
can be modeled using the proposed framework’s logic if needed. 
Exploit Functionality  
The high-level objective of the attacker is to compromise the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the information. This “information to be compromised” is 
stored in some place, transmitted using some mechanism, and is potentially processed by 
some entity. These represent the available opportunities (to compromise the information) 
and become the logical choices for the attack. These opportunities represent the potential 
situational sub-goals. Examples of situational sub-goals are “location to which access is 
needed”, “process to be hijacked”, and “transmission to be captured”. These situational 
sub-goals have a functional relation with the goal “information to be compromised”. 
Therefore, they are called cognitive domain specific tasks to exploit functionality.  
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This dissertation uses the concept of the deictic representations described in [109] to 
label the goals and sub-goals. In deictic representations entities are described in terms of 
their relationship to the agent [109]. An example of this is “the-cup-I-am-drinking-from” 
[109]. This dissertation uses this concept of deictic representations to label the 
relationship of entities to the attacker goal. For example, a sub-goal of the attacker can be 
“location to which access is needed”, which may be storing some “information to be 
compromised”.  
Exploit Connectivity 
The software system storing, processing, and transmitting information are connected 
to each other using different connection mechanisms. These connections further provide 
an opportunity for launching attacks. The connected entities, by virtue of their 
connection, become potential situational sub-goals of the attacker. In this dissertation, 
these are called cognitive domain specific tasks to exploit connectivity.  
Exploit Attributes 
Finally, these software systems (storage location, processing applications, or 
transmission mechanism) also have their own characteristics. For example, if the storage 
location is encrypted, then “decrypt information” becomes the logical situational sub-
goal. In this dissertation, these are called cognitive domain specific tasks to exploit 
attributes. 
4.3.2 Planning Philosophy 
The proposed framework neither tracks nor models the system evolution using a 
state transition model. Plans in the proposed framework are driven by attack situation, 
characterized by the dynamic interaction between the opportunities, the attacker (or 
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encoded attacker behavior in the form of goals, strategy and preferences), and the tools 
available to discover and exploit these opportunities. The main objective of the proposed 
planning framework is to encode 1) the opportunities provided by the system, 2) the 
attacker thought processes in decomposing goals, and discovering and exploiting these 
opportunities, 3) attacker preferences and strategies, and 4) the available attacks. Once 
encoded, this knowledge is used in logical reasoning to generate the attack plans given 
the situation.  
The proposed framework, instead of relying on traditional planning algorithms to 
search for applicable actions, uses a distributed planning logic to instantly accommodate 
dynamic information. 
The distributed planning logic is designed to emulate the attacker thought processes 
for decomposing goals (and sub-goals), and discovering and exploiting opportunities 
provided by the system. The distributed logic attempts to classify the available system 
information and threat information into logical sets representing attacker’s goals, sub-
goals and actions. This classification is done by using a series of logical inferences. Each 
inference adds more knowledge that can be used for classifying sub-goals and actions. In 
this dissertation, whenever the classified or inferred knowledge becomes useful for 
generating the risk scenarios, it is considered triggered.  
The centralized planning algorithm in the proposed framework:  
1. Provides the information about attacker’s decisions (selected goal, sub-goals, and 
actions) to the distributed logic, which triggers the classification and inferences. 
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2. Queries the triggered information from the distributed logic for graphically 
displaying the output. The order of this query is determined in real time by using 
the encoded attacker preferences and attacker’s situational decision points. 
3. Builds the attacker’s knowledge state, which is used to control the knowledge that 
can be triggered by the distributed planning logic. 
4.3.3 Knowledge Representation 
Cyber-security is a knowledge-intensive domain. A large amount of knowledge may 
be required to generate the risk scenarios, and this knowledge may not be available a 
priori. This requires capturing and using knowledge dynamically while generating the 
attack plans. This section introduces the knowledge representation language used to 
encode the cyber-security domain knowledge in this dissertation. The distributed logic is 
also designed using this knowledge representation language. 
The proposed framework uses mathematical logic language to represent the cyber-
security domain knowledge. The knowledge representation technique used in the 
proposed framework is called ontology , and the mathematical logic language is called 
Web Ontology Language (OWL) [110].  
In this knowledge representation language, the domain knowledge is encoded as 
machine and human understandable logical statements. Logical reasoning, using the 
encoded logic statements, allows classifying the information relevant for attack plan 
generation.   
4.3.3.1 Knowledge Representation Language 
This section briefly introduces the OWL language used to encode the cyber-security 
domain knowledge. A detailed overview of the language is described in [110, 111]. This 
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section explains how the information can be encoded as the logical constructs of this 
language. These constructs are described below. 
Individuals 
Individuals are the basic element of this logical language and they represent objects 
of the cyber-security domain. According to [110, 111], individuals can be referred to as 





Figure 9:  Example individuals 
Properties   
According to [110, 111], properties represent the relations between the individuals. 
For example, the property ‘isStoredIn’3  links the individual ‘Tradesecret’ to the 
individual ‘MySQLServer’4. Properties may have inverse properties[110, 111]; for 
example, ‘stores’ can be defined as the inverse property of ‘isStoredIn’.  
 
 
                                                 
3The properties in this dissertation are written using italic fonts. 







Figure 10: Example properties 
Properties with a single value are called functional properties[110, 111]. Properties 
can also be transitive or symmetric [110, 111]. A property chain can also be created by 
combining two properties together [112]. For example, if an attack called Attack A 
targets a web server called IIS Server (encoded as Attack A attackHasTarget 
IISServer), and the IIS Server is hosted on Windows Server (encoded as IISServer 
isHostedOn WindowsServer), then it can be inferred that the Windows Server is the host 
of Attack A’s target (shown as Attack A hostOfAttackTarget WindowsServer). This is 
done by defining property hostOfAttackTarget as the chain linking properties 
attackHasTarget and isHostedOn. 
 





Classes are logical sets of individuals [110, 111]. They describe a collection of 
similar types of individuals. An individual can be manually assigned to a class, or its 
membership in class can be inferred by defining the criteria under which an individual 
becomes a member of a class [110, 111].   
An example of manual assignment of individuals to classes is shown below.  
 









Figure 13: Example of class encoding using special ‘type’ property 
Membership criteria can be logically encoded either by using logical definitions or 
by using property restriction. Property restriction can be used to group together 







Set mathematics can be used to create a hierarchy of classes. This allows defining 
sub-class, super-class, intersections, and unions. Figure 14 below shows an example in 
which the individual MySQLServer is classified as a member of set Database, and the 
class Location is defined as the super-class of Database class. It can be inferred that the 
MySQLServer is a member of the class Location.  
 
Figure 14: Example class hierarchy 
Class membership can also be defined by using the properties of individuals [110, 
111]. More specifically, class membership can be defined by restricting the values the 
properties can have to a certain range or to a specific value [110, 111]. For example, this 
logic can be used to define a class whose individuals have some a functional relation with 
the selected goal. Figure 15 below shows this example. In this Figure, the class 
FunctionalGoalTriggeredSubgoal is defined as the class of individuals who are related 
to the members of selected goal class (by hasFunctionalRelation property). This is 
achieved by restricting the hasFunctionalRelation to take values as individuals who are 




Figure 15: Example property restriction 
One feature of the logical language used in this dissertation is its ability to define a 
class with no name. These unnamed classes [110, 111] are defined by using property 
restriction. For example, if all individuals that can be scanned by a certain type of 
fingerprinting method need to be grouped together, then it can be achieved by defining a 
class by limiting the values of the property ‘canBeScannedBy’ to ‘DataBaseScan’. The 
act of limiting the property value is called property restriction [110]. This is shown in 
Figure 16 below. This ability to create anonymous class can be used to define a super-
class without explicitly creating a new named class.  
 
Figure 16:  Example of class hierarchy and property restriction 
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4.3.3.2 Knowledge Representation Language Usage 
The knowledge representation language used in this dissertation is the ontology 
language used for designing the Semantic Web [113]. According to [114], “The Semantic 
Web is a web of data”. It [114] also mentions that , “The Semantic Web provides a 
common framework that allows data to be shared and reused across application, 
enterprise, and community boundaries.” Semantic Web a collaborative effort led by the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [115], which is an international community that 
develop Web standards. According to [114] one of the applications of the Semantic Web 
technologies is data integration, “whereby data in various locations and various formats 
can be integrated in one, seamless application” [114]. 
The features of this knowledge representation language are used in this dissertation 
to capture diverse cyber-security domain knowledge, which may be generated from 
different sources dispersed in space and time. The knowledge representation language 
and the logical reasoning are used to design the distributed planning logic. The usage of 
the knowledge representation language is introduced below and is detailed in Section 6.1. 
1. Capture Diverse and Dispersed Cyber-security Domain Knowledge: The red-
team (and attacker) may use diverse amount of knowledge to generate the attack 
plan. This knowledge may be about the use of software system in the target 
infrastructure, the design of the software that makes it vulnerable to potential 
attacks, the attacker thought process in decomposing the goal or for discovering and 
exploiting vulnerabilities, the theories of attacker behavior etc. This knowledge can 
also be generated by sources dispersed in space and time. Example of these diverse 
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types of knowledge, and the potential (example) sources from which it is collected 
is shown in the Figure 17 below.  
 
Figure 17: Example of diverse types of knowledge 
 
The knowledge representation language used in this dissertation provides 
sufficient vocabulary to encode and combine this diverse knowledge about the 
cyber-security domain. The logical language used in this dissertation also allows 
capturing this knowledge directly from the source.  
2. Incomplete Information: The knowledge representation language (OWL) and 
logical reasoning used in this dissertation assumes that the knowledge is 
incomplete and that new knowledge can be available at any time [116]. OWL was 
designed for Semantic Web. According to [116], in Semantic Web “Anyone can 
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say Anything about Any topic” and as a result “there could be always something 
new that someone will say”. The traditional planning algorithms and traditional 
knowledgebase [117] assume that the knowledge encoded is complete and all the 
knowledge that is not encoded is false (i.e. there are no unknowns). This 
assumption is not valid in the cyber-security domain.  
3. Distributed Planning Logic: The proposed framework is divided into two 
components: centralized algorithms and distributed logic. This dissertation uses 
the knowledge representation language to design the distributed logic.  
The knowledge representation language allows building distributed logic 
incrementally. In this incremental logic building process, new distributed logic 
can be added when more understanding about the domain becomes available. This 
makes the planning logic flexible and scalable.  
4. Contextual Interpretation: In the cyber-security domain, new information 
availability may require interpreting already encoded information and inferences 
differently. The same attacks and vulnerabilities may be used differently by 
different types of attackers, and different cyber-security experts may associate the 
same attacks and vulnerabilities with different attack plans. Due to the nature of 
the cyber-security domain, it should be possible to interpret the information 
encoded differently in different contexts. The knowledge representation language 
[110] and the encoded logic allows contextual interpretation of information (i.e., it 
allows interpreting the relation between individuals differently when new 
information about individuals is available). 
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5. Information Validation: The logical language [110] used in this dissertation 
provides the ability to check for logical conflicts among the encoded information. 
This feature can be used for identifying the conflict between the encoded expert 
theories. 
This section introduced the concept of ontology, the OWL language, and described 
how it is used in this dissertation. Appendix II provides more background information 
about ontology, and describes how the ontologies are used for other applications [118] in 
cyber-security domain (for example, encoding security features requirements for 
application development; annotating the web service descriptions with security 
requirements and capabilities; developing ontology of intrusion detection system for 
communicating the information regarding an attack; developing a global security 
ontology etc.).   
4.3.4 System Model and Action Model  
The system and action model in proposed framework are encoded by a group of 
ontologies.  
Asset Ontology 
This ontology describes the software system’s characteristics, usage, and design. 
Asset ontology captures the information at two levels – abstract and specific. The abstract 
level logic consists of generic information about the software system. For example, the 
operating system is a type of software, the firewall is a cyber-security countermeasure, 
the MySQL Server is a type of database server, etc. Specific level logic captures 
information about instances of software systems. For example, Archie is the name of a 
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Windows 2003 Server, Archie hosts a MySQL Server, etc. Combining both types of logic 
enables capturing abstract reasoning that characterizes the attacker thought process.  
Threat Ontology 
The threat ontology encodes information about the known and conceptual (potential) 
attacks and vulnerabilities, definition of potential target of attack, and the impact of the 
attack. The threat ontology describes 1) how the attack can be used to exploit 
vulnerability, 2) what type of target may be vulnerable to such attack, and 3) what impact 
the threat may have on the target. The asset, threat, and planning ontology capture the 
logic of how the fingerprinting actions can be triggered.  
Attacker Behavior Ontology 
The attacker preference and strategies are encoded in attacker behavior ontology. 
Attacker strategy in turn is influenced by the attack’s environmental context and the 
attacker’s motivation. 
Planning Ontology 
The planning ontology uses the information encoded in asset and threat ontology to 
trigger the information relevant for generating the risk scenarios. 
4.3.5 Dynamicity 
Any automated framework generating the attack plan should be capable of handling 
the availability of new information. Information to be used by the planning algorithm is 
typically stored in a knowledgebase.   
4.3.5.1 Type of Reasoning to Capture Cyber-security Domain Dynamicity 
All planning algorithms use some form of logical reasoning. Two major categories of 
reasoning are reasoning assuming complete knowledge (closed world reasoning), and 
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reasoning assuming incomplete knowledge (open world reasoning). The type of 
reasoning chosen influences: 1) how the information stored (or not stored) in the 
knowledgebase is interpreted, and 2) design of the planning algorithm. This section 
describes these two types of reasoning.  
 Reasoning Assuming Complete Knowledge (Closed World Reasoning) 
Most traditional planning algorithms as well as traditional knowledgebase are 
developed by assuming whatever information is not explicitly stated is false [75, 117].  
This reasoning is called “closed world reasoning” or “closed world assumptions”. This is 
used either when the knowledgebase used by the planning algorithm is known to be 
complete, or when the knowledgebase is known to be incomplete but a best definite 
answer has to be derived from incomplete information[75, 117].5 
The “complete knowledge” assumption is appropriate in many domains[75, 117], 
since in those domains it might be natural to explicitly represent only positive knowledge, 
and assume the truth of negative facts by default. This can be illustrated by the example 
of an airline knowledgebase [75, 117] in which all the flights and the cities they connect 
are explicitly represented. In this [75, 117]  knowledge base, “Failure to find an entry 
indicating that Air Canada flight 103 connects Vancouver with Toulouse permits one to 
conclude that it does not.” 
In the absence of such assumption, one would have to explicitly encode all the 
destinations that Air Canada flight 103 connects, and which ones it does not connect. 
Depending on the type of domain, the number of negative facts may far exceed the 
                                                 
5  The reference paper makes these statements about closed world databases. Here the term 
knowledgebase is used a general form of database. 
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number of positive facts, making the requirement to encode all facts (positive and 
negative) explicitly unfeasible.  
To avoid this, many knowledgebase and planning algorithms assume that whatever 
information is not encoded explicitly is false. According to [75, 117], “Notice, however, 
that by adopting this convention, we are making an assumption about our knowledge 
about the domain, namely, that we know everything about each predicate of the domain. 
There are no gaps in our knowledge”. Furthermore, according to [75, 117], “The implicit 
representation of negative facts presumes total knowledge about the domain being 
represented. Fortunately, in most applications, such an assumption is warranted.” This 
assumption does not hold true for the cyber-security domain.  
Reasoning Assuming Incomplete Knowledge (Open World Reasoning) 
To capture the cyber-security domain information, which is characterized by 
incompleteness and continuous change, the proposed framework must use the reasoning 
that assumes incomplete knowledge (open world reasoning). This reasoning assuming 
incomplete knowledge, is used to encode distributed planning logic. 
This reasoning, unlike the “complete knowledge” assumption, does not make any 
inferences or assumptions about information that is not present (i.e., it does not assume 
that the absence of information means that the information is false). This is known as the 
“open world reasoning”. Using the example mentioned above, if it was encoded that 
flight 103 connects Vancouver to Washington DC, this information can be used in 
planning an itinerary. However, the inference that “there is only one flight out of 
Vancouver” is not supported by the open world reasoning, as another flight out of 
105 
 
Vancouver may exist (or can exist in future), and the itinerary-planning framework just 
does not know about it.   
Impact of Reasoning on Planning  
Traditional planning selects actions if the perquisites for those actions have been 
satisfied. These prerequisites are described using system states. In each system state, the 
planning algorithm searches for applicable actions using these prerequisites. The 
prerequisites (in the knowledge representation language) can be encoded by using a 
property hasPreRequiste as shown in Figure 18 below.  
 
 
Figure 18:  Open world pre-requisites 
 
Figure 18 shows an example action called BufferOverflowAttack, which needs to 
be enabled when its prerequisites are satisfied. This can be encoded by logic: if all the 
individuals, related to BufferOverflowAttack by hasPreRequiste property, are members 
of the class CurrentState, then BufferOverflowAttack has its prerequisites satisfied and 
becomes the applicable (enabled) attack in current state. However, this logic, asserting 
that all pre-requisites are satisfied, excludes the possibility of a statement in which 
BufferOverflowAttack is related to an individual by the hasPreRequiste that is not a 
member of class CurrentState. The later cannot be inferred in reasoning assuming 
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incomplete knowledge (open world reasoning) as either this statement may exist without 
knowledge of the planning framework, or can be stated anytime. Hence, it cannot be 
inferred that the prerequisites of the individual are satisfied[119]. This challenge of 
encoding pre-requisites in open world reasoning using pre-requisites was identified in 
[119]. The example shown above was adapted from an example of a semantic 
questionnaire described in [119]. 
According to [119], one way to make the reasoning framework infer that 
prerequisites are satisfied, without completely “closing the world” (i.e., assuming all non-
stated information to be false) is to assume that “partial knowledge” is available a priori. 
This “partial knowledge” states that the numbers of prerequisites are known a priori. This 
can be presented by a variable n. When these n numbers of prerequisites are met, this fact 
will remain true. The challenge in cyber-security domain is that these encoding of pre-
requisites may be driven by expert knowledge. Hence, different experts may disagree on 
the number of pre-requisites in advance. In addition, even if the number of pre-requisites 
are encoded in advance, the framework still allows adding new statements using the pre-
requisite property (i.e. a [n+1]th statement can be made by using the hasPreRequiste that 
was not previously encoded). The reasoning framework cannot be sure that these first n 
observed statements semantically represent the needed prerequisites of the action the 
expert was trying to encode. If the framework encounters a (n+1)th  statement, then it does 
not reject this statement; it infers that this is a different way of encoding one of the n 
statements. For example, if a third statement was encoded in Figure 18 as  
BufferOverflowAttack hasPreRequiste UseOfBuffer and if it was stated that the buffer 
overflow attack has two prerequisites , then the logical reasoning infers that UseOfBuffer 
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individual is another name of already encoded individuals, AvailableVulnerability or 
NoBoundaryProtection. This may lead to inferring incorrect information.  
As a result, the traditional planning algorithm structure of encoding actions in the 
form of prerequisites and effects may not be usable directly, while using open world 
reasoning. This dissertation, instead of encoding prerequisites, encodes the logic behind 
“why” the statements were selected as prerequisites. More specifically, instead of 
encoding that a system has vulnerability, this dissertation encodes logic about why the 
system may have this vulnerability. If the available system knowledge meets this logic 
then it can be inferred that the system has this vulnerability. This also better captures the 
attacker thought process for uncovering such vulnerability.  
4.3.6 Planning Algorithm  
The previous sections described the inputs of the planning algorithm, or the factors 
that influence the design of the planning algorithm. This section describes the planning 
algorithm. Logic of the proposed planning framework is divided into two core 
components: centralized algorithm and distributed logic. These are described in detail in 
this section.  
The proposed framework’s modified planning problem for cyber security domain 
generates the attack plans by trying to answer the following questions. 
Given that, the attacker selects a goal: 
1. What cognitive tasks does the attacker have to execute to accomplish this goal, 
given the opportunities provided by the system? 
2. How can the attacker discover these opportunities? 
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3. What type of attacks can be used to exploit these opportunities, to accomplish the 
selected cognitive tasks or goals? 
4. What opportunities are available to execute these attacks? 
5. How does the attacker select which cognitive tasks, opportunity discovery actions, 
and attacks to execute? 
The purpose of distributed logic in this case is to: 
1. Trigger the cognitive tasks as possible sub-goals available to the attacker, given 
the information about selected attack goals and attacker’s state of knowledge. 
2. Trigger the fingerprinting actions available to the attacker, given the information 
about selected goal, sub-goals, attacks, and attacker’s state of knowledge.  
3. Trigger the opportunities that can be targeted, given the attacker’s state of 
knowledge about the system. This knowledge can be acquired by executing the 
fingerprinting actions identified above. 
4. Trigger the available attacks that can achieve the selected goal or sub-goal given 
the attacker’s state of knowledge. 
The purpose of the centralized algorithm is to: 
1. Insert the attacker decisions in the distributed logic that triggers the sub-goals, 
fingerprinting actions, opportunities that can be targeted, and the available 
attacks. 
2. Graphically generate the attack plan by querying the triggered information and 
attacker preferences. The order of this query is determined in real time by using 
the encoded attacker preferences and attacker’s situational decision points.  
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3. Build the attacker’s knowledge state for generating the attack-scenarios. This 
knowledge state is used to control the knowledge that can be triggered by the 
distributed planning logic. 
Figure 19, shown below, describes the interaction between these two components.  
 
Figure 19: Interaction between cetralized and distributed logic 
The interaction shown in Figure 19 is described below:   
1. The centralized planning algorithm queries the distributed planning logic. The 
centralized algorithm is also used to program the graphical user interface, which 
is used to elicit the expert’s attacker behavior theories. The order of this query is 
determined in real time by using attacker preferences and attacker’s situational 
decision points encoded in the attacker behavior ontology. 
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2. The centralized algorithms insert the attacker decisions in the distributed planning 
logic. Consequently, they query the results of these decisions.  
3. The distributed logic is dynamic, in which new individuals and classes are often 
discovered. This dissertation develops a set of variables to act as the interface 
between this dynamic distributed logic and static centralized algorithms. This set 
of variables is called the “anchor set”. The class that forms the anchor set does not 
change, but its sub-classes and member individuals may change based on the 
dynamicity of the domain. The centralized algorithm queries and/or populates the 
anchor sets. 
4. The anchor sets are related to other classes (called catcher sets) and individuals in 
the distributed logic by a class or property hierarchy. This class and property 
hierarchy may change, and it can be defined in real time. New classes can be 
defined as sub-classes of the anchor set, and new individuals may become 
member of anchor sets. This increases or decreases the members of the anchor set. 
5. The catcher set representing lower level planning logic, encodes the logic about a) 
under what circumstances the individuals that are of interest for generating the 
attack plan, may become a member of this sub-class, and b) given that an 
individual becomes a member of this sub-class, what other information can be 
inferred that is relevant to planning logic. These individuals are stored in asset and 
threat ontologies, but they participate in the planning ontology by becoming 
members of classes defined in planning ontology. Due to the dynamicity of the 
domain, new individuals and relationships between individuals are often 
discovered. Furthermore, the relationship between these individuals evolves as 
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more information is available. This lower level planning logic in a way “catches” 
these individuals, which can be used in generating attack plan, as they evolve or 
become available in this dynamic pool of individuals defined by the asset and 
threat ontology. Hence, these sets are called catcher sets.  
6. The asset and threat ontology were introduced in Section 4.3.4. They represent a 
dynamic set of cyber-security domain individuals, the relationship between these 
individuals, and the classes aggregating these individuals. The combination of 
individuals in these ontologies can be described as a “pool of individuals” in 
which these individuals originate and their relationship and membership evolve.   
7. The asset and threat ontology individuals can become members of catcher set 
classes, when they satisfy their membership criteria.  
Following sections describe the centralized, distributed planning logic and its 
interaction by using an example.  
4.3.6.1 Centralized Planning Algorithm   
The centralized planning algorithm generates the graphical attack plans, and acts as 
human interface. This can be illustrated using an example, in which an attacker is trying 
to compromise an organization’s trade secret information. The centralized algorithm 




Figure 20: Generic flow of centralized planning algorithms 
The steps below describe the flow of logic shown in Figure 20.   
1. The algorithm starts when the attacker goal is selected. In the example, the 
centralized algorithm marks trade secret as “information to be leaked” and as the 
selected goal of the attack. This is done by classifying the individual 
“TradeSecret” as a member of Anchor set class “SelectedGoal” and 
“InformationToBeLeaked”. 
2. The selected goal triggers the cognitive domain specific tasks (sub-goals), 
fingerprinting sub-goals, and attacks available to the attacker. These available 
options are queried by the centralized algorithm to generate the attack tree. 
a. Fingerprinting sub-goals (scans) to learn about opportunities available to 
achieve goals are triggered. These are represented as double dotted lines.  
(                  ). In the current example, the fingerprinting options are 
“fingerprint the location where trade secret is stored”, “fingerprint how the 




b. Sub-goals representing the cognitive tasks that can accomplish the 
selected goals are triggered and available as options to the attacker.  
i. These are represented as dotted lines (                      ) indicating 
that these sub-goals can possibly accomplish the selected goal but 
the information about how to accomplish (or decompose) them is 
not available. In this example, the sub-goals can be “compromise 
the location where trade secret is stored”, “compromise the 
computer processing trade secret”, or “compromise the channel 
transmitting trade secret”. 
ii. The execution of fingerprinting options further identifies the 
specific achievable sub-goals. In this example, it is assumed that 
the attacker selects the “fingerprint the location where trade secret 
is stored” option.  
iii.  If the executed fingerprinting action is able to gather specific 
information about which of the possible sub-goals are achievable, 
then these becomes the attacker’s available options. These 
available sub-goals are presented by solid lines (                    ). In 
the current example, the trade secret is stored in the MySQL 
Server. If this information is accurately fingerprinted, then the 
available sub-goal becomes “Compromise MySQL Server”. 
3. When the attacker selects an available sub-goal, the centralized algorithm inserts 
this information in the distributed logic. This is done by classifying the sub-goal 
as a member of the “selected sub-goal” anchor class. This classification further 
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triggers more sub-goals, fingerprinting sub-goals, or attacks. In the current 
example, MySQL Server is the selected sub-goal, and the “location to which 
access is needed”.  
a. Fingerprinting sub-goals are triggered to learn about available 
opportunities to accomplish the sub-goals. In the current example, 
“Database Scan” becomes the available fingerprinting sub-goal.  
b. Actions available to accomplish the sub-goals are triggered given the 
attacker’s knowledge state. In the current example, the SQL injection 
attack that can be used to compromise MySQL Server is triggered.   
4. The attacker selects available attack(s) to achieve the sub-goal(s) and goal. In the 
current example, executing the SQL injection attack achieves the selected sub-
goal of MySQL as the “location to which access is needed”, which in turn 
accomplishes the selected goal of compromising the trade secret. 
This logic is represented as sequential logic, but its implementation is more iterative. 
For example, the selected sub-goal can in turn decompose/trigger further sub-goals until 
they can be achieved by executable actions.    
4.3.6.2 Distributed Planning Logic 
Anchor sets 
Planning ontology captures the logic behind how the sub-goals, fingerprinting 
actions, and attacks are triggered. This ontology consists of layers of distributed logic. 
The first (and the highest) layer of this is described as the anchor set. The centralized 
algorithm mentioned above functions by querying or populating these anchor sets. The 
interaction between the centralized planning algorithm and the anchor sets is shown in 
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Figure 21 below. The numbers in this Figure represent the corresponding steps shown in 
Figure 20.  
 
Figure 21 Anchor set classes 
 
In anchor set logic, when an individual is classified as the selected goal (shown in 
step 1), other individuals that can help accomplish this goal are classified the “goal 
triggered sub-goals”, if the information about them is available. The sub-goals that can 
provide information about the selected goals are classified as members of “goal triggered 
fingerprinting goal” (shown in step 2-a). The information collected by selecting (shown 
in step 2-b-ii) and executing the fingerprinting sub-goal, can further trigger the available 
sub-goals (shown in step 2-b-iii) or attacks. 
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Similarly, when an individual classified as “goal triggered sub-goal” is chosen as the 
selected sub-goal (step 3), further individuals are classified as members of “sub-goal 
triggered sub-goal” and the “sub-goal triggered fingerprinting goal” (shown in step 3-a). 
Subsequently any attacks that can accomplish either the selected goal or the selected sub-
goal are classified as the triggered attacks (shown in step 3-b). The triggered attack’s 
section and execution may achieve the sub-goals and goal. 
The distributed planning logic can be described as multiple distributed triggered 
classifications.  
Catcher Sets 
The logic of how the individuals become member of the triggered anchor sets comes 
from the lower levels of the distributed logic. These lower level logic sets are also called 
catcher sets.  
Low-level distributed planning logic describes the circumstances in which 
individuals may become the members of catcher sets. The individuals in catcher sets 
further become the members of anchor sets either by virtue of class hierarchy (in which 
anchor sets are encoded as a parent class of catcher sets) or by property hierarchy (in 
which anchor sets are defined by restricting the parent properties of the properties defined 
in catcher set logic). In this manner, the catcher sets control the size of the anchor sets by 
providing individuals.  
The catcher set logic itself is dynamic and is encoded by current cyber-security 
domain understanding. This catcher set logic is illustrated with an example below.   
This example logically encodes the following thought process “Consider the case in 
which the trade secret is the information to be leaked and it becomes the selected goal. 
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The only a priori information available is that the trade secret is stored in a MySQL 
database. Hence, compromising the MySQL Server becomes the logical choice of attack. 
Since the MySQL Server is a database, more information about it may be gathered by 
using a database scan.” 
The information about individuals described in this example is stored in the asset 
ontology. This asset ontology stores specific and abstract asset information. Example of 
the specific and abstract information stored in asset ontology is shown in Figure 22. This 
example logic encodes the following information: 
 Trade secret is stored in the MySQL Server. This is encoded as- Tradesecret 
isStoredin MySQLServer6. This is an example of specific information. 
 Trade secret is a type of information. This is encoded as- Tradesecret type 
Information. This is an example of abstract information. 
 MySQL Server is a type of database, and is encoded as MySQLServer type 
Database (example of abstract information). 
 The inverse of relation “isStoredIn” is “stores (example of abstract information). 
From this encoded logic, a simple inference using the inverse relationship can be 
made, stating that the MySQL Server stores the trade secret (MySQLServer stores 
TradeSecret).  
                                                 
6 This is stored in the knowledge representation language as below: 
 <owl:Thing rdf:about="#Tradesecret"> 
        <isStoredin rdf:resource="#MySQLServer"/> 
    </owl:Thing> 





Figure 22: Asset ontology example  
The high-level abstract information enables abstract reasoning. The asset ontology 
shown in Figure 23 encodes  
 The class database has a parent class called location encoded as (Database 
subClassOf Location). 
 Database class’ superclass is defined as a group of individuals that can be 
scanned by database scan. ((Database subClassOf  (canBeScannedBy hasValue 
DataBaseScan)7. 
 Database scan is a type of scan (DataBaseScan type Scan). 
 canBeScannedBy is defined as an inverse property of scans. 
                                                 
7 This is encoded in the OWL language as shown below: 
 <owl:Class rdf:about="#Database"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Location"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf> 
            <owl:Restriction> 
                <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#canBeScannedBy"/> 
                <owl:hasValue rdf:resource="#DatabaseScan"/> 
            </owl:Restriction> 
        </rdfs:subClassOf> 
    </owl:Class> 
This dissertation abbreviates this type of detailed logical encoding for explaining the ontologies. 
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Given this ontology example, when the MySQLServer is classified as a member of 
the Database class, it is also automatically classified as a member of the parent class 
location, and the unnamed superclass mentioned above. Since all members of this 
unnamed superclass have to satisfy its definition as “a class of individuals that can be 
scanned by a database scan”, it can be inferred that the MySQLServer can be scanned by 
a database scan.   
 
 
Figure 23 Asset ontology example encoding abstract information 
 
How this asset information is used in the attack plan generation is defined by the 
planning ontology. An example of this planning ontology, shown in Figure 24 encodes 
the following information: 
 “Location to which access is needed” is a catcher class and it is defined as a class 
that stores some “information to be leaked”. This is done by restricting the 
property “stores” to individuals that are classified as “information to be leaked”. 
In other words, “location to which is access is needed” is a class describing a 
collection of individuals that have some “stores” relation with the individuals 
classified as “information to be leaked”. This is encoded as 
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(LocationToWhichAccessIsNeeded = stores someValuesFrom 
InformationToBeLeaked) 
 “Functional goal triggered sub-goal”, also a catcher class, is defined as a class 
that “has functional relation” with some selected goal. This is defined by the 
property restriction encoded as  FunctionalGoalTriggeredSubgoal = 
hasFunctionalRelation someValuesFrom SelectedGoal 
 “Sub-goal triggered fingerprinting goal” class is an anchor class and is defined as 
a class that scans some triggered sub-goal. This is encoded as 
(SubGoalTriggeredFingerpritntingGoal = scans someValuesFrom 
TriggeredSubGoal). 
 “Functional goal triggered sub-goal” is a catcher class and is defined as a sub-
class of “goal triggered sub-goal”. The “goal triggered sub-goal” is further 
defined as a subclass of “triggered sub-goal”. 
 Furthermore, the property hasFunctionalRelation is defined as a parent property 
of stores and isStoredIn. This means all individuals related to other individuals by 






Figure 24: Planning ontology examples - anchor and catcher classes 
The inferences mentioned in the scenario example can be generated by combining all 
logic captured in asset and planning ontology fragments. This is shown in Figure 25 and 
is described below.   
 
Figure 25: Combined logic of examples 
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In the combined logic shown in Figure 25, the following information is added by the 
centralized algorithm as input (i/p).   
(i/p): The trade secret is classified as a selected goal and is the information to be 
leaked. 
Given this information, the following inferences are triggered: 
1. Since the MySQL Server has a stores relation with trade secret, which is now the 
“information to be leaked”, it satisfies the membership definition of “location to 
which access is needed” class and is classified as a member of this class. 
2. Since the MySQL Server satisfies the relation hasFunctionalRelation with the 
selected goal, trade secret, it further satisfies the membership definition of the 
class “Functional goal triggered sub-goal”.  
3. “Functional goal triggered sub-goal” is classified as the subclass of the “goal 
triggered sub-goal” class. Hence, the MySQL Server becomes a “goal triggered 
sub-goal”. 
4. The “Goal triggered sub-goal” is further defined as a subclass of “Triggered sub-
goal”. Hence, the MySQL Server becomes a “Triggered sub-goal”. 
5. Given all this information, the database scan now satisfies the definition of the 
“Sub-goal triggered fingerprinting goal” class, and is classified as a member of 
this class. 
This example shows how the series of distributed classifications can trigger the sub-




4.3.7 Planning Output  
The planning framework, as implemented, generates four types of graphical outputs. 
Apart from this, the distributed planning logic can be queried directly to generate custom 
outputs. These five types of outputs are generated by the following five modes of 
operations.  
Mode 1- Attack Tree Generation without Attacker Preference: This mode 
generates the attack tree. The attack tree shows the goal, the decomposed sub-
goals, and the executable attacks exploiting vulnerabilities that can accomplish 
these goals and sub-goals.  
In this mode, the proposed framework’s centralized algorithm provides the 
information about the attacker’s goal. The distributed logic triggers the sub-goals, 
and the available attacks that can achieve the attacker goal (and sub-goal). The 
centralized planning algorithm then queries this triggered information to 
graphically generate the attack tree assuming that the system has been 
fingerprinted perfectly and all possible ways of achieving the goals are selected. 
Mode 2- Attack Scenario Generation Using Red-team:  The attacker may not 
act in the sequential order described by the attack tree and may backtrack, 
abandon the scenario, or change goal in accordance with the available 
opportunities. This behavior is captured in the form of an attack-scenario, which 
indicates the actual steps taken by the attacker, including backtracking, re-
execution of the attacks, and changing goal.   
The cyber-security risk scenarios are often generated by a red-team. This mode 
provides the red-team with an interface to interact with the target network. In this 
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mode, the proposed framework’s centralized algorithm gives the red-team 
possible attack goals as options. When the red-team selects a goal from these 
options, the distributed logic triggers the fingerprinting actions (that can provide 
knowledge about how to decompose or achieve this goal) or available attacks. 
When the red-team selects one of the triggered fingerprinting actions, the 
centralized algorithm builds the red-team’s (or attacker’s) knowledge state by 
capturing the knowledge that can be discovered (using this fingerprinting action). 
The red-team’s (or attacker’s) knowledge state is used by distributed logic to 
trigger more sub-goals and attacks. The centralized algorithm gives the red-team 
triggered sub- goals as options. When the red-team selects a sub-goal from these 
options, the distributed logic triggers more sub-goals, fingerprinting actions, and 
the attack actions that can be used to achieve this sub-goal. This process continues 
until the red-team’s  goal is achieved or abandoned.  
The centralized algorithm then displays the actual steps taken by the red-team. In 
this mode, the red-team’s theories about attacker thought process and preferences 
are also elicited. 
Mode 3- Automated Attack-scenario Generation: This mode of operation uses 
the attacker behavior theories to generate the attack-scenario automatically. This 
attack-scenario represents the most likely risk scenario given the attacker’s 
preference. 
Mode 4- Ranked Attack Tree Generation Using Attacker Preferences: In this 
mode, the branches of the attack tree generated in Mode 1 are ranked according 
to the encoded attacker preferences.  
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Mode 5- Direct Query: Apart from the graphical modes of operation described 
above, the distributed logic can be directly queried to generate custom output. 
These modes of operations are detailed in Chapter 8. 
The Table 8 shown below summarizes the differences in design of the proposed 
framework and the current vulnerability graph generation algorithms. 
 
 Vulnerability Graph Framework Proposed Framework 
Planning 
Framework 
Uses traditional planning framework Uses combination of traditional planning 
framework, and the situated action theory 
Goal Static Well Defined 
 Goal: Gain restricted privileges or 
circumvent a security property. 
Dynamic Well Defined 
 Intentional Goals:  Compromise 
integrity, confidentiality, and 
availability of information 
 Situational Sub-goals: Attacker’s 
cognitive domain specific tasks to 
achieve the intentional goals. 
Planning 
Philosophy 
Planning philosophy is to track the 
evolution of a system in the form of 
system states using a state transition 
model.  
 
Plans in the proposed framework are driven 
by situation, characterized by the dynamic 
interaction between 1) the opportunities 
provided by the system, 2) the attacker 
thought processes in decomposing goals, 
and discovering and exploiting these 
opportunities, 3) attacker preferences, and 
4) the attacks available to attacker.  
System and  
Action 
Models 
 System Model: Encodes the 
system states  
 Action Model: Encodes actions 
using pre-requisites and effects. 
Action pre-requisites typically 
encodes the attacker’s initial 
privileges, presence of 
vulnerability, and connectivity 
between software systems; Action 
effects typically encodes 
attacker’s elevated privileges, 
possible crashing of software or 
change in system state. 
 Asset Ontology: Captures software 
system’s characteristics, usage, and 
design.  
 Threat Ontology: Encodes known and 
conceptual (potential) attacks and 
vulnerabilities, definition of potential 
target of attack, and the impact of the 
attack.   
 Attacker Behavior Ontology: Encodes 
attacker strategy and preferences. 
Knowledge 
and 
Assumes static and  knowledge-lean 
domain 




Dynamicity  Uses limited knowledge  
 Assumes knowledge is available a 
priori and is complete 
 Uses diverse and dispersed knowledge 
 Assumes knowledge is not available a 
priori and is incomplete 
Planning 
Algorithm 
Searches for which action can be 
executed in what state to achieve the 
desired outcome  
Instead of relying on traditional planning 
algorithms to search for applicable actions, 
uses a distributed logic to instantly 
accommodate dynamic information 
 Distributed Logic:  Designed to 
emulate the attacker thought processes; 
Uses the information, as it becomes 
available, to trigger the sub-goals, the 
fingerprinting actions, the opportunities 
that can be targeted, and potential 
attacks 
 Centralized Algorithm: Provides the 
attacker decision, and queries triggered 
information. The order of this query is 
determined in real time by using the 
encoded attacker preferences and 
attacker’s situational decision points. 
Builds the attacker’s knowledge state 




Outputs Generates the vulnerability graph Generates attack tree and attack scenarios. 
Encoded and triggered information can also 
be directly queried to generate custom 
output. 











5 Framework Architecture  
Chapter 4 introduced the proposed planning framework and algorithm for generating 
the attack plans. The planning algorithm has two types of logic – distributed and 
centralized –and five modes of operations generating four different types of graphical 
output. Chapters 5-8 describe how the planning algorithm is implemented. The 
distributed and centralized logic are implemented by two corresponding modules called 
Flux and CieKI, as shown in Figure 26. 
5.1 Flux  
Flux implements the distributed planning logic. Flux consists of the asset, threat 
(vulnerability and attack), and planning ontology. It is called Flux because it captures the 
dynamic information, and uses it to trigger the knowledge relevant for generating attack 
plans. Chapter 6 describes Flux in detail.  
5.2 CieKI 
CieKI (pronounced psyche) stands for Cognition Induced Kinetic Intelligence. It 
consists of centralized algorithms and the attacker behavior ontology. Its main purpose is 
to capture the attacker behavior, create the attacker behavior ontology, and generate 
attack plans given this attacker behavior. CieKI generates the attack plans by inserting the 
attacker behavior information and attacker decisions in Flux and by querying its impact 
from Flux. The order of this query is determined in real time by using the encoded 






Figure 26 Proposed framework architecture with output 
Apart from these two core modules, an attack tree graphical algorithm is developed 
that queries Flux directly to display the attack tree for the first mode of operation. This 
graphical algorithm  does not use attack preferences, and is not part of CieKI.  
5.3 Modes of Operation 
Flux and CieKI are used to support the four graphical modes of operation as shown 
in Table 9 below. Along with these graphical modes, Flux distributed can also be directly 








Modes of operation Modules supporting modes of operation
1 
Attack tree generation without using 
attacker preference 
 Flux  
 Attack tree graphical algorithm 
2
2 
Attack-scenario generation using red-
team   CieKI 
o CieKI algorithms 





Automated attack-scenario generation  
4
4 




Direct query of distributed planning sets  Flux 
Table 9- Proposed architecure- modes of operation to component mapping 
These two modules and the five modes of operations are explained in this 
dissertation using a case study described in next section. Chapter 8 describes these modes 
of operation in detail. The case study is also used to compare the proposed framework 
with the manual attack tree generation, and current automated vulnerability graph 
generation methods. Chapter 9 describes the comparison between frameworks in detail. 
5.4 Case Study 
The case study used in this dissertation is adopted from [81]. It is reused in this 
dissertation to compare the proposed framework with existing manual attack trees and 
automated vulnerability graph generation methods.  
The network architecture for this case study is shown below.  
 
Figure 27: Case Study Architecture  
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The case study network contains MySQL Server storing trade secret information. 
This MySQL Server, along with a proxy server called Squid and a chat program known 
as Linux Internet Chat Query (LICQ), is hosted on a Linux Server. This Linux Server is 
located inside the organization’s private network and is protected by a firewall. This 
private network also contains a Windows Server called Windows –Archie. The network 
contains a web server in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). DMZ is described as a network 
segment inserted between an organization’s private network and the Internet [120]. The 
Internet Information Services (IIS) Server application is used as the web server and it is 
hosted on a Windows Server. Initially, the attacker is assumed to be outside the network 
and the only a priori information available to him/her is that the trade secret information 
is stored in some MySQL Server. Where this MySQL Server is located is not known to 
the attacker.   
This case study’s network has been slightly modified from the one described in [81] 
by changing the definition of one vulnerability, deleting one vulnerability, and adding 
two vulnerabilities. This has been done to facilitate the comparison between frameworks.  
In this modified case study, the IIS Server has two buffer overflow vulnerabilities 
that allow the attacker to remotely gain administrative privileges to the Windows Server 
in DMZ. The buffer overflow vulnerability allows overloading a predefined amount of 
space in a buffer (a data structure used by the software), which can potentially overwrite 
and corrupt data in memory [120]. The buffer overflow attack can use this vulnerability 
to overwrite the location in memory that allows him to gain unauthorized access or it can 
corrupt data to crash the software. 
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Both the Windows Servers have buffer overflow vulnerability, in their 
implementation of the Server Management Block (SMB) protocol, which allows the 
attacker to gain unauthorized access to the server. The LICQ application has a 
vulnerability that allows the attacker to gain access to the Linux Server hosting this 
application. Finally, buffer overflow vulnerability on the Linux Server allows attacker to 
gain administrative privileges remotely. The goal of the attacker is to obtain the trade 
secret information stored in the MySQL Server.  
This case study is used as a running example to explain Flux (Chapter 6), CieKI 
(Chapter 7) and modes of operations (Chapter 8). It is also used to compare the proposed 
framework with vulnerability graph generation framework (Chapter 9) and to describe 
applications and extensions of current framework (Chapter 10).  
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6 Framework Component: Flux 
Flux was introduced in section 5.1 and is described in detail in this chapter.  
6.1 Flux: Overview 
Flux implements the distributed  planning logic and consists of the asset, threat, and 
planning ontology. Flux assumes that knowledge is incomplete (open world reasoning) 
and makes inferences only from explicitly encoded information describing the cyber-
security domain.  
Section 4.3.3 introduced the knowledge representation technique’s applications. 
These applications are detailed in this section. Subsequent sections explaining the 
different types of ontology illustrate these applications with examples.  
6.1.1 Capture Diverse and Dispersed Cyber-security Domain Knowledge 
Section 4.3.3.2 introduced that the ontology language can be used for capturing 
diverse knowledge available from dispersed sources. This section explains how this is 
achieved in Flux. 
6.1.1.1 Encoding Diverse Knowledge  
The ontology language provides a diverse set of constructs to encode the cyber-
security domain knowledge. These logical statements are machine as well as human 
readable. The cyber-security domain knowledge is captured at different levels of 
abstraction. For example, the knowledge that “System A is connected to System B” is at 
a high level of abstraction. It does not specify how exactly the two systems are 
connected. There can be different types of connections possible between the systems. 
These connection mechanisms may include physical connection, a trust mechanism, 
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connection using open ports, etc. Similarly the knowledge that “System A is physically 
connected to System B” is at a lower level of abstraction. This lower level of abstraction 
can be generalized to say that two systems are connected if needed.  
The encoding of knowledge at lower levels of abstraction allows capturing the 
diverse amount of relationships that may exist in the cyber-security domain, and 
abstracting them when needed. If the knowledge is stored only at a high level of 
abstraction, then the opportunity to use the detailed knowledge in different situations in 
the future is lost. For example, recording the knowledge that “System A is physically 
connected to System B”, can be used to infer that both System A and System B may be in 
the same geographic location. This knowledge is lost in high-level encoding “System A is 
connected to System B”.   
In this dissertation, specific detailed information is captured and summarized by a 
high level of abstraction when needed. This is illustrated with an example in Section 6.3, 
describing the asset ontology.  
Flux encodes the diverse amount of knowledge. This knowledge may be about the 
use of software system in the target infrastructure, the design of the software that makes it 
vulnerable to potential attacks, the attacker thought process in decomposing the goal or 
for discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities, the theories of attacker behavior etc. 
6.1.1.2 Capturing Dispersed Information 
Information in the cyber-security domain can be generated by multiple dispersed 
sources. These sources are often dispersed in space (across the internet) and time. For 
example, the knowledge about attacks and vulnerabilities is available through 
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vulnerability and attack databases, cyber-security forums, paid cyber-security services, 
etc.  
This presents two challenges for capturing and maintaining information. 
1. Traditionally the dispersed information is extracted from its source and stored 
locally (typically in a database or knowledgebase) so that it can be used by the 
planning algorithm. In this case, any change in information at source or new 
information availability will not be reflected in the attack plans until this 
information is extracted, encoded, and the planning algorithm is re-executed. In 
cyber-security domain, the information used for planning should be updated when 
it is changed at the source, and new information should be captured when it 
becomes available.  
2. The information encoded by different sources should be combined. This is a 
challenge, since even the same information generated from different sources may 
not use the same format or naming conventions, and often these format or naming 
conventions are not explicitly stated. This becomes more difficult when different 
types of information need to be combined, especially when the information may 
be incomplete.  
This first challenge is addressed by linking the source and local storage of 
information using logical constructs, and the second by using information fusion logic to 
combine the diverse cyber-security domain information. The ontology language [110, 
121] provides this data integration functionality [114]. This is illustrated with an example 
in section 6.3.   
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6.1.2 Incomplete Information 
 Flux uses open world reasoning. It assumes that the knowledge is incomplete and 
that new knowledge can be available at any time. In Flux, the reasoning is done only on 
the information that is explicitly encoded.  
6.1.3 Distributed Planning Logic 
 The OWL language is used to design the Flux. This knowledge representation 
language allows building distributed logic incrementally. In this incremental logic 
building process, new distributed logic can be added when more understanding about the 
domain becomes available. This makes the planning logic flexible and scalable.  
6.1.4 Contextual Interpretation  
In the cyber-security domain, the availability of new information may lead to 
interpreting previously available information and inferences in a different way. The same 
attacks and vulnerabilities can be used by different types of attackers differently. These 
attacks and vulnerabilities can also be used differently by the same attacker to accomplish 
different goals. Finally, different cyber-security experts also may associate the same 
attacks and vulnerabilities with different risk scenarios. Because of this, the information 
encoded needs to be interpreted differently in different contexts.   
This contextual interpretation is achieved in the proposed framework by defining a 
logic, which describes how the relationships and class memberships of individuals should 
be interpreted in different situation (for example, if this individual becomes a member of 
a specific class). This can be considered as one logical statement triggering the 
classification of related individuals. This triggered classification, implemented using a set 
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of logical statements to accommodate the situational characteristic of the domain, is the 
core logic of the distributed planning. 
6.1.5 Information Validation 
Traditionally, information validation is done to check syntax (i.e., the format of 
information). The traditional knowledgebase (or database) also checks for completeness 
of information. In both cases, incorrect or incomplete information is typically rejected. 
The logical language used in this dissertation performs information validation at semantic 
level. Instead of checking for syntax of the information, it checks for logical conflicts 
among encoded information. This feature can be used for determining conflicts among 
the encoded expert theories.  
6.2 Ontology Logic Representation  
In order to explain the encoded distributed logic, this dissertation explains how these 
ontologies are used, and what typical inferences are made using these ontologies. These 
typical inferences are called ontology logic patterns in this dissertation. The ontology 
logic is explained using selected examples of encoded ontologies.  
Section 6.3 explains how the information is encoded at specific and abstract levels in 
asset ontology, the inferences that can be made using this information, and the 
applications of the asset ontology.  
The threat ontology encodes the known and conceptual (potential) attacks and 
vulnerabilities, definition of potential target of attack, and the impact of the attack. This is 
described in section 6.4. 
The planning ontology describes how the distributed planning logic uses the 
information encoded in the asset and threat ontologies to trigger the information that can 
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be used in attack plan generation. The planning ontology also describes the anchor and 
catcher sets. This is described in section 6.5. 
6.3 Asset Ontology 
Asset ontology encodes the knowledge about software systems and the 
information stored, processed, or transmitted using them. This ontology encodes the 
software system’s characteristics, usage, and design. This knowledge is encoded by using 
basic logical constructs described in Section 4.3.3. The logical reasoning is used to infer 
further information from explicitly encoded information. The asset ontology captures this 
knowledge at two levels: abstract and specific.   
6.3.1 Specific Asset Information 
The specific level logic captures the information about specific instances of software 















Figure 28: Example fragment of specific information encoding in asset ontology 
 
In the Figure 28, the knowledge that the  “trade secret” is stored in the MySQL 
Server is encoded as, “Tradesecret isStoredIn MySQLServer” 8(i.e., two individuals 
MySQLServer and Tradesecret are connected using the property isStoredIn).  
                                                 
8 This is stored in the knowledge representation language as below: 
 <owl:Thing rdf:about="#Tradesecret"> 
        <isStoredin rdf:resource="#MySQLServer"/> 
    </owl:Thing> 
This dissertation abbreviates this type of detailed logical encoding for efficiently explaining the 
ontologies. For example, the above mentioned encoding is abbreviated to Tradesecret isStoredin 
MySQLServer. 
Encoded Information 
Individual Property Individual 
Tradesecret isStoredin MySQLServer 
MySQLServer isHostedOn LinuxServer 
LICQ isHostedOn LinuxServer 
LinuxServer isProtectedBy Firewall1 
LinuxServer hasTrust WindowsServerArchie 
WindowsServerArchie isProtectedBy Firewall1 
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The asset ontology also encodes the semantics of information for more basic 
human-like reasoning. For example, it is easy for humans to understand that, if an 
application is hosted on an operating system, then it is a bi-directional relationship, 
meaning that the operating system hosts the application. This logic is encoded by 
defining an inverse relationship. For example, “isHostedOn” is defined as the inverse of 







Figure 29:  Asset Ontology- inverse properties 
When the ontology logic patterns shown in figures 28 and 29 are combined, then 
the information shown in Figure 30 can be inferred. 
 
Encoded Information 
Property Property Construct Property 
isStoredIn inverseOf stores 
isHostedOn inverseOf hosts 
isProtectedBy inverseOf protects 








Figure 30 Example fragment showing inverse relations 
When the new information is available, it is added as an overlay property 
definition. This overlay information is also called as “tags”. Adding or changing 
information corresponds to adding or changing these tags. These tags can also be 
generated by using logical inference, which allows updating information in real time. 
Figure 31 shows two new types of property relations added to the asset ontology 
describing that Windows Server is connected to LICQ and MySQL Server on default 
port.   
Inferred Information 
Individual Property Individual 
MySQLServer stores Tradesecret 
LinuxServer hosts MySQLServer 
LinuxServer hosts LICQ 
Firewall1 protects LinuxServer 
Firewall1 protects WindowsServerArchie 








Figure 31: Asset ontology- information addition 
6.3.2 Abstract Asset Information 
The asset ontology also encodes abstract logic consisting of conceptual 




Individual Property Individual 
WindowsServer isConnectedOnDefaultPort LICQ 










Figure 32  Example of specific and abstract information encoding in asset ontology 
 
The asset ontology captures abstract information like “trade secret is a type of 
information” and “MySQL Server is a type of database”. The abstract information may 
encode commonly known high-level concepts that can be used for machine reasoning.  
The encoded information about a specific instance can itself be abstracted for 
high-level reasoning. This allows capturing of different types of relationships that may 
exist between individuals, and abstracting them when needed. For example, one of the 
information needed to generate the attack plan is the connectivity between software 
systems. This is important information because connected software systems can be used 
as a launching point for the attack. This is often encoded in the current vulnerability 
graph generation algorithms by a connectivity matrix [81]. Connectivity matrix encodes 
Encoded Information 
Individual Property Class 
TradeSecret type Information 
MySQLServer type Database 
DatabaseScan type Scan 
Encoded Information 
Class Property Class 
Database subClassOf Location 




presence of a connection between two software systems by a boolean variable in the n x n 
matrix. This captures the high-level information regarding whether the two assets are 
digitally (using communication ports) or physically connected. However, different types 
of connections between entities may exist. Some types of connection relationships were 
described in Figure 29.   
It would be a simplistic representation if all the individuals were represented by a 
high-level connection relationship. This would preclude using this detailed connection 
information differently in different types of situations. This high-level abstraction, 
however, may also be needed for abstract reasoning. Both (abstract and detailed) types of 
reasoning are achieved in this dissertation by encoding the specific detailed relations and 
abstracting them when needed. This is implemented by defining a property relationships 
hierarchy in which the properties have more abstract parent properties. This is illustrated 


















Figure 33 Hierarchy of property relations 
Detail Information about connections can be used to summarize different 
relationships between individuals at different levels of abstraction. From the property 
hierarchy shown in Figure 33, if it is encoded that “TradeSecret isStoredin 





isStoredIn subPropertyOf hasFunctionalRelation 
Stores subPropertyOf hasFunctionalRelation 
isHostedOn subPropertyOf directlyConnectedTo 
Hosts subPropertyOf directlyConnectedTo 
isConnecedOnDefaultPort subPropertyOf hasLimitedconnection 
directlyConnectedTo subPropertyOf isConnectedTo 
hasLimitedconnection subPropertyOf isConnectedTo 
isConnectedTo subPropertyOf hasRelationWith 





isStoredIn subPropertyOf hasRelationWith 
Stores subPropertyOf hasRelationWith 
isHostedOn subPropertyOf hasRelationWith 
Hosts subPropertyOf hasRelationWith 
isConnecedOnDefaultPort subPropertyOf hasRelationWith 
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with each other, and are connected to each other by hasFunctionalRelation and 
hasRelationWith properties. Similarly, if it is encoded that “MySQLServer isHostedon 
LinuxServer”, then it can be inferred that “MySQLServer” is directly connected to, 
(using diretclyConnectedTo property), to LinuxServer. The property 
diretclyConnectedTo itself is further abstracted by isConnectedTo property. These 




Figure 34 Inferences drawn from hierarchy of property relations 
The abstract reasoning used in asset (and threat) ontology attempts to capture the 
attacker’s thought processes in discovering the opportunities. It is important to note that 
the research does not assume that if there is a connection between the computational 
Inferred Information 
Individual Property Individual 
Tradesecret hasFunctionalRelation MySQLServer 
Tradesecret hasRelationWith MySQLServer 
MySQLServer hasFunctionalRelation Tradesecret 
MySQLServer hasRelationWith Tradesecret 
MySQLServer directlyConnecedTo LinuxServer 
MySQLServer hasRelationWith LinuxServer 
LinuxServer directlyConnecedTo MySQLServer 
LinuxServer hasRelationWith MySQLServer 
146 
 
entities, then it will be used by the attacker to launch the attack. The asset and threat 
ontologies capture the “possibilities” of attacker actions. These possible actions are 
refined by the attacker’s fingerprinting actions or attacker’s knowledge state to determine 
if these are “available” to the attacker. Finally, the attacker behavior (goals, strategy, and 
preferences) will determine if they are “useable” (or “preferred”) in attack plans.  
6.3.3 Information Integration 
Information in the cyber-security domain is often generated by multiple sources 
dispersed in time and space. Traditionally, this distributed information is extracted from 
its source and stored locally (typically in a database or knowledgebase) for its use in the 
planning algorithm. The logical language used in this dissertation can be used to link the 
local storage of information directly to the source of information. This allows updating 
information as it changes at the source. Furthermore, the logical encoding is used to 
combine the information from multiple sources. The following example explains how this 
can be accomplished 
In this example: 
 The information about software systems is generated by two separate network 
management systems. 
 This information is stored in two separate network information ontologies.  
 These network management systems periodically scan the network and update the 
information in these two network information ontologies.   
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 Network information ontology 1 (NIO1) stores the information that MySQL 
Server is database server (NIO1:MySQLServer type NIO1:DatabaseServer).9 
 Network information ontology 2 encodes that the MySQL Server is a SQL Server 
(NIO2:MySQLServer type NIO2:SQLServer). 
The asset ontology has to combine the information from these two sources to use it 
for planning. This is done by linking the individuals in the asset ontology to their source 
network information ontology. Instead of copying the information about the individual to 
a new ontology, only a reference to the individual is inserted in the asset ontology. Any 
further information encoded in the asset ontology is added as an overlay tag on this 
reference. This is a convenient feature and allows using, classifying, and adding more 
information to the individual without physically copying the individual to a new 
integrated ontology.   
The two network information ontologies can also be logically combined without 
creating a new merged ontology. This is done by adding additional information about 
how the original information should be interpreted. This is explained using the examples 
below.  
The two ontologies encode that (NIO1:MySQLServer type NIO1:DatabaseServer) 
and (NIO2:MySQLServer type NIO2:SQLServer). Both of these statements are true. 
These statements can be merged by defining a class Asset:Database in the asset 
ontology, and making the NIO1:DatabaseServer and NIO2:SQLServer sub-classes of 
this Asset:Database class. This is shown in case (a) of Figure 35 below.  
                                                 
9  The notation OntologyName: (individual, class, property) indicates that the individual, 
class or property following the (:) belongs to the ontology called OntologyName. 
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Alternatively, if it is to be encoded that two classes represent different names of the 
same class, then they can be merged by defining two classes to be equivalent classes (or 
by defining NIO1:DatabaseServer and NIO2:SQLServer as sub-classes of one another), 
and making one of the these two class an equivalent class to Asset:Database class. This 
is shown in Figure 35 (b). 
It is known that SQL Servers are also a type of database servers. If it is to be encoded 
that all the members of NIO2:SQLServer are also members of NIO1:DatabaseServer, 
then it can be achieved by making NIO2:SQLServer a subclass of NIO1:DatabaseServer, 
















Figure 35: Asset Ontology- fusion example 
The examples explained in this section are used only to illustrate different ways of 
combining information. It is important to note that the general rule of thumb for encoding 
the information in this dissertation is to “retain the detailed information and abstract the 
details when needed”. This means that while combining the information, it is important 
not to lose the fact that “SQL Server” may be vulnerable to an “SQL injection” attack, 
even though “SQL Server” is now encoded as “Database Server”. Since, the logical 
encoding allows retaining the information that the individual now classified as “Database 
Scenario Encoded Information 
Class Property Class 
(a) NIO1: DatabaseServer subClassOf Asset:Database 
 NIO2: SQLServer subClassOf Asset:Database 
(b) NIO1: DatabaseServer subClassOf NIO2: SQLServer 
 NIO2: SQLServer subClassOf NIO1: DatabaseServer 
 NIO1: DatabaseServer equivalentClass Asset:Database 
(c) NIO2: SQLServer subClassOf NIO1: DatabaseServer 
 NIO1: DatabaseServer equivalentClass Asset:Database 
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Server” is also a “SQL Server”, the information that this individual may be vulnerable to 
“SQL injection” attack is not lost.  
Similar to subClassOf relation, a subPropertyOf relation can be used to combine 
different property definitions. Finally, the individuals can also be defined as equivalent 
individuals by using the sameAs property.  
This act of combining information is called information fusion. The information 
fusion techniques mentioned in Figure 35 above are an application of the ontology 
language used in this dissertation. This language [110, 114, 116, 121] was invented to 
provide this type of functionality.  
6.4 Threat Ontology 
The previous section explained how the basic logical constructs and inferences could 
be used to encode a rich set of information about assets. This section describes how the 
information about threat is encoded. 
6.4.1 Source of Information 
Information about attacks and vulnerability is available through many sources. A 
detailed comparison of the content and structure of these data sources is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, but they are summarized in this section. 
6.4.1.1 Vulnerability Database  
The majority of software vendors maintain their own vulnerability databases( for 
example, Microsoft publishes security advisories [122]. Many research, government, and 
open source communities also maintain public repositories/databases of vulnerability 
information [5, 123-126]. These databases may store different types of information about 
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the same vulnerability, and often reference each other so that human researchers can 
gather more information.  
6.4.1.2 Pattern  
The term “pattern” in software industry vocabulary refers to a frequently recurring 
structure or a template. The “attack patterns” are templates of common methods for 
exploiting software. These attack patterns are mainly used as information sources to 
develop more secure software. Multiple sources of knowledge about attack pattern exist 
[127, 128]. 
6.4.1.3 Attack Database 
Unlike the vulnerability and pattern databases, attack databases are not collected and 
maintained as rigorously, but this information is available on the internet. One type of 
community effort to capture and study attacks is carried out by using specialized 
networks known as “honeynets”[129] and “honeypots”[130]. The penetration testing 
tools designed to evaluate cyber-security by compromising the system also maintain their 
own repository of implemented attacks [131].   
6.4.1.4 Taxonomies, Ontology and Modeling Languages  
Several attempts to classify vulnerabilities or attacks have been made. These 
attempts have varied from trying to classify all vulnerabilities or attacks [132, 133] to 
creating a sub-classification structure for a specific class of attacks [134]. Even though a 
wide range of taxonomies exists, there is no predominant taxonomy that is widely used.  
There are also different types of cyber-security ontology available. Appendix II  
describes how the ontology are used for other applications[118, 135] in cyber-security 
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domain (for example, for encoding security features requirements for application 
development; annotating the web service descriptions with security requirements and 
capabilities; developing ontology of intrusion detection system for communicating the 
information regarding an attack; developing a global security ontology etc.). These 
ontologies can be used as information source to the proposed framework. The proposed 
framework’s ontologies also can be integrated (or map) in broader cyber-security domain 
ontology. 
The information about attacks can also be captured using different attack modeling 
languages describing different aspects of the attacks. The major attack modeling 
languages are JIGSAW [136], LAMBDA[137], and CAML [138].  According to [1] 
CAML, LAMBDA, and JIGSAW defines preconditions and effects for attack actions and 
describes the state of network components. According to [1]  the Correlated Attack 
Modeling Language (CAML) “can be used to model attack scenarios and recognize 
scenarios from intrusion-detection alerts.” CAML  [138] enables specification of 
multistage attack scenario in modular fashion. LAMDA [137] uses a declarative approach 
to encode attack pre-conditions, effects, scenarios, and detection steps. According to 
[136], “JIGSAW provides a convenient tool for describing attack components in terms of 
capabilities and concepts.” 
These taxonomies, ontology, and modeling languages are considered as information 
sources to the proposed framework. 
6.4.1.5 Information Usage 
The goal of this dissertation is not to create or support a database, taxonomy, pattern, 
or ontology but to use these as diverse knowledge sources. This dissertation uses the 
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concept of patterns, described in Section 6.4.1.2 (note that this pattern does not refer to a 
specific attack pattern database). Currently, attack pattern databases are primarily used to 
build more secure software by protecting against known vulnerabilities. Apart from using 
the attack pattern for technical understanding, this dissertation uses the information about 
potential attacker behavior to understand the decisions points available to the attacker. In 
this dissertation, the encoded information in pattern ontology may come from multiple 
vulnerability, attack, and pattern databases.  
6.4.2 Threat Ontology Logic 
The threat pattern describes a template to encode threat information. Three types of 
information are important for planning. These are the structure of the threat pattern, the 
target of the threat, and the impact of the threat.   
6.4.2.1 Structure of Threat Pattern 
The structure of the threat pattern describes how an attacker can exploit the 
vulnerability described by the pattern. At minimum, this structure encodes what type of 
vulnerability is exploited by the pattern, what attack can be used to do so, and what are 









Figure 36: Minimal encoding of pattern information 
  
The pattern also encodes details of the attack process when such information is 




Individual Property Individual 
BO-IIS-SSI hasAttack IndigoPrototype 
BO-IIS-SSI hasVul CAN-2001-0506 














Figure 37: Detailed encoding of pattern information 
 
This pattern encodes that the attack can be executed in four steps. The pattern also 
encodes the sequence in which the steps should be executed by using the property 
Additional Encoded Information 
Individual Property  Individual 
BO-IIS-SSI hasStep Step_1 
BO-IIS-SSI hasStep Step_2 
BO-IIS-SSI hasStep Step_3 
BO-IIS-SSI hasStep Step_4 
Step_1 hasMethod Method_1 
Step_2 hasMethod Method_2 
Step_3 hasMethod Method_3 
Step_4 hasMethod Method_4 
Step_1 label Identification of buffer to target 
Step_2 label Identification of the injection vector 
Step_3 label Crafting the content to be injected 
Step_4 label Injecting Content 
Step_1 hasPrecedence Step_2 
Step_2 hasPrecedence Step_3 
Step_3 hasPrecedence Step_4 
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hasPrecedence. Each of the four steps has a method associated with it, and these four 
steps have descriptive labels. These are called “identification of the buffer to target”, 
“identification of the injection vector”, “crafting the connect to be injected”, and 
“injecting content’, which captures the information identified in [139].   
6.4.2.2 Target of the Threat Pattern   
Target of the threat pattern refers to a software system (or a component of a system) 
that may have a vulnerability, which can be targeted using the attack pattern. 
Traditionally, this information originates from vulnerability and attack databases. This 
information is traditionally encoded as a direct relationship stating that a certain system 
has certain vulnerabilities. Instead of encoding that the system has vulnerability, Flux 
encodes the logic behind why the system may have this vulnerability. This is done to 
better capture the attacker thought processes for uncovering the vulnerability.  
Once encoded, this logical definition is used to infer that a specific system may be 
susceptible to buffer overflow, when the available information about system 
characteristics matches the encoded logical definition.  
For example, it is known that, the buffer overflow vulnerability allows overloading a 
predefined amount of space in a buffer (a data structure used by the software), which can 
potentially overwrite and corrupt data in memory [120]. The buffer overflow attack can 
use this vulnerability to overwrite a location in memory that allows him to gain 
unauthorized access or it can corrupt data to crash the software. Buffer overflow 
vulnerability can be prevented by using a method called boundary protection, which 
checks the bounds of buffers to prevent overloading. 
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Given this, it can be stated that if the software using a data structure called a buffer, 
does not use a boundary protection, then it is potentially susceptible to buffer overflow 
attacks. Using this information, the buffer overflow target (BO-Target) is encoded by the 
property restriction that ((softThatsLacking someValuesFrom BoundryProtection) and 





Figure 38: Target of the pattern logic example 
When it is discovered that a certain system matches this class membership criteria, 
the system is classified as a potential target of a buffer overflow attack. This inference is 
true even if specific buffer overflow vulnerability has not yet been discovered in the 
system, or if an attack to exploit a discovered vulnerability currently does not exist. This 
is important because not only such vulnerability or attack can be discovered in future, but 
this type of abstract reasoning is also used by the attacker to discover such vulnerability. 
Furthermore, this may be sufficient information for a leap-before-you-look type of 
attacker to launch known buffer overflow attacks against the system. 
Encoded Information 
Class Property  Class 








The information that a system is susceptible to a certain type of vulnerability is used 
to trigger the pattern that can exploit this vulnerability. This is shown in Figure 38 and is 
described below. 
 The target class (BO-Target), shown in Figure 38 has an anonymous parent class 
defined by the restriction targetThatTriggers hasValue BO-Pattern.  
 When an individual becomes a member of this target class, the following can be 
inferred: 
o This individual is also a member of the anonymous parent class 
(targetThatTriggers hasValue BO-Pattern) 
o Since the individual is a member of this parent class, it has to meet the 
encoded restrictions, and hence the individual has to satisfy the property 
relation targetThatTriggers hasValue BO-Pattern. 
o Given this, it can further be inferred that the individual is related to BO-
Pattern by the targetThatTriggers property. 
This can be used to infer that the system that is classified as the member of the BO-
Target class triggers the BO-Pattern pattern.   
When more information about the system’s characteristics is available, more patterns 
that may target the systems can be identified. For example, if it is discovered that 
“System A” uses a buffer data structure, does not implement a boundary protection 
mechanism, and is an IIS Server, then it can be inferred that “System A” is susceptible to 
the IIS buffer overflow attack.  
If more information is available, indicating that this IIS Server uses functionality 
called ISAPI (Internet Server Application Programming Interface), then it can be further 
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inferred that this system is susceptible to a buffer overflow attack in this functionality. 
This is shown in Figure 39 below. 
 
Figure 39: Target of the threat pattern logic example when more information is available 
The target of the threat pattern logic is used in planning ontology to 1) identify the 
potential target of threat based on availability of the information about software systems, 
2) to trigger the threat pattern, and 3) to trigger the fingerprinting goals to discover the 
information about software systems. 
Encoded Information 
Class/Individual Property  Class/ Individual 
BO-Target-IIS equivalentClass BO-Target and IIS 
BO-Target-IIS subclassOf targetThatTriggers hasValue BO-IIS-SSI 
BO-Target-ISAPI equivalentClass BO-Target and IIS and (usesFunctionality 
hasValue ISAPI) 
BO-Target-ISAPI subClassOf targetThatTriggers hasValue BO-Chunkcode 
SystemA type BO-Target-IIS 
SystemA usesFunctionality ISAPI 
Inferred Information 
Class/ Individual Property  Class/ Individual 
SystemA targetThatTriggers BO-IIS-SSI 
SystemA targetThatTriggers BO-Chunkcode 
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6.4.2.3 Impact of the pattern 
The impact of the threat pattern is encoded as a part of the structure of the pattern, as 
shown in Figure 36 and 37. The planning ontology uses this impact information to trigger 
the information that can be used in attack plan generation. The planning ontology logic is 
described in next section. 
6.5 Planning Ontology 
6.5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Section 4.3.6, the planning logic generates the attack plans by 
trying to answer the following questions. 
Given that, an individual is classified as the selected goal of the attack: 
1. What cognitive tasks does the attacker have to execute to accomplish this goal, 
given the opportunities provided by the system? 
2. How can the attacker discover these opportunities? 
3. What type of attacks can be used to exploit these opportunities, to accomplish the 
selected cognitive tasks or goals? 
4. What opportunities are available to execute these attacks? 
5. How does the attacker select which cognitive tasks, opportunity discovery actions, 
and attacks to execute? 
To encode this information, the objective of the distributed planning ontology is to: 
1. Trigger the cognitive tasks as possible sub-goals available to the attacker, given 




2. Trigger the fingerprinting actions available to the attacker, given the information 
about selected goal, sub-goals, attacks (threat patterns), and attacker’s state of 
knowledge.  
3. Trigger the opportunities that can be targeted, given the attacker’s state of 
knowledge about the system. This knowledge can be acquired by executing the 
fingerprinting actions identified above. 
4. Trigger the available attacks (threat patterns) that can achieve the selected goal or 
sub-goal. 
The attacker behavior ontology described in Chapter 7 answers the fifth question 
about how the attacker decides which cognitive tasks, opportunity discovery methods, 
attacks to choose. 
The planning ontology encodes the logic of how the information (described above) is 
triggered. This planning ontology uses the information stored in the asset and threat 
ontology. Section 6.5.3 describes how the information encoded in the asset and threat 
ontologies is used by the planning logic to trigger the four types of information identified 
above. The planning ontology is also divided into anchor and catcher sets. These are also 
described in Section 6.5.2.  
6.5.2 Planning Ontology: Anchor and Catcher Sets 
Anchor and catcher sets describe which classes will remain stable and which will 




6.5.2.1 Anchor Sets  
Anchor sets represent the highest layer of the planning ontology logic that remains 
stable (i.e., the names, meaning and usage of an anchor set does not change or does not 
change frequently). The centralized algorithm queries and/or populates the anchor sets.   
The centralized algorithm populates the anchor sets with information about 
attacker’s decisions (selected goal, sub-goals, patterns, and attacks). Flux uses this 
information to further trigger (populate) the anchor sets.  
In anchor set logic, when an individual is classified as a “selected goal”, other 
individuals that can help accomplish this goal are classified as members of “goal 
triggered sub-goals”. The fingerprinting sub-goals that can provide information about the 
selected goals are classified as members of “goal triggered fingerprinting goals”. 
Similarly, when an individual classified as a sub-goal is chosen as the “selected sub-
goal”, more individuals are classified as members of “sub-goal triggered sub-goal” and 
the “sub-goal triggered fingerprinting goals”. Any threat patterns that can accomplish 
either the selected goal or the selected sub-goals are classified as “triggered patterns”. 
The attacks available in the “triggered patterns” are classified as “triggered attacks”. 
The vulnerabilities available in the “triggered patterns” are classified as “triggered 
vulnerabilities”. 
6.5.2.2 Catcher Sets 
The logic of how the individuals become members of the triggered anchor sets is 
derived from more detailed catcher set logic.   
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Catcher sets are dynamic and their availability, meaning, and usage may change 
based on the cyber-security domain information and the attack situation. Different catcher 
sets can become members of different anchor sets, depending on the attack situation. 
Catcher sets logic describes under what circumstances individuals will become 
members of these catcher sets. This logic is described in Section 6.5.3. Section 6.5.3 also 
describes how the individuals in catcher sets become the members of anchor sets, either 
by virtue of class hierarchy (in which anchor sets are encoded as a parent class of catcher 
sets), or by property hierarchy (in which anchor sets are defined by restricting the parent 
properties of the properties defined in catcher set logic). In this way, the catcher sets 
control the size of the anchor sets by providing individuals. 
6.5.3 Planning Ontology: Functional Description 
This section describes how the four types of information described in Section 6.5.1 
are triggered by the planning ontology. 
6.5.3.1 Trigger the Cognitive Tasks as Sub-goals 
This logic triggers the cognitive tasks as sub-goals given the information about 
attack goals (or sub-goals) and attacker’s knowledge state. There are three types of 
cognitive domain specific tasks and three types of corresponding sub-goals available to 
the attacker. These are identified as exploit functionality, exploit connectivity, and exploit 
attributes. Note that new types of intentional goals and situational sub-goals can be 
modeled using the proposed framework’s logic if needed. 
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6.5.3.1.1 Exploit Functionality   
The objective of attacker is to compromise information confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability. The information to be compromised is stored in some place, transmitted 
using some mechanism, and potentially processed by some entity. These become the 
logical choices of attack or the opportunities that the domain provides. These 
opportunities are represented as the potential situational sub-goals called “location to 
which access is needed”, “process to be hijacked”, “transmission to be captured”, etc. 
These situational sub-goals have a functional relation with the goal “information to be 
compromised”. Therefore, they are called cognitive domain specific tasks to exploit 
functionality.  
An example of how the exploit functionality type of sub-goals are triggered using the 
asset ontology information was illustrated in Section 4.3.6. This example is reproduced in 
this section. Figures 40 and 41 represent the encoded and inferred information using this 







Figure 40:  Anchor and catcher sets for triggering exploit functionality subgoal 
Encoded Information 
Class Property  Class 
LocationToWhichAccessIsNeeded equivalentClass stores someValuesFrom InformationToBeLeaked 
FunctionalGoalTriggeredSubGoal equivalentClass hasFunctionalRelation someValuesFrom 
SelectedGoal 
SubGoalTriggeredFingerprintingGoal equivalentClass scans someValuesFrom TriggeredSubgoal 
FunctionalGoalTriggeredSubGoal subClassOf GoalTriggeredSubgoal 





Figure 41:  Trigger logic for “exploit functionality” subgoal  
The inference flow shown in Figure 41 is described below. 
(i/p): The trade secret is classified as a selected goal and is the information to be 
leaked. 
Given this information, the following inferences are triggered: 
1. Since the MySQL Server has a stores relation with trade secret, which is now the 
“information to be leaked”, it satisfies the membership definition of “location to 
which access is needed” class and is classified as a member of this class. 
2. Since the MySQL Server satisfies the relation hasFunctionalRelation with the 
selected goal, trade secret, it further satisfies the membership definition of the 
class “Functional goal triggered sub-goal”.  
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3. “Functional goal triggered sub-goal” is classified as the subclass of the “Goal 
triggered sub-goal” class. Hence, the MySQL Server becomes a “Goal triggered 
sub-goal”. 
4. The “Goal triggered sub-goal” is further defined as a subclass of “Triggered sub-
goal”. Hence, the MySQL Server becomes a “Triggered sub-goal”. 
5. Given all this information, the database scan now satisfies the definition of the 
“Sub-goal triggered fingerprinting goal” class, and is classified as a member of 
this class. 
Apart from this, the planning ontology, also encodes how the attacker can exploit the 
functionality originated by the processing and transmission of information.   
6.5.3.1.2 Exploit Connectivity 
As described in the Section 6.3, the computational entities are connected to each 
using different connection mechanisms. These connections further provide an opportunity 
for launching attacks. The connected entities, by virtue of their connection, become 
potential situational sub-goals of the attacker. In this dissertation, these are called 
cognitive domain specific tasks to exploit connectivity.   
An example of how exploit connectivity sub-goals are triggered is shown in Figure 
42. This example uses the relation hierarchy shown in Figure 33. Figure 42 below shows 
two restriction classes. The first restriction class defines individuals that have a trusted 
connection with a selected sub-goal, encoded as (hasTrustedConnection 
someValuesFrom SelectedSubGoal). The second restriction class called 
ConnectedToSubGoal represents the class of individuals that are directly connected to 
the selected sub-goal, encoded as (directlyConnectedTo someValuesFrom 
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SelectedSubGoal). The classes defined by these restrictions are defined as a subclass of 
the SubGoalTriggeredSubGoal class. 
 
Figure 42: Trigger logic for “exploit connectivity” subgoal 
 
If the information that MySQLServer is selected as a sub-goal is added to this 
example ontology logic, then the following inferences can be made: 
 Since it is encoded that MySQLServer isHostedOn LinuxServer, given the 
property hierarchy in Figure 33, it can be inferred that MySQLServer is 
directlyConnectedTo  LinuxServer. 
Encoded Information 









 LinuxServer now satisfies the definition of restriction class, encoded as 
directlyConnectedTo someValuesFrom SelectedSubGoal, and is classified as a 
member of this class. 
 Since this restriction sub-class is a member of the SubGoalTriggeredSubGoal 
class, LinuxServer is also classified as a member of this class.  
6.5.3.1.3 Exploit Attribute 
Finally, the software systems (storage location, processing applications, or 
transmission mechanism) also have their own characteristics. For example, if the storage 
location or information is encrypted, then “decrypt information” becomes the logical 
situational sub-goal. In this dissertation, these are called cognitive domain specific tasks 
to exploit attributes. These sub-goals are triggered using similar planning ontology logic. 
6.5.3.2 Trigger Fingerprinting Sub-goals 
The fingerprinting sub-goals are triggered using the attacker behavior, decisions 
(selected goal, sub-goal, pattern, or attack) and attacker’s state of knowledge. Example 
logic to trigger the fingerprinting action given the selection of sub-goal was described in 
Section 6.5.3.1.1. Similar logic can be used to encode the fingerprinting sub-goal 
triggered by selecting goals and threat patterns.  
6.5.3.3 Trigger the Target of the Threat Pattern 
This logic triggers the threat pattern’s target, given the attacker’s state of knowledge. 
Section 6.4.2.2 described how system information could be used to infer that the system 
may be vulnerable to attack patterns. The logic shown in Figure 39 is extended in Figure 
43. In this logic, patternTriggeredBy is defined as the inverse property of 
170 
 
targetThatTriggers. The class GoalTriggeredPattern is defined by the property 
restriction patternTriggeredBy someValuesFrom SelectedGoal. This means that the 
“goal triggered pattern” is triggered by the selected goal. This is shown in Figure 43 






Figure 43:  Ontology example describing goal triggered pattern logic 
Encoded Information 
Class/ Individual/Property Property Class/ Individual/Property 
BO-Target-IIS equivalentClass BO-Target and IIS 
BO-Target-IIS subclassOf targetThatTriggers hasValue BO-IIS-SSI 
BO-Target-ISAPI equivalentClass BO-Target and IIS and (usesFunctionality 
hasValue ISAPI) 
BO-Target-ISAPI subClassOf targetThatTriggers hasValue BO-Chunkcode 
SystemA type BO-Target-IIS 
SystemA usesFunctionality ISAPI 
targetThatTriggers inverseOf patternTriggeredBy 
SystemA type SelectedGoal 
GoalTriggeredPattern equivalentClass patternTriggeredBy someValuesFrom SelectedGoal 
Inferred Information 
Class/ Individual Property Class/ Individual 
SystemA targetThatTriggers BO-IIS-SSI 
SystemA targetThatTriggers  BO-Chunkcode 
BO-IIS-SSI patternTriggeredBy SystemA 
BO-Chunkcode patternTriggeredBy SystemA 
BO-IIS-SSI type GoalTriggeredPattern 
BO-Chunkcode type GoalTriggeredPattern 
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6.5.3.4 Trigger the Threat Pattern 
This section describes an example of how the attack patterns are triggered given the 
goal or sub-goal information with the example shown below. For ease of presentation, 
this logic is described in two Figures. Figure 44 displays steps 1-6 and Figure 45 displays 
the steps 7-9 
The numbered steps in Figure 44 are explained below.  
1. Section 6.4.2.2 described how the target of a pattern is triggered. This section 
builds on that logic. The targetThatTriggers property has an inverse property 
called patternHasTarget. 
2. Section 6.4.2.1 described the structure of the pattern. This structure encodes 
information about the effect of the pattern. This information is reproduced here as 








Figure 44:  Example logic for triggering attack pattern – part 1 
 
Encoded Information 
Class/ Individual/Property Property Class/ Individual/Property 
IISServer targetThatTriggers BO-IIS-SSI 
targetThatTriggers inverseOf patternHasTarget 
BO-IIS-SSI  hasEffect PrivillEscalation 
ConnectedHostToWhichAccess-
IsNeeded 




effectProvides inverseOf providedByEffect 
patternProvides propertyChainAxiom hasEffect, effectProvides 
providedByPattern inverseOf patternProvides 
targetThatProvides propertyChainAxiom targetThatTriggers, 
patternProvides 
Inferred Information 
Class/Individual Property Class/Individual 
PrivillEscalation effectProvides WindowsServer 
WindowsServer providedByEffect PrivillEscalation 
BO-IIS-SSI patternProvides WindowsServer 
WindowsServer providedByPattern BO-IIS-SSI 
IIS-Server targetThatProvides WindowsSever 
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3. Conceptually, if an application is hosted on an operating system, one of the ways 
to gain access to this host is to execute a privilege escalation10 attack on the 
application. This conceptual information is encoded by: 
a.  Defining an anonymous class as a collection of all individual sub-goals 
that are achieved by the privilege escalation effect. This is done by 
defining a class using the property restriction providedByEffect to the 
value PrivillegeEscalation.  
b. Making the class describing the host (for example, the 
ConnectedHostToWhichAccessIsNeeded class) a sub-class of this 
anonymous superclass. 
4. In this example, when an individual, WindowsServer  becomes  a member of this 
ConnectedHostToWhichAccessIsNeeded class, the following can be inferred: 
a.  WindowsServer is member of the 
ConnectedHostToWhichAccessIsNeeded, which is declared as a sub-
class of the anonymous class defined by restriction providedByEffect 
hasValue PrivillegeEscalation. Given this, it can be inferred that 
WindowsServer meets the membership criteria of the anonymous 
superclass. Hence, WindowsServer has to satisfy the property 
relationship defined in the membership criteria. From this it can be 
inferred that WindowsServer providedByEffect PrivillegeEscalation.   
                                                 
10 The privilege escalation attack exploits any vulnerability on application or software running on an 
underlying host machine to gain an elevated access to this host which otherwise is protected from this 
application or software.  
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b. The property effectProvides is defined as the inverse property of 
providedByEffect; it can be inferred that ‘PrivillegeEscalation  
effectProvides  WindowsServer’ 
5. The property patternProvides is defined as a chain of property combining 
‘hasEffect’ and ‘effectProvides’.  
a. This leads to the inference that BO-IIS-SSI patternProvides 
WindowsServer. 
b. The providedByPattern property is defined as an inverse of 
patternProvides. Therefore it can be inferred that WindowsServer 
providedByPattern BO-IIS-SSI 
6. Finally, the targetThatProvides is defined as a chain of property combining 
targetThatTriggers and patternProvides so it can be inferred that IISServer 
targetThatProvides WindowsServer. 
For ease of presentation, steps 7-12 are described in Figure 45. This shows the 









Figure 45: Example logic for triggering attack pattern – part 2 
 
7. The patternTargetHostedOn is defined as a property chain combining the 
paternHasTarget and isHostedOn property. It can be inferred that BO-IIS-SSI 
pattenTargetHostedOn WindowsServer. 
8. hostOfPatternTarget is defined as the inverse property of patternTargetHosteOn, 
so it can be inferred that WindowsServer hostOfPatternTarget  BO-IIS-SSI. 
9. Finally, all these inferences can be combined to define the triggered pattern as.  
TriggeredPatternLocToWhichAccessIsNeeded is defined as:  
TriggeredPatternLocToWhichAccessIsNeeded =  
( (patternHasTarget someValuesFrom TriggeredSubgoal) 





Property Class/ Individual/Property 
patternTargetHostedOn propertyChainAxiom patternHasTarget, isHostedOn 
hostOfPatternTarget inverseOf patternTargetHostedOn 
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                                      and (hostOfThePatternTarget 
someValuesFrom Pattern)))) 
This is equivalent to saying that the pattern (BO-IIS-SSI)  can be used to 
compromise the “connected host location to which is access is needed” 
(WindowsServer) is triggered, if: 1)  it targets a “triggered sub-goal” , 2) the IIS 
Server is hosted on the Windows Server,  and 3) the pattern’s execution can 
achieve (provide) this sub-goal.   
This example shows how the basic constructs can come together in a specific 
situation. The complexity of the attack plan is driven by the interplay of these otherwise 
simple constructs. Logic patterns similar to this one are used to define how other attack 
patterns could be triggered when information is available.   
 This Chapter described how Flux triggers the information that can be used for 
generating risk scenarios. Next chapter describes CieKI’s centralized algorithms and 









7 Framework Component: CieKI 
CieKI (pronounced as psyche) stands for Cognition Induced Kinetic Intelligence. It 
consists of centralized algorithms and the attacker behavior ontology. The attacker 
behavior ontology encodes the attacker strategy and preferences. 
The main purpose of CieKI is to: 
1. Insert the attacker decisions in the distributed planning logic (Flux) that triggers 
the sub-goals, fingerprinting actions, and the available attacks. 
2. Graphically generate the attack plan by querying the triggered information from 
Flux, and attacker behavior ontology.  
3. Build the attacker’s knowledge state for generating the attack-scenarios. This 
knowledge state is used to control what knowledge is triggered by Flux. 
CieKI represents the attacker’s decisions points, during the attack process, using a 
situational dynamic decision tree. The attacker preferences for these decision points are 
encoded using the attacker behavior ontology. CieKI uses this situational decision tree 
and attacker preferences to determine the order in which the distributed planning logic 
(Flux) is queried.  
This chapter describes the situational dynamic decision tree and the attacker behavior 
ontology. 
7.1 Situational Dynamic Decision Tree 
It is important to study how and when the attacker makes decisions during the attack 
process, in order to replicate this behavior for automated plan generation. These attacker 
decision points are represented using a situational dynamic decision tree. The options 
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available at these decision points depend on the attack situation. The logic flow for the 
situational dynamic decision tree is shown in Figure 46 below.  
 
 
Figure 46: Situational Dynamic Decisison Tree 
In Figure 46, the trapezoids refer to the anchor set classes in Flux. If there are any 
members in the anchor set, then the corresponding decision point is enabled. Otherwise, 


















anchor sets become the decision options available to the attacker. The decision point is 
shown as the diamond-shaped decision box in Figure 46. This box is the same color as 
the trapezoidal anchor set that enables it. 
This decision tree logic is explained below. The numbers in this explanation refer to 
the component marked with the same number in Figure 46. Note that this numbering does 
not indicate the flow of decision sequences. The actual sequence in which the decisions 
are made depends on attacker preferences and the attack situation.  
1. The decision tree starts with the attacker’s (or red-team’s) selection of a goal, 
represented by the decision point “selected goal”. This selected goal may trigger 
the “goal triggered FP (fingerprinting) goal”11, “goal triggered subgoal”, or 
“goal triggered pattern”.  
2. If initially no information is available, only the fingerprinting goals may be 
triggered.  
a. In this case, the attacker (or red-team) may choose a fingerprinting goal 
from the triggered options. The information gathered by executing the 
selected fingerprinting option may further trigger the sub-goals and/or 
patterns as indicated in Figure 46 above. Note that the effect of 
fingerprinting goals is global, since they are used to learn about the 
system. The information that can be uncovered, by executing the 
fingerprinting goals, can trigger any sub-goals, patterns, or attacks even 
though the executed fingerprinting goal is classified as the “goal trigger 
fingerprint goal”. CieKI builds the attacker’s knowledge state using the 
information discovered by executing fingerprinting goals. 
                                                 
11 In the Figure 48 Fingerprinting is abbreviated to FP for ease of graphical presentation  
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3. The selected goal may trigger potential sub-goals if information about how to 
decompose the goal is available, either by executing the fingerprinting goals, or 
from a priori knowledge.  
a. These triggered sub-goals are available as options for the attacker (or red-
team). When the attacker (or red-team) selects a sub-goal, the “subGoal 
triggered FP (fingerprint) goal” is triggered. If the information about how 
to decompose the selected sub-goal, or to accomplish them is available, 
then “subgoal triggered subgoal” and “subgoal triggered Pattern” are also 
triggered.   
4. If patterns that may accomplish the selected goal are available, then “goal 
triggered patterns” are triggered. 
a. The attacker (or red-team) may select a triggered pattern to accomplish the 
selected goal based on his/her preference. 
b. If a pattern is selected, then the corresponding available attacks are 
triggered. The attacker (or red-team) then may select one of the triggered 
attacks. 
c. If the selected attack accomplishes the goal, then the goal is marked as 
accomplished. When this happens, the logic of the tree moves to the 
beginning of the decision tree if any more goals or fingerprinting actions 
(that may trigger new goals) are available. Note that the attacker (or red-
team) may choose not to use any triggered attacks, if these attacks do not 
satisfy his/her preferences.  
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5. A selected sub-goal may further trigger more sub-goals, finger printing goals, or 
patterns. 
6.  Selected fingerprinting goals may provide more information about the system, 
which can further trigger sub-goals, patterns, and attacks. Again, note that the 
effect of fingerprinting goals is global, since they are used to learn more about the 
system.  
7. Also similar to “goal triggered pattern”, the “sub-goal triggered pattern” 
selection further triggers available attacks whose execution achieves the selected 
sub-goal. The accomplishment of sub-goals in turn may achieve the selected goal. 
In this case, the control returns to the top of the decision tree if any more goals, or 
fingerprinting actions (that may trigger new goals), are available.  
CieKI also provides an interface for the red-team to interact with the target network. 
This interface is called CieKI Red-team Diary (RTD).This decision diagram is a core part 
of CieKI RTD interface. Situational decision tree is used for developing the proposed 
framework’s mode 2, 3, and 4 algorithms. Section 4.3.7 introduced these modes of 
operation, and Chapter 8 describes them in detail. 
7.2 Attacker Behavior Ontology 
Attacker strategy and preferences influences the decisions made by the attacker. 
Attacker strategy in turn is influenced by the attack’s environmental context and the 




Figure 47: Factors influencing attacker strategy 
 
The same attacker may use a different attack strategy, for example, if the information 
to be compromised is located in a military network as opposed to a University lab 
network. The attacker strategy is also dependent on the attacker’s motivation. The 
attacker may choose different types of attacks, for example, if the motivation was 
learning as opposed to getting public attention.  
Given the environmental context and attacker motivation, this dissertation encodes 
four types of attacker strategies called direct, fastest, prudent, and stealth strategy. Note 
that even though this dissertation initially focuses on these four strategies, the proposed 
framework’s logic is scalable enough to encode new strategies, or new combinations of 
current strategies if needed. This ontology can also be used to encode technological 







These four strategies are described as: 
1. Direct Attack Strategy:  In direct attack strategy, the attacker tries to 
compromise the system directly, and avoids using other systems as a launching 
point of the attack.  
2. Fastest Attack Strategy: In fastest strategy, the attacker tries to launch the attack 
as soon as possible. An attacker with this strategy may not try to capture detailed 
information about the system using fingerprinting, but will instead use only the 
minimum amount of information that allows selection of an attack as “good 
enough” information. The leap-before-you-look attacker is an example of this 
type of attacker. Apart from shortening the information-gathering phase, the 
fastest attack strategy may also prefer faster attacks given the option. The fastest 
attack strategy is a more constrained direct attack strategy.  
3. Prudent Attack Strategy: This strategy is the opposite of the fastest attack 
strategy. In this strategy, the attacker tries to gather as much information as 
possible before selecting and launching the attack. Given the option, the attacker 
using this strategy may select attacks that are more accurate (or reliable).  
4. Stealth Attack Strategy:  This strategy can be used with any of the above-
mentioned strategies. In this strategy, the attacker prefers stealthy attacks given 
the option.  
7.2.1 Encoding Attacker Strategy 
In order to encode the attacker preference, the attacker’s decision points are first 
identified using the situational dynamic decision tree. The attacker’s preferences are then 
encoded at these decision points, using the attacker behavior ontology.  
185 
 
7.2.1.1 Attacker Decision Points   
The attacker’s decision points are shown in Figure 48 below. The decisions made at 
these points are driven by the attacker’s strategy. Figure 48 illustrates the decision points 
as 11 blocks after removing the successor flow of logic from the decision tree shown in 
Figure 46.  
Decision points 1 and 7 allow the red-team to select the goal and sub-goal. At 
decision points 2 and 8, the red-team may select either the fingerprinting goal, or a 
pattern that accomplishes the selected goal or sub-goal, or they may choose to decompose 
the goal or sub-goal further. Decision point 6 shows that the selected goal or sub-goal can 
be further decomposed into exploiting functionality, connectivity, or attribute sub-goal 
types. The decision points 3 and 9 allow the selection of triggered fingerprinting goals. 
Decision points 4 and 10 allow the selection of triggered patterns, and decision points 5 




















7.2.1.2 Attacker Behavior Ontology 
Attacker preferences are applicable at these decision points. These preferences are 
encoded using attacker behavior ontology. This ontology is created by encoding the 
following three logic types. 
1. The first type of logic describes the conceptual relationship among the decision 
points (or among the options within a decision point), using properties. For 
example, the information that exploiting a triggered pattern is faster than 
decomposing a goal is encoded as (GoalTriggeredPattern isFasterThan 
GoalTriggeredSubgoal). This is shown in Figure 49. 
2. The second type of logic associates the properties with a strategy. For example, 
the ‘isFasterThan’ property can be used to implement the fastest attack strategy. 
The other three strategies have corresponding properties ‘isDirectThan’, 
‘isPrudentThan’ and ‘isStealthyThan’.  
3. The third type of logic involves defining an abstract anchor property 
‘isPreferedThan’ and making one of the properties defined in step 2 a sub-
property of this anchor property, according to the selected strategy. For example, 
if the fastest attack strategy is the selected strategy, then the isFasterThan 
property is made the sub-property of the isPreferedThan property. If it is stated 
that “AttackA isFasterThan AttackB” then using the property relation and 
strategy information, it can be inferred that “AttackA isPreferedThan AttackB”. 
This ‘isPreferedThan’ property is called an anchor property (conceptually 
similar to the anchor class ) because it allows the CieKI algorithms to query this 
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fixed property every time, but the meaning of this property can be changed in real 
time to reflect the attacker strategy.  
For example, if the strategy is changed from fastest attack to stealthy attack, 
then the isStelthierThan property is made the sub-property of the isPreferedThan 
property. If it is stated that “AttackB isStelthierThan AttackA”, then it can be 
inferred that “AttackB isPreferedThan AttackA”. 
This is shown in the Figure 50 below. The blank decision option trapezoid is 
filled in real time based on the strategy chosen by the red-team or attacker. 




Figure 49: Attacker strategy driven properties between the decsions points 
 
 
Figure 50:  isPreferredThan property 
 
Note that there is one active strategy for each decision point, but the algorithm 
supports choosing hybrid strategies (appropriate combination of the four strategies, or 
any new strategies) for different decision points. 
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7.3 Centralized Algorithms 
The centralized algorithm inserts the attacker decisions in Flux, and queries its 
outcome from Flux. The order of this query is determined by evaluating the attacker 
preferences at each decision point represented in the situational decision tree. The 
centralized algorithms generate the four types of graphical outputs. These centralized 





8 Framework Modes of operation 
The proposed framework has five modes of operations. This chapter describes these 
modes in detail. 
Mode 1: Attack Tree Generation without Attacker Preference: This mode 
generates attack trees. It displays all possible ways the attacker can compromise the 
information’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability given perfect knowledge of 
the system (i.e., it is assumed that the system has been fingerprinted perfectly.) This 
mode assumes that all triggered sub-goals are selected by the attacker (i.e., it is 
assumed that all possible ways of achieving the goals are selected.) 
Mode 2 Attack Scenario Generation Using Red-team:  This mode generates the 
attack-scenario using red-team. It displays the actual steps taken by the red-team, 
given no knowledge of the system (i.e., it is assumed that the red-team has to  
fingerprint the system.) This mode provides the available goals, and triggered 
fingerprinting goals, sub-goals, patterns, and attacks, as options to the red-team. It 
observes the decisions made by red-team, and elicits their theories about attacker 
preferences. This mode builds the red-team’s knowledge state, and uses it to trigger 
the options available to the red-team.  
Mode 3- Automated Attack-scenario Generation: This mode automates 
generation of the attack-scenario. It displays the actual steps taken by the attacker, 
given no knowledge of the system (i.e., assuming that the attacker has to fingerprint 
the system.) This mode uses information about attack goal, and the attacker 
preference encoded in attacker behavior ontology to automate the generation of 
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attack-scenarios. This mode builds the attacker’s knowledge state, and uses it to 
trigger the options available to the attacker.  
Mode 4- Ranked Attack Tree Generation Using Attacker Preferences: This 
mode generates ranked attack trees. It displays attack tree, whose branches are 
ranked according to the attacker preferences encoded in attacker behavior ontology.  
Mode 5- Direct Query: In this mode, Flux can be queried directly to generate 
custom outputs.  
8.1.1 Attack Tree Generation without Attacker Preference 
This section describes the first mode of operation. This mode generates all possible 
ways the attacker can compromise the system, given perfect knowledge of the system. 
This mode of operation is implemented by: 
1. Enabling all encoded system knowledge (i.e., assuming that the system has been 
fingerprinted perfectly.) 
2. Making all “triggered sub-goals”  “selected sub-goals” (i.e., assuming all possible 
ways of achieving the goals are selected.) 
8.1.1.1 Pseudocode 
The pseudocode used for generating the outputs is as shown below: 
1. Read the ontology files  
2. Retrieve class SelectedGoal 
3. For each SelectedGoal 
4. Add tree vertex SelectedGoal 
5. Retrieve the GoalTriggeredSubGoal instances 
6. Determine the SubGoal type for all GoalTriggeredSubGoal instances 
7. Add nodes indicating the SubGoal types 
8. Add tree edge from  SelectedGoal to SubGoal types 
9. Add nodes displaying the GoalTriggeredSubGoal instances 
10. Add appropriate tree edge from  SubGoal type to GoalTriggeredSubGoal 
11. For each GoalTriggeredSubgoal instance 
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a. Retrieve the SubGoalTriggeredSubGoal instances  
b. Determine the SubGoal types for all SubGoalTriggeredSubGoal instances 
c. Add nodes indicating the SubGoal types 
d. Add tree edge from  GoalTriggeredSubGoal to SubGoal type 
e. Add nodes displaying the SubGoalTriggeredSubGoal instances 
f. Add appropriate tree edge from  SubGoal type to 
SubGoalTriggeredSubGoal instances 
12. Retrieve TriggeredPattern 
a. For each TriggeredPattern 
i. Add nodes representing TriggeredPatterns 
ii. Add appropriate edge between TriggeredPattern and the target 
(sub-goal or goal) triggering the pattern. 
iii. Retrieve the TriggeredAttacks  
iv. Add nodes representing TriggeredAttacks 
v. Add appropriate edge between TriggeredPattern and the 
TriggeredAttacks 
8.1.1.2 Output 
The first mode of operation generates the attack tree as shown in Figure 51. This 
graphical output is generated by using a Java graphical software library (and its example), 
called Java Universal Network/Graph Framework (JUNG) [140].  
In Figure 51, the red nodes represent the goals and sub-goals, orange nodes represent 
available patterns, black nodes represent available attacks, and white nodes represent the 
type of sub-goals. In order to optimize screen space, the exploit functionality sub-goal is 
called FunctionalSub-goal and ConnectedHostToWhichAccessIsNeeded is 
summarized as ConnectedHost. 
The tree-structure shown in Figure 51 can be collapsed into concentric circles 
indicating the cluster of nodes. This is shown in Figure 52. This can be used as a visual 
overview to determine which type of sub-goal provides the majority of attacks. Any part 
of the tree or graph can be zoomed in and out. The tool also uses “lens” application from 
JUNG software library [140], which allows magnification of a specific portion of the 
tree. These different features of the output are displayed in Appendix V.  
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Finally, the progression of attacks can also be presented in the form of a radial 
output, as shown in Figure 53. In Figure 53, each concentric circle represents how the 
goal is broken down to executable attacks that can accomplish the goal. These different 
graphical presentations are generated using Java Universal Network/Graph Framework’s 



















8.1.2 Attack Scenario Generation Using Red-team  
This section describes Mode 2 of the proposed framework. This mode provides the 
red-team with a graphical interface that allows them to interact with the target network. It 
records and displays the actual steps taken by the red-team, given no knowledge of the 
system (i.e., assuming that the red-team has to fingerprint the system.) This interface is 
part of CieKI and is called CieKI RTD (red team diary). It implements the situational 
dynamic decision tree described in Section 7.1.This mode of operation is implemented 
by: 
1. Providing the red-team possible attack goals, triggered sub-goals, fingerprinting 
goals, patterns, and attacks as options. When the red-team selects an action, 
CieKI RTD inserts the decision in Flux, and provides the triggered outcome of 
action back to the red-team. 
2. Building the red-team’s knowledge state using the knowledge discovered 
because of red-team’s selection (execution) of a triggered fingerprinting goal. 
This knowledge state is used to trigger the sub-goals, patterns, and attacks 
(available to the red team) using Flux. 
3. Observing the decisions made by the red-team, and eliciting their theories about 
attacker strategy and preferences.  
8.1.2.1 CieKI RTD Input Interface 
This section describes the input interface of the CieKI RTD shown in Figure 54. The 
red-team interacts with this interface to make decisions and to view the options available 
to them. This interface is divided into multiple input/output panels shown by different 
colors. These panels correspond to the attacker decision points in the situational dynamic 
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decision trees. This section describes these panels and the red-team’s interaction with 





Figure 54: CieKI RTD Interface 
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Goal Selection Panel 
The goal selection panel is the first panel that red-team interacts with. Using this 
panel, the red-team can select the goal, change the selected goal, and re-activate an old 
unaccomplished goal. This panel also displays the information about the systems 
compromised by the red-team. 
Figure 55 below shows two panels labeled “Available Goal” and “Attacker Access,” 
shown in cyan and red.   
The “Available Goal” panel displays the possible attack goals available to red-team. 
The availability of the goal depends on red-team’s knowledge about the system. This 
knowledge can be available a priori (a specific goal may be provided to red-team) or can 
be collected by executing fingerprinting goals.  
The red-team can select the goal by choosing an option from the "Available Goals" 
list and pressing the select goal button. CieKI RTD classifies this selected option as a 
member of SelectedGoal class in Flux. Flux uses this information to trigger the “goal 
triggered sub-goals”, “goal triggered fingerprinting goals”, or “goal triggered patterns”. 
This triggered information is displayed in the sub-goal selection panel (shown in Figure 
56), the fingerprinting goal selection panel (shown in Figure 57), and the pattern panel 




Figure 55 : CieKI RTD – Goal Panel 
The panel displaying the “Available Goal” list also contains three more lists called 
“Selected Goal”, “Goals Accomplished”, and “Back of your mind”. The goal, when 
selected, is moved from the “Available Goal” list to the “Selected Goal” list, and the 
“Select Goal” button is disabled. This is because there can be only one active goal in 
current implementations of CieKI. However, there can be more than one active selected 
sub-goal.  
If the red-team decides to change the selected goal before it is accomplished (either 
due to inability to accomplish the selected goal or to pursue another goal), by pressing the 
“Change Goal” button, it is moved to the “Back of your mind” list. This “back of your 
mind” goal can be reactivated by the red-team if needed. One of the objectives of red-
team elicitation is to capture when and why the red-team puts a selected goal on the 
“back of your mind” list, and under what circumstances it is reactivated.   
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Goals that are accomplished are moved to the “Goal Accomplished” list. The 
“Attacker Access” list shows the systems, applications, or information the red-team has 
gained access to by executing actions. At the beginning of the attack scenario, this list 
shows ‘None’, indicating attacker has not compromised any systems or information, and 
it is updated as the red-team analyst accomplishes goals and sub-goals. 
Sub-Goal Selection Panel 
 
 
Figure 56: CieKI RTD –Sub-Goal Panel 
 
There are two sub-goal selection panels in the CieKI RTD interface, the “goal 
triggered sub-goal” and “sub-goal triggered sub-goal” panel. An example of this panel 
template is shown in Figure 56. Flux’s triggered sub-goals are presented in the topmost 
text box above the select button. These sub-goals are triggered either when a goal (or sub-
goal) is selected or when fingerprinting actions are executed (i.e. when new knowledge is 
discovered by the red-team).  
When the red-team selects a sub-goal, it is moved to the selected sub-goal text box, 
and CieKI RTD classifies it as member of Flux’s “SelectedSubGoal” class. Flux uses this 
information to triggers further “sub-goal triggered sub-goals”, “sub-Goal triggered FP 
203 
 
goals”, or “sub-goal triggered patterns”. This triggered information is displayed in the 
sub-goal selection panel (shown in Figure 56), the fingerprinting goal selection panel 
(shown in Figure 57), and the pattern panel (displayed in Figure 58). 
If a sub-goal is accomplished by executing attacks, then it is moved to the 
“Accomplished Sub-goal” list. Note that only selected sub-goals can trigger the available 
patterns, but executing the attacks in the pattern can also accomplish the sub-goals that 
are triggered but not selected.  
Fingerprinting Goal Panel 
The fingerprinting goal panel is shown in Figure 57. There are four such panels in 
the CieKI input interface. The fingerprinting goals, triggered by Flux, are displayed in the 
text box above the “Execute” button. The fingerprinting goals, when executed, are moved 
to the “Accomplished FP Goal” list.  The execution of fingerprinting goals provides 
information about the target network.  CieKI RTD uses this information to build the red-
team’s knowledge state. Flux triggers the available goals, sub-goals, patterns, or attacks, 
given the red-team’s knowledge state.  
 Note that the effect of the fingerpriting goal is global  (i..e., a “sub-goal triggered 
fingerprining goal” can also trigger “goal triggered patterns”). This is because the 
purpose of fingerpriting is to collect information about the target network, and the 
usefulness of collected information may not be limilted to a specfic goal (even though the 





Figure 57: CieKI RTD – Fingerprinting Goal Panel 
Pattern and Attack Panel 
The pattern panel is shown in Figure 58 below. The triggered patterns are displayed 
in the top most textbox. These triggered patterns are further filtered by using the 
information about attacker’s access. Once the patterns are triggered, the Threat Ontology 
checks to see if the patterns are executable given the current access of the attacker. If the 
patterns are executable, then the ontology classifies them as “Executable Patterns”.  
These triggered patterns are displayed for information only and cannot be selected. 
Only the executable pattern can be selected. This executable pattern is displayed in the 
second text box in Figure 58. Once the red-team selects an executable pattern, it is moved 
to the selected pattern list, and is classified as a member of Flux’s “SelectedPattern” 
class. This classification triggers the corresponding attacks encoded in the pattern. The 




Figure 58: CieKI RTD – Pattern Panel 
The triggered vulnerabilities are also displayed for information purpose only. Attacks 
can be selected to exploit these vulnerabilities. When the triggered attacks are executed, 
they are moved to the “Accomplished Attack” list, and the vulnerability exploited by this 
attack is moved to the “Exploited Vulnerability” list. The sub-goals and goals 
accomplished by executing attacks are also moved to the “Goals Accomplished” and 
“Accomplished Sub-Goals” lists. The “Attacker Access” list is also updated to reflect the 
accomplished goals and sub-goals. The attack panel is displayed below the vulnerability 




Figure 59: CieKI RTD – Attack and Vulnerability Panel 
 
 Red-team’s decisions are recorded by the CieKI-RTD as they are made. CieKI RTD 
then graphically generates the attack-scenario based on these decisions. The red-team’s 
theories about attacker preference and strategies are elicited manually at each decision 
points. This elicited information is recorded in the attacker behavior ontology. This 
elicited information can be used to automatically generate the attack-scenarios in mode 3 
and to rank the attack tree’s branches in mode 4.   
8.1.2.2 RTD Pseudocode  
The algorithm in the form of a pseudo code is shown below.  
I. SELECT: Goal 
A. ASSERT:  Selected Goal in Flux 
1. Disable select goal option 
B. Selected Goal may TRIGGER GoalTriggeredFingerprintGoal or 
TriggeredPattern  or  GoalTriggeredSubgoal  given the information in Flux 
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1. IF (GoalTriggeredFingerPrintGoal) THEN enable this as  the 
decision to  be  made ELSE declare no goal triggered fingerprint goal 
2. IF (TriggeredPattern) THEN enable this as decision to be made 
ELSE  declare no goal triggered pattern 
3. IF (TriggeredSubGoal) THEN enable this as decision to be made 
ELSE  declare no triggered subgoals 
II. Repeat 
A. IF (enabled goal triggered decisions to be made)  
1. THEN   
a) DISPLAY the enabled decisions to be made 
b) IF Selected (GoalTriggeredFingerPrintGoal) THEN 
(1)  EXECUTE the goal  
(2)  ASSERT the outcome in Flux  
(a) The fingerprint outcome may TRIGGER 
TriggeredPattern  or  TriggeredSubgoal given 
the information in Flux 
(b) Enable appropriate goal and sub-goal 
triggered decisions to be made 
c) IF Selected (GoalTriggeredSubGoal) THEN  
(1) ASSERT:  Selected Sub-Goal in Flux 
(2) Selected SubGoal may TRIGGER 
SubgoalTriggeredFingerprintGoal or TriggeredPattern 
 or  SubgoalTriggeredSubgoal  given the information 
in Flux 
(3) Enable appropriate goal and sub-goal triggered 
decisions to be made 
d) IF selected (ExecutableTriggeredPattern) THEN  
(1) ASSERT:  Selected Pattern in Flux 
(2) EXECUTE  pattern 
(3) IF (SelectedPattern provides selected Goal) THEN 
(a) Declare goal is achieved  
(b) Updated Attacker Access 
B. IF (enabled subgoal triggered decisions to be made)  
1. THEN   
a) DISPLAY the enabled decisions to be made 
b) IF selected (SubGoalTriggeredFingerPrintGoal) THEN 
(1)  EXECUTE the goal  
(2)  ASSERT the outcome in Flux  
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(a) The fingerprint outcome may TRIGGER 
TriggeredPattern  or  TriggeredSubgoal given 
the information in Flux 
(b) Enable appropriate goal and sub-goal 
triggered decisions to be made 
c) IF selected (SubGoalTriggeredSubGoal) THEN  
(1) ASSERT:  Selected Sub-Goal in Flux 
(2) Selected SubGoal may TRIGGER 
 SubgoalTriggeredFingerprintGoal or 
TriggeredPattern  or   SubgoalTriggeredSubgoal  
given the information in Flux 
(3) Enable appropriate goal and sub-goal triggered 
decisions to be made 
d) IF selected (ExecutableTriggeredPattern) THEN  
(1) ASSERT:  Selected Pattern in Flux 
(2) EXECUTE  pattern 
(3) IF (SelctedPattern provides selected SubGoal or 
Goal) THEN 
(a) Declare goal or sub-goal is achieved  
(b) Updated Attacker Access 
C. IF selected (change Selected Goal) THEN 
1. Put  current Selected Goal on Back of your Mind Buffer 
2. Enable select goal option 
3. IF selected (new available goal or Back of your Mind Buffer goal) 
a) ASSERT:  Selected Goal in Flux 
(1) Disable select goal option 
b) Selected Goal may TRIGGER 
GoalTriggeredFingerprintGoal or TriggeredPattern  or  
GoalTriggeredSubgoal  given the information in Flux 
(1) IF (GoalTriggeredFingerPrintGoal) THEN enable 
this as  the decision to  be  made ELSE declare no 
goal triggered fingerprint goal 
(2) IF (TriggeredPattern) THEN enable this as decision 
to be made ELSE  declare no goal triggered pattern 
(3) IF (TriggeredSubGoal) THEN enable this as 
decision to be made ELSE  declare no triggered subgoals 




8.1.2.3 CieKI RTD Output  
RTD generates the attacker scenario representing the actual red-team steps. An 
example of this for the case study described in Section 5.4 is as shown in Figure 60 
below. These steps are numbered according to the sequence in which they were executed. 
The loop shown in Figure 60 indicates that the initial goal was put on the back of your 
mind buffer and was reactivated later. This change and re-activation of goals and 
backtracking are important aspects of the attacker behavior that are not captured by the 
attack tree.    
In Figure 60, the red nodes indicate the goals and sub-goals, yellow nodes indicate 
fingerprinting action, orange node indicates selection of a pattern, and the black node 
indicates execution of attack.   
In the scenario displayed in Figure 60, the attacker selects “compromising trade 
secret” as the goal. The steps taken by red-team are explained below: 
1. The goal has a functional relationship with the MySQLserver, and it is selected 
as the sub-goal by the red-team. 
2. Because no other information is available, the red-team executes a network scan. 
However, because the server hosting the MySQL is in the private network and 
protected by a firewall, no information about this selected sub-goal 
MySQLServer is available. The network scan however returns information about 
a Windows Server, and the applications executing on this server.  
3. Since no information about selected sub-goal is available, the red-team analyst 
puts the TradeSecret on the “back of your mind buffer” and makes 
compromising the discovered WindowsServer a new goal.  
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4. There are executable patterns available to compromise the WindowsServer. 
From these patterns, a buffer overflow pattern called BO-SMB, targeting the 
implementation of server message block protocol, is selected by the red-team.  
5. The BO-SMB pattern and the WindowsServer goal are accomplished by 
executing a new (hypothetical) variant of Sasser attack called SasserEq.  
6. The red-team then performs a fingerprinting action again from the new locations 
they now have access to. The Windows Server in the given example has visibility 
into the internal network and provides the information that MySQL Server is 
hosted on a Linux Server.  
7. The red-team uses this newly discovered information to reactivate the 
“compromise trade secret” from the “back of your mind buffer”, making it the 
new selected goal. 
8. The MySQL Server again becomes the new selected sub-goal to achieve the 
“compromise trade secret” goal.  
9. The Linux Server hosting this MySQL Server is also triggered and further 
selected as a sub-goal. 
10.  An executable pattern providing unauthorized access to Linux Server is triggered 
and selected. 
11. This pattern is achieved by executing the “LICQ attack”. Having access to the 
Linux Server accomplishes the sub-goal of compromising “MySQL Server”, and 




Figure 60:  CieKI RTD Output – Attack-scenario 
8.1.2.4 Benefits of CieKI RTD 
Traditionally, the red-team has to discover system information as part of the red-
teaming exercise. The red team then uses their attack launching tools to execute proof of 
concept attacks12 to achieve a pre-determined goal. The red-team may spend a significant 
amount of time discovering system information by executing fingerprinting actions, and 
executing attacks to compromise the discovered vulnerabilities.   
The main value of using the red-team, however, lies in their theories about attacker 
behavior and not in their ability to execute the fingerprinting actions and attacks.    
In the proposed framework, the red-team interacts with the target network to be 
compromised using the CieKI RTD interface. This interface isolates the underlying target 
network from the red-team.  
CieKI RTD provides the red-team available goals, and triggered sub-goals, 
fingerprinting actions, patterns, and attacks as options. When the red-team selects an 
action, it inserts the decision in Flux, and provides the triggered outcome of action back 
                                                 
12 Note that the red team carries out an attack only if it is asked to do so.  
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to the red-team. CieKI RTD can also be integrated with scanning and attack launching 
tool like Metasploit [131] .  
The advantage of this tool is: 
1. It eliminates the red-team’s burden of executing fingerprinting actions, and 
launching attacks. This allows red-teams more time to develop and test attacker 
behavior theories.  
2.  CieKI RTD facilitates expert theory elicitation. Using this interface, the 
elicitation analyst can observe and ask questions about the red-team’s selection of 
actions. This allows the elicitation analyst to develop the attacker preference 
ontology. The elicited ontology can be used for automatically generating the 
attack plans.  
3. In secured facilities, it may not be possible to give the red-team access to the 
actual target network. The proposed framework’s red-team interface allows 
abstracting the actual system information, thus giving the red-team only the need-
to-know information.   
4. New proof-of-concept attacks generated by the red-team can be added to the 
threat ontology as new actions. 
8.1.3 Attack Scenario Generation Using Encoded Attacker Behavior Theory  
This mode automates generation of the attack-scenario. It displays the actual steps 
taken by the attacker, given no knowledge of the system (i.e., assuming that the attacker 
has to fingerprint the system.) This mode uses information about attack goal, and the 




This mode of operation is implemented by: 
1. Querying the triggered information from Flux using the attacker’s goal and 
knowledge state. The order of query itself is determined by querying the attacker 
behavior ontology to evaluate the attacker’s preferred decisions at each decision 
point in the situational dynamic decision tree.  
2.  Building the attacker’s knowledge state using the knowledge discovered because 
of attacker’s selection (execution) of a triggered fingerprinting action. Similar to 
Mode 2, the attacker’s knowledge state is used to control the information that can 
be triggered by the distributed logic. Unlike Mode 2, the attacker’s fingerprinting 
actions are chosen by the Mode 3 algorithm based on encoded attacker’s 
preferences and need for information. 
This mode generates the attack-scenario similar to the one generated by CieKI RTD. 
However, each time a goal is changed, the scenario leading to this goal change is 
displayed in a new scenario graph window. The example scenario is displayed in three 
windows, shown in Figure 61-63, indicating that the attack goal was changed two times 
in this example. The scenario within each window (or within each goal) continues until 
either the goal is changed, or until it is accomplished, or until the algorithm declares that 
the goal cannot be accomplished. Figure 61 shows the scenario fragment in which the 
available fingerprinting goals were tried, but the information available could not 
decompose or accomplish the sub-goal “MySQL Server”. Figure 62 shows the 
continuation of this scenario after putting the “compromise trade secret” goal on the 
“back of your mind” buffer and making WindowsServer the new selected goal. This 
ends when the WindowsServer goal is accomplished. Figure 63 shows the continuation 
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of this scenario after the Windows Server is compromised, and the “compromise trade 
secret” goal is reactivated.  
 
 










Figure 63: Automated scenario generation output after reactivating initial goal 
 
8.1.4 Attack Tree Generation Using Attacker Behavior 
This mode of operation ranks the attack tree generated in the mode described in 5.5.1 
using the attacker preference. This is shown in Figure 64. It shows which branch of the 
attack tree is preferred by the attacker. The Flux’s graphical algorithm is modified to 
query the preferences of the attacker encoded in attacker behavior ontology to rank the 




Figure 64 Ranked attack tree 
8.1.5 Direct Query 
Another way to retrieve information from Flux is to use query tools to extract 
specific information directly. This is shown with an example of querying the Flux sets 
directly using an ontology query tool called the “DL Query”[141]. Figure 65 (a) below 
shows the output of querying the selected goal class and (b) shows an example of 








Figure 65: Direct query of Flux knowledgebase 
Figure 65 section (a) describes the members of the class SelectedGoal. In this tool, 
the individuals are called instances. Section (b) displays the outcome of the intersection 
of restriction classes encoded as (patternHasTarget hasValue IISServer), and the 
TriggeredPattern class.   
Direct queries can be used to create custom graphical presentations. One possible 
custom graphical representation allows monitoring the size of the anchor sets. The size of 
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the anchor sets increases or decreases based on the situation and information availability. 
The system administrators currently monitor the availability of new vulnerabilities or 
attacks almost on the daily basis. Using Flux, the system administrators can monitor how 
these vulnerabilities and attacks may be used in the attack plans targeting the information 






9 Framework Evaluation and Comparison  
This chapter compares the proposed framework with manual attack tree and 
automated vulnerability graph generation frameworks. This comparison is done using the 
cyber-security domain requirements identified in Section 3.4, and by using the case study 
described in Section 5.4.  
9.1 Cyber-security Domain Requirements Comparison  
This section compares the proposed framework with the manual attack tree and 
automated vulnerability graph generation frameworks using the cyber-security domain 
requirements.   
9.1.1 Domain Dynamicity  
These dynamicity requirements suggest that the risk scenario generation framework 
should assume that information is incomplete and update the risk scenarios when new 
information is available. The proposed framework generates the risk scenarios using open 
world reasoning assuming that information is incomplete. The proposed framework also 
uses real-time information as it becomes available to generate these risk scenarios. 
The distributed planning logic also meets the following three knowledge 
representation requirements:  
1. Dispersed Information Sources: The cyber-security domain information (For 
example, information about software systems characteristics, vulnerabilities, and 
attacks, attack theories etc.) may be generated by multiple sources dispersed in 
space and time. The ontology language[110, 114] used in this dissertation can 
capture and combine the information from these dispersed sources.  
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The vulnerability graph frameworks capture and use limited information 
(primarily about the presence of vulnerability, connectivity between software 
systems, attacker’s initial privileges, and the privileges gained by exploiting the 
vulnerabilities). Some vulnerability graph generation frameworks [81, 82, 87, 89] 
can capture information about known vulnerabilities using vulnerability scanning 
tools, and/or vulnerability databases. 
2. Dynamic Knowledgebase: One of the challenges of the vulnerability graph 
generation methods is that they require an explicit encoding of the information a 
priori (before executing the planning algorithm). Any change in information as 
well as availability of new information is incorporated by re-capturing and re-
encoding the information, and re-executing the planning algorithm. The proposed 
framework overcomes this by using the information, as it becomes available, to 
trigger the information relevant (for example, sub-goals, the fingerprinting 
actions, the available attacks etc.) for generating the risk scenarios.  
3. Incomplete Information: Current vulnerability graph generation methods using 
traditional knowledgebase and planning algorithms assumes that information is 
complete, there are no unknowns, and whatever information is not explicitly 
stated is false. For example, if information about vulnerability is not stored in the 
knowledgebase, then it is assumed that such vulnerability does not exist. This 
assumption may not valid in the cyber-security domain.  
The proposed framework’s logic overcomes this limitation by assuming that 
information is incomplete and new information may be available. The proposed 
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framework uses only the information that is explicitly stated without making any 
assumption about the information that is not encoded.  
In summary, the proposed framework assumes that information is incomplete, when 
new information is available or if the encoded information changes, the proposed 
framework captures, combines and uses it to generate the risk scenarios in real time.   
9.1.2 Attacker Behavior 
The proposed framework captures the logic behind why the attacker may exploit any 
available opportunities. The proposed framework generates attack plans by capturing 
attacker behavior. The distributed logic captures and emulates the attacker thought 
process for decomposing goals (and sub-goals) and for discovering and exploiting 
opportunities provided by the target network. The proposed framework captures and uses 
the attacker’s motivation, strategy, and preferences for generating the risk scenarios. In 
accordance with the attacker’s exploratory nature, the proposed framework assumes that 
the attacker may discover knowledge during the attack process. This knowledge 
discovery not only guides the attack plan but it also may change attacker’s initial goal. 
The proposed framework builds the attacker’s knowledge state for controlling the 
knowledge that can be triggered by the distributed logic for generating risk scenarios. 
Current automated vulnerability graph generation methods describe how the known 
vulnerabilities may be exploited, but they do not capture why the attacker may exploit 
these vulnerabilities, apart from the fact that they are available. These methods do not 
consider attacker behavior (attacker’s motivation, strategy, preferences, thought process, 
exploratory nature) for generating risk scenarios.   
222 
 
9.1.3 Expert Theory 
The proposed framework allows eliciting and encoding expert theories about attack 
and attacker behavior. It generates the risk scenarios using these theories. This explicit 
encoding of expert theories allows communicating and validating these theories. The 
proposed framework also allows experts to test the impact of their theories, and it can be 
used to calibrate the experts. This is described in detail in Section 10.2.3. 
The main value of using the red team is in their theories about attacker behavior. 
Current manual attack risk scenarios are generated by red teams using their theories of 
attacker behavior. This output (in the form of risk scenarios) abstracts the expert’s 
attacker behavior theories, while summarizing only the actions that the attacker may take 
in the risk scenario. If the risk scenarios are generated without explicitly stated 
underlying theories, then the opportunity to validate and re-use accurate theories, or to 
update inaccurate theories is lost. The vulnerability graph generation methods does not 
elicit, use, or validate expert theories.  
9.1.4 Automation 
Today’s technology infrastructure consists of a large number of software systems. In 
addition, a large number of attacks and vulnerabilities exist. Consequently, the 
vulnerability graph may have hundreds of nodes. To capture this vast amount of 
information, the cyber-security risk scenario generation needs to be automated. 
Automation is not only required because of the scale of the risk scenario, but it is also 
needed to capture the domain dynamicity. This section compares the frameworks using 
these automation requirements. 
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1. Completeness: The vulnerability graph represents all possible ways the 
attacker can gain restricted privileges (or circumvent a security property). In 
the case of manual attack tree generation, the completeness of the attack tree 
is limited to the analyst's ability to identify the attack-scenarios. The 
proposed framework’s attack tree generates all possible ways the attack goal 
of compromising information can be achieved.  
2. Repeatability: The automated vulnerability graph generation framework  
and the proposed framework generate repeatable output given the same 
information as input. The outcome of manual attack tree generation may vary 
even with the same input information, depending on the skills and knowledge 
of the analyst generating the output.  
3. Scalability: The scalability of an algorithm is limited by increase in run time 
(the time it takes for the algorithm to execute) as more inputs are added.  
According to [1], most of the vulnerability graph generation frameworks have 
exponential run time growth (run time grows exponentially).  The algorithm 
described by Ammann et al [85]  has the polynomial run time. 
The OWL language used in this dissertation (OWL DL) has the worst-case 
exponential complexity [142]. However, new versions of OWL languages 
have already reduced this worst-case complexity to the polynomial 
time[142]. The main difference between the proposed framework and 
vulnerability graph algorithm is in how they handle new knowledge. Current 
vulnerability graph generation framework has to re-capture and re-encode the 
knowledge and re-execute the algorithm when knowledge changes. This is a 
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time consuming process. In the proposed framework, new knowledge can be 
incrementally classified into appropriate classes. This incremental reasoning 
may decrease the classification time significantly.  
The proposed framework’s logic is also scalable i.e. new logic can be added 
when new domain understanding is available.  
4. Analyst Dependence: The manual attack tree generation’s quality, 
completeness, and repeatability are dependent on the analyst. The automated 
vulnerability graph and attack plan generation framework have limited 
analyst dependence for generating the tree.  
These comparisons are summarized in Table 10.
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Table 10: Comparison of risk scenario generation frameworks





Can capture information from 
automated tools like 
vulnerability scanners and 
vulnerability database. 
Yes Can capture diverse information from distributed sources. Supports 
information fusion to combine information.  
Dynamic 
Knowledgebase 
Requires re-capturing and re-
encoding information, and re-






Captures dynamic information when it becomes available. Uses this 
captured information to trigger the information relevant for 
generating risk scenarios. 
Incomplete 
Information 
Assumes information is 
complete, and available a 
priori. 
Yes Assumes information is incomplete and is not available a priori 
Attacker Behavior 
 
Does not capture or use attacker 
behavior theories. 
Yes Emulates attacker thought 
process for decomposing 
goals and sub-goals, and 
discovering and exploiting 
opportunities. 
Captures and uses the attacker’s 
motivation, strategy, and preferences. 
Assumes that the attacker discovers 
knowledge during the attack process. 
This knowledge discovery may also 
change attacker’s initial goal. It 
builds and uses the attacker’s 
knowledge state for generating 
attack-scenarios. 
Expert Theories Does not capture or use expert 
theories 
Yes Captures and uses expert theories about attacker behavior. Supports 
expert theory validation and calibration. 
Automation Completeness Displays all possible ways the 




Displays all possible ways 
the attacker goal can be 
achieved. 
Displays all possible ways the 
attacker goal can be achieved given 
attacker preferences. 
Repeatability Yes No Yes Yes 
Scalability Best case polynomial runtime. 
New knowledge requires re-
capturing, re-encoding and re-
executing algorithms. 
Yes Best case polynomial runtime. New knowledge is captured 
incrementally. The risk scenario generation logic of the proposed 
framework is also scalable.  
Analyst 
Dependence 




9.2 Case Study Comparison 
The algorithms of vulnerability graph generation frameworks and the proposed 
framework were compared in detail in Chapter 3 and 4. This section compares the 
proposed framework with the manual attack tree and automated vulnerability graph 
generation frameworks by their, input, and outputs, using the case study described in 
Section 5.4.  
The input and output encoding described in Sheyner [81] is used as an example to 
illustrate the vulnerability graph generation framework’s input and output. This 
framework was selected because:  
1. Even though the current vulnerability graph generation framework uses 
different algorithm or different encoding language, at high level the structure 
of their input (using prerequisites and effects) and outputs (in the form of 
attack graph) are similar.  
2. Sheyner’s  [81]  approach encodes attacker’s fingerprinting actions (using 
system state, pre-requisites, and effects). This allows comparing this 
approach with the proposed framework’s encoding of the attacker’s 
knowledge acquisition.  
3. Sheyner [81] describes input encoding of all actions and output using a 
detailed case study that can be used for comparison. This case study is reused 
in this dissertation.  
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9.2.1 Comparison of Input   
This section compares the frameworks by the type of information used as the input, 
and the process used to encode these inputs.  
9.2.1.1 Vulnerability Graph Generation Framework Input 
The vulnerability graph frameworks primarily uses information about the presence of 
vulnerability, privilege gained by exploiting these vulnerabilities, connectivity between 
software systems, actions that can exploit these vulnerabilities, and the initial system state 
(including attacker’s initial privileges). The actions are encoded using prerequisites and 
effects[1]. The action prerequisites are used to identify the system in which they are 
applicable. Action effects encode the state that the system will be in after the action 
execution.  
The challenges of encoding input in this manner are: 
 Hard coding of fingerprinting action using pre-requisite and system state is 
susceptible to errors. 
 Input encoding of current vulnerability graph generation frameworks cannot 
semantically differentiate the effects of a multi-effect action. Capturing the 
semantics of multi-effect action, and the attacker behavior associated with it 
is important to generate the real-life risk scenarios. 
 The vulnerability graph generation frameworks often make simplifying 
assumption to decrease the search space or to increase the scalability of 
algorithm. These assumptions may not reflect the real life scenario. 




This section illustrates an example of the input and output encoding using the 
encoding described in Sheyner [81]. It then details the challenge of input encoding. 
Example of Input Encoding 
Encoding Presence of Vulnerability 
Sheyner’s framework  [81]  captures the presence of vulnerabilities by encoding 
whether a vulnerable application is executing on the software system or not. This 




w3svch Indicates that IIS web service running on host ‘h’[81] 
squidh Indicates that Squid proxy running on host ‘h’[81] 
licqh Indicates that LICQ running on host ‘h’[81] 
scriptingh Indicates that HTML scripting is enabled on host 
‘h’[81]
vul-ath Indicates that “at” program is vulnerable to buffer 
overflow on host ‘h’[81]
 
Table 11: Vulnerabilty graph geenration method’s encoding of vulnerability information - source of 
data [81, 82] 
Encoding Connectivity between Software Systems 
The connectivity between software systems is represented using connectivity matrix. 
The connectivity matrix is shown in Table 12 below. The Table shows three type of 
connectivity between two software systems encoded using Boolean variables. These 
Boolean variables are in “x,x,x” format. In this, ‘x’ is substituted with ‘y’ (yes) if the two 
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software systems are connected and is substituted with ‘n’ if they are not. The three 
variables capture whether the two software systems are connected by 1) a physical link, 
2) port number13 80, and 3) port number 5190. In real life, the two software systems can 
be connected using more than two ports. In theory, two software systems can be 
interconnected using any of the 65,536 ports. The technology infrastructure also has 
hundreds of software systems. As a result, the connectivity matrix can grow very rapidly.  
 
Host  Intruder IIS Web Server  Windows  Linux  
Intruder  y,y,y y,y,n n,n,n n,n,n 
IIS Web 
Server  y,n,n y,y,y y,y,y y,y,y 
Windows  n,n,n y,y,n y,y,y y,y,y 
Linux  n,n,n y,y,n y,y,y y,y,y 
Table 12:  Vulnerability graph connectivity matrix - source of data [81, 82] 
Encoding Actions that Exploit the Vulnerability  
This section describes how the actions are encoded using prerequisites and effects. 
These actions have four components intruder prerequisites, network prerequisites, 
intruder effects, and network effects.  
The intruder prerequisites capture the necessary privileges that the intruder must 
have in order to execute this action. This is encoded by function plvl(x), which captures 
the intruder’s privilege level (plvl) on host x.  
                                                 
13 In transmission protocols, a port is an endpoint to a logical connection between two computers. 
These ports are numbered from 0 to 65536. Many well-known applications use a predetermined port 
number to accept connections from clients. For example, web serves uses port number 80 to accept 
connections from clients.  
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The network prerequisites encode the presence (or absence) of a vulnerable 
application, and reachability of this vulnerable application (or software system) from the 
source of attack, or any other specific conditions on target network. This reachability is  
encoded by function R(S; T; p) which captures that host ‘T’ (target) is reachable from 
host ‘S’ on port ‘p’. Some vulnerability graph generation framework calculates this 
reachability using firewall and router rules [89, 143], or by using [87] vulnerability 
scanning tools .   
Intruder and network effects are encoded by a change in system state (Example of 
system states are “scanning done”, “vulnerable service not executing”, etc.).  
Sheyner  [81]  requires the actions to be encoded in the format shown in Figure 66 
below.  
 
Figure 66: Action Template 
The encoding of four actions described in the case study used in this dissertation is 

















Squid web proxy to 
conduct a port scan 
Gives a remote user 
a user level privilege 




vulnerability on a 
setuid root file to 
gain root access 
Intruder 
preconditions 
plvl(S) ≥ user plvl(S) = user plvl(S) ≥ user plvl(T) = user 
plvl(T) < root ⌐scan plvl(T) = none  
  scan  
Network 
preconditions 
w3svcT squidT licqT vul-atT 
R(S; T; 80) R(S; T; 80) R(S; T; 5190)  
Intruder effects plvl(T) = root scan plvl(T) = user plvl(T) = root 
Network effects ⌐w3svcT    
Table 13: Action encoding - source of data  [81] 
Sheyner  [81]  uses a binary state variable to represent the system state before 
fingerprinting (represented as “⌐ scan”) and after fingerprinting (represented as “scan”). 
This state variable is encoded as a prerequisite to action LICQ-remote-to-use shown in 
Table 13.  
Encoding Initial System State 
The initial state is encoded as the system state in which 1) vulnerable applications, 
shown in Table 11, are executing, 2) the intruder has “root” access only on his own 
machine, and 3) initially no fingerprinting was performed so the ‘scan’ variable is set to 
false (⌐ scan). 
Challenges of Input Information encoding  






Encoding Fingerprinting Actions  
Hard coding of fingerprinting action using pre-requisite and system state is 
susceptible to errors. An example of this action encoding is shown in Table 13. This 
encoding has a hidden assumption, which if removed may not generate any attack plans. 
This is explained by an example taken from  [81]  that is described below.  
In this example, it is assumed that no fingerprinting (⌐scan) was performed initially, 
and the attacker has user level access to the web server. The only action available in this 
situation is “action IIS-Buffer-Overflow” shown in Table 13. Since this is the only action 
available the vulnerability graph generation algorithm selects this action (exploits the 
buffer overflow vulnerability to gain root access on this web server). The system state 
after executing this action is still (⌐scan) and the only other action available to the 
attacker in this state is called “action squid-port-scan”. This action is available because 
its pre-requisites system state is encoded as (⌐scan). Execution of this action changes the 
state to ‘scan’. This new system state enables the execution of actions whose pre-requisite 
requires the system to be in ‘scan’ state. 
The vulnerability graph using this encoding may select the SQUID scan vulnerability 
using the above-described logic. However, in real life if the attacker was in similar 
situation, how would he/she know to target the machine running the SQUID Proxy Server 
(located in the private network protected by firewall) if he/she does not know that this 
machine exists (because no scans are done yet)? In real life, either the attacker cannot do 
anything (as he/she does not have the knowledge), or he/she will have to use some other 
scanning action to discover this SQUID proxy in first place. If the attacker uses any other 
scanning action to discover the SQUID Proxy Server may also discover other 
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opportunities for executing action (by potentially changing the state of the system to 
‘scan’), and therefore making exploiting the SQUID vulnerability unnecessary. 
The hard coding of fingerprint actions also implicitly links the action with a specific 
network configuration (i.e., the reason Linux vulnerability was hard-coded with ‘scan’ 
because they were inside the private network). This will require re-encoding the actions 
whenever the network configuration changes. For example, if the IIS Server is relocated 
to the private network from the DMZ , the actions exploiting its vulnerabilities will 
require re-encoding by adding a ‘scan’ to their prerequisites.  
Multi-effect Actions  
It is challenging to encode the actions with multiple effects in current vulnerability 
graph generation methods. For example, buffer overflow vulnerability can be used to gain 
unauthorized access to the system as well as to crash the program against which it is 
executed. These two are separate effects that can be used differently in different attacker 
goals. In the current vulnerability graph generation framework, a single action encoding 
is used to capture both effects of multi-effect actions. An example of this is shown in 
Table 13. This is true syntactically as the action can produce both the effects. However, 
in real life the attacker trying to gain remote access to the machine is doing so to use it as 
a precursor to some form of follow up activity (for example, to launch further attacks or 
to gain access to trade secret information). Crashing the program and simultaneously 
gaining access to it may counter this goal of the attacker. 
The attacker’s next applicable actions may be encoded with the pre-requisites 
requiring the service to be available and compromised. Both of these conditions may not 
be met by executing (selecting) the multi-effect action as it is currently encoded. 
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The attacker may also select both the effects when needed, but this selection is 
optional and it is driven by the goal of the attacker. Furthermore, gaining access to a 
target using buffer overflow may require higher attacker skills than crashing the service. 
The input encoding of current vulnerability graph generation framework cannot 
semantically differentiate the effects of a multi-effect action. The current syntactic model 
does not allow selecting only the appropriate effect based on the attacker’s goal and 
situation. Capturing the semantics of multi-effect action, and the attacker behavior 
associated with it is important to generate the real-life risk scenarios.  
Simplifying Assumptions 
The vulnerability graph generation frameworks often make simplifying assumptions 
to decrease the search space or to increase the scalability of algorithm. These assumptions 
may not reflect the real life scenario.  
One such assumption called monotonicty was described in Table 7. Under this 
assumption [85] , 1) the precondition of an exploit, once satisfied, never becomes 
unsatisfied, and 2) the negation operator cannot used to express the precondition. Simply 
put monotonicity assumes that the attacker never backtracks [85]. This assumption may 
not reflect the real-life attacker behavior. 
Another simplifying assumption is made for grouping information together to 
decrease the search space of the algorithm. One of the challenges of the cyber-security 
domain is that a large number of attacks and vulnerabilities exist. Sheyner addresses this 
concern by  [81]  assuming that multiple instances of vulnerabilities can be captured by 
using a single generic action. For example, under this assumption all buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities in an IIS Server can be captured by a single action. This assumption does 
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not reflect reality, where different types of vulnerabilities are available to attackers in 
different situations. These vulnerabilities can have different impacts and can be exploited 
using different attacks. 
This can be explained with an example of three buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the 
IIS Server called CAN-2002-0147[144], CAN-2001-0506 [145], and CVE-2002-0364 
[146]. CAN-2002-0147 is only applicable if the IIS Server is using ASP extensions, and 
it generates a denial of service (DoS) impact when executed. CAN-2001-0506 and CVE-
2002-0364 may lead to the same effect of privilege escalation, but are available to the 
attacker in different situations. CAN-2001-0506 is only available to the attacker when the 
IIS is using the Server Side Include (SSI) directives. It may not be possible to use these 
vulnerabilities interchangeably. 
That being said, it is possible to group together vulnerabilities and attacks, but not as 
substitutes for each other. This grouping can be done to categorize similar vulnerabilities 
and attacks in order to study and encode how they differ. Attack patterns often group 
similar vulnerabilities and attacks. These patterns describe the template of an attack and 
identify the basic steps the attacker may have to carry out to execute these types of attack.  
In summary, it is possible to group together attacks and vulnerabilities, but this 
grouping may not support the inference that the members of the group are 






Encoding the Actions Manually   
The manual encoding of actions in vulnerability graphs is susceptible to the 
following types of errors.  
1. The analyst may accidently encode situation specific knowledge (or inferences) 
using his/her general cyber-security knowledge. For example, it is well known that web 
servers (especially the ones hosting the organization’s websites) in DMZ are easy to find 
(may not require much fingerprinting to locate them). Consequently, the actions attacking 
these servers in DMZ may be encoded using the pre-requisite of system state assuming 
no fingerprinting is required (described by system state ‘⌐scan’). This knowledge may 
remain hard coded even if the situation changes (for example if the web server is moved 
to the internal private network from the DMZ). This accidental encoding of situation 
specific knowledge may not reflect the reality or may limit the scope of hard-coded the 
action.  
2. The analyst may assume the algorithm to know what is commonly known in the 
cyber-security domain. This also may limit the application of the algorithm. 
3. The analyst, while making the modeling decision of what to include in the 
prerequisites, may subconsciously think through the attack plan to be generated (i.e., 
instead of encoding each action independently, the analyst may think through how these 
actions interplay with each other). This may lead to encoding hidden assumptions in 
action prerequisites and effects that may not hold true in all scenarios.  
These issues are exacerbated in real life, where the analyst or defender has to model 
hundreds of actions. Also in real world situations, the action models will be generated by 
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different analysts over a period. Hence, these actions modeled should be flexible enough 
to be accurately integrated together in any (appropriate) risk scenarios.  
9.2.1.2 Proposed Framework Input 
The proposed framework’s input encoding was explained in detail in Chapter 6. The 
proposed framework does not encode the actions by prerequisites and effects; instead, it 
encodes the logic of cyber-security domain. 
Encoding Fingerprinting Actions 
The proposed framework also captures the attacker’s exploratory more accurately. In 
accordance with this exploratory nature, the proposed framework assumes that the 
attacker may discover knowledge during the attack process. This knowledge discovery 
not only guides the risk scenario but it also may change attacker’s initial goal. The 
proposed framework builds this attacker’s knowledge state for controlling the knowledge 
that can be used for generating attack-scenarios. Fingerprinting (or knowledge 
acquisition) is also modeled as a situational sub-goal. This fingerprinting goal is triggered 
based on the attacker strategy, the decisions made by the attacker and the attacker’s 
knowledge state.   
Multi-effect Actions  
The proposed framework captures the semantics of multi-effect actions and triggers 
the action with appropriate effects based on the attacker’s goal and situation. This allows 
attacker (or red-team) to choose the effect that is needed to reflect his/her goal, strategy, 
and preferences. The example logic of triggering multi-effect buffer overflow action is 





The proposed framework does not make simplifying assumptions that may restrict 
the applicability of the framework. The proposed framework assumes that the attacker 
may backtrack, abandon the scenario, or change the goals in accordance with the 
available opportunities. The proposed framework encodes the detailed logic of the 
vulnerability without grouping them together. This logic can capture how different 
vulnerabilities are available to the attacker in different situations. This encoding is 
described in detail in section 6.4.2.2, using the example of the IIS server vulnerabilities. 
Encoding the Actions Manually   
The proposed framework can captures the cyber-security domain knowledge from 
diverse sources. These sources can provide the information without having to think (or 
know) about how it will be used in the risk scenario generation. This knowledge is also 
encoded independent of the risk scenario generation logic. The risk scenarios are 
generated by dynamically combining the encoded information in accordance with the 
attacker behavior (i.e. by emulating the attacker’s interaction with the target 
environment). This avoids the challenges of encoding actions manually.  
9.2.2 Comparison of Output  
This section compares the output generated by different frameworks using the case 
study described in Section 5.4. Note that the case study described in Section 5.4 slightly 
modifies the case study described in [81]. For example, given the challenges of using the 




9.2.2.1 Manual Attack Tree Output 
A manually generated attack tree for the case study described in Chapter 5 is shown 
in Figure 67 below. This tree was drawn manually using the guidelines provided by 
Schneier [72], described in Section 3.5.2.1. This tree shows the different ways of stealing 
the “trade secret” information.   
 
 
Figure 67: Case Study - Manual Attack Tree Output 
 
9.2.2.2 Vulnerability Graph Generation Framework Output 
The output of the vulnerability graph is manually constructed using the graph 
generation algorithm and is represented in Figure 68 below. In this tree, the attacker first 
exploits vulnerabilities in the IIS Server and the Windows Server. The attacker then 
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exploits vulnerability in the LICQ application, or exploits buffer overflow vulnerability in 
a Linux Server to gain the root privileges on the Linux Server. 
 
 
Figure 68: Case study - vulnerability graph 
The vulnerability graph framework also generates a set of critical actions, whose 
elimination will isolate the end state from the initial state. However, this critical set of 
actions is generated assuming that there are no unknowns. This assumption along with 
the attacker’s adaptability may produce counter intuitive results. To explain this, SQUID 
action is added back to the scenarios. The vulnerability graph, with the addition of the 
SQUID action, is shown in Figure 69.  
Sheyner’s critical set analysis[81] of this vulnerability graph identifies SQUID 
scanning action as the single critical action to eliminate. There is “known unknown” 
knowledge in the cyber-security community that the attacker can fingerprint some 
software systems using unknown (or unknowable) methods (for example, social 
engineering, dumpster diving, network packet sniffing).This means that the conclusion 
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drawn assuming that the only fingerprinting action available to the attacker is the SQUID 
scanning action, may not be true. In reality, given this known unknown, the system 
administrators (or defenders) would prefer patching the Linux Server and LICQ 
vulnerabilities before patching the SQUID scanning action vulnerability. Hence, the 
vulnerability graph framework may produce counter-intuitive results assuming that there 
are no unknowns in cyber-security domain. 
 
 
Figure 69: Vulnerability graph after adding SQUID scan action 
The proposed framework generates the attack plans assuming that there are 
unknowns in the cyber-security domain. The proposed framework’s reasoning assuming 
incomplete knowledge (open world reasoning) does not conclude that SQUID scanning 
action is the only action available to the attacker. It however, can use this knowledge to 
generate the risk scenario showing how this action can be used, if the attacker chooses to 
use this action.  
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9.2.2.3 Proposed Framework Output 
The proposed framework’s modes of operations and outputs were described in detail 
in Chapter 8. These outputs are reproduced here.   
The attack tree generated by the first mode of operation is shown in Figure 70 below. 
This attack tree shows the goal at the top. This goal is decomposed into a functional sub-
goal compromising the MySQL Server. This MySQL Server can be attacked by using the 
trusted hosts (WindowsServer-Archie), connected applications (IIS Server, LICQ, and 
SQUID Proxy), or the connected hosts (Windows Server and the Linux Server). The red 
nodes represent the goals and sub-goals, orange nodes represent the availability of 
patterns to accomplish the goal or sub-goals, and black nodes represent the availability of 
attack to execute the patterns. The white nodes represent the type of sub-goal. 
  
 
Figure 70: Case study- attack tree 
Note that the proposed framework does not prune the branches of the tree if 
complete information is not available. For example, the WindowsServer-Archie does not 
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have a threat pattern associated with it but this branch is not pruned, because such threat 
pattern may become available in future, or it may already exist without the knowledge of 
the framework (i.e., there may be a known unknown pattern). Also note that the pattern is 
attached to the sub-goal node that of interest to the attacker. For example, the BO-IIS-SSI 
pattern technically targets the IIS Server, but it is used to achieve the attacker’s sub-goal 
of gaining unauthorized access to the Windows Server. Hence, the pattern node BO-IIS-
SSI is attached to the sub-goal Windows Server in this example. The information that 
BO-IIS-SSI technically attacks the IIS Server is not lost and can be used for patching the 
IIS server, or can also be displayed in the attack tree if needed.  
The attack scenarios showing the actual steps taken by the red-team (or attacker), are 
shown in Figure 71 below. This output is generated by modes two and three of the 




Figure 71: Case study - attack-scenario 
Attacker preferences are used to rank the attack tree. This output is generated by 





Figure 72: Case study - Ranked attack tree 
 
Adding Actions 
The advantage of the attack tree format is that when new attacks or opportunities are 
discovered, they are simply added as new branches of the tree. In the case of the 
vulnerability graph, however, discovery of a new action requires either regenerating the 
tree or using a node insertion algorithm, because the nodes are interconnected. This may 
be a computationally expensive task, depending on the size of the tree and the 
connectivity of the node. 
Changing Branch Definitions  
Proposed framework also allows changing the definition of branches of the tree if 
needed. This can be used for combining or splitting the branches. For example, the 
connected host in Figure 72 shows the Windows Server as well as the Linux Server. The 
Linux Server hosts the MySQL Server application, while the Windows Server is 
connected using a communication port to the MySQL Server. Due to this difference in 
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the type of connection, compromising the Linux Server provides direct access to the 
MySQL Server. Compromising the Windows Server, however, may not provide direct 
access to the MySQL Server but the Windows Server can be used for fingerprinting 
MySQL Server. This differentiation can be made by defining a new class “visible host” 
and classifying all the software systems that are indirectly connected (for example using 
communication ports) to the MySQL Server, as members of this class. This “visible host” 
can be added as a new branch to the tree. This is shown in Figure 73 below.   
 
Figure 73: Attack Tree- Adding New Branch 
 
Represents all Possible Ways the Attacker’s Goal can be achieved 
The attack tree represents all possible ways the attacker’s goal of compromising the 
information can be achieved in a single tree. For example, if it was discovered that the 
MySQL Server has an information disclosure vulnerability that allows the attacker to 
view the trade secret directly, then it can be added as a new branch in the tree. This new 
vulnerability may be exploited by an attack called MySQL Injection attack and it is 
represented by a new branch in the attack tree, shown in Figure 74 below.  
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The vulnerability graphs on the other hand only display how the attacker can gain 
restricted (root) privileges on the Linux Server. Gaining root privilege on the Linux 
Server (or MySQL Server) is only one of the ways of compromising the trade secret. As 
shown in the Figure 74 the attacker can use the MySQL Injection attack to compromise 
the trade secret without compromising the Linux server. The proposed framework can 
display all the possible ways the attack goal of stealing the Trade Secret can be achieved 
on the same attack tree. The vulnerability graph generation methods may require 
generating two separate trees in this case. 
 
 
Figure 74: Attack Tee - Adding New Attack 
Potential Attacks 
Proposed framework’s attack tree can also display potential attacks. This is done by 
using the encoded logic of vulnerability. For example, it can be stated that if the software 
using a data structure called a buffer, does not use a boundary protection, then it is 
potentially susceptible to buffer overflow attacks. When it is discovered that a certain 
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system matches this class membership criteria, the system is classified as a potential 
target of a buffer overflow attack. This inference is true even if specific buffer overflow 
vulnerability has not yet been discovered in the system, or if an attack to exploit a 
discovered vulnerability currently does not exist. Figure 75, shows this potential attack 




Figure 75: Attack Tree Showing Potential Attacks 
 
Does not Assume Attacker’s Initial Location 
The vulnerability graph and the attack tree outcomes are compared in Figure 76 
below. The vulnerability graph progresses from initial state to goal state, and the attack 
tree decomposes from goals to attacks. One of the differences in the outputs is that the 
attack tree does not assume the initial location of the attacker. The same attack tree can 
be used whether the attacker is launching the attack from outside or from inside the 
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private network of the organization. However, the vulnerability graph reduces to two 
nodes (LICQ and Local-SetUID-BO) if the attacker’s initial location is assumed to be 
inside the private network of the organization.  
 
Figure 76: Attack Tree and Vulnerability Graph Comparison 
 
Directly Querying the Triggered Information 
Apart from these graphical output modes, the triggered information can also be 
directly queried from Flux to create custom graphical outputs or to use it directly to 
create automated defensive methods.  
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10 Research Contribution, Application and Extension   
This chapter explains the research contributions, applications, and extension of the 
proposed framework. 
10.1 Research Contributions 
The research contributions of this dissertation are summarized in this section. These 
contributions focus in five areas:  generating risk scenarios, assisting the red team, 
simplifying risk scenarios generation, identifying the cyber-security domain 
characteristics and requirements, and providing the core framework to enable defensive 
and expert validation applications. 
10.1.1 Generating Risk Scenarios by Incorporating the Cyber-security 
Domain Requirements 
The proposed framework overcomes the limitation of current manual and automated 
risk scenario generation frameworks. The benefits of the proposed frameworks are 
summarized below:   
1. Compromising Information is the Goal: The proposed framework generates 
the risk scenario using the attacker’s goal of compromising the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of information. The current vulnerability graph 
generation methods generate risk scenarios only for attacker gaining restricted 
privilege on the targeted software or for violating a security property. This 
represents only one of the ways the attacker can achieve his/her goal of 
compromising information. 
2. Uses Diverse Knowledge: The proposed framework uses diverse cyber-security 
knowledge (for example, the knowledge about software systems’ usage, the 
250 
 
software’s design leading to potential vulnerabilities, availability of known 
vulnerabilities and attacks, the attacker behavior etc.) for generating risk 
scenarios. This knowledge can be generated by sources dispersed in time and 
space. In proposed framework, these sources can provide the knowledge without 
having to think about how it may be used for generating for risk scenarios. 
Manual attack trees are generated by experts using their attacker behavior 
theories and diverse type of knowledge. The automated vulnerability graph 
generation frameworks primarily uses the information about presence of 
vulnerability, connectivity between software systems, attacker’s initial privilege, 
and privilege gained by exploiting vulnerabilities. The automated vulnerability 
graph generation frameworks do not use attacker behavior or expert theories to 
generate risk scenarios. 
3. Assumes Incomplete Knowledge: The proposed framework generates risk 
scenarios by assuming that the information is incomplete, there are unknowns in 
the cyber-security domain, and new knowledge is available frequently.  
4. Uses Attacker Behavior: Proposed framework’s distributed logic classifies the 
knowledge as it becomes available by emulating the attacker thought process for 
decomposing goals, and for discovering and exploiting opportunities provided by 
the target network. The proposed framework also captures the attacker’s 
motivation, strategy, and preferences for generating risk scenarios. In accordance 
with the attacker’s exploratory nature, the proposed framework assumes that the 
attacker may discover knowledge during the attack process. This knowledge 
discovery not only guides the attack plan but it also may change attacker’s initial 
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goal. The proposed framework builds this attacker’s knowledge state for 
controlling the knowledge that can be classified using the distributed logic. 
5. Uses Expert Theories: The proposed framework also uses the red-team’s expert 
theories about the attacker’s thought process and preferences for generating risk 
scenarios. This explicit encoding of expert theories allows communicating and 
validating these theories. 
10.1.2 Assisting the Red Teaming Process 
The proposed framework generates the risk scenarios automatically using red-team 
theories. This decreases the frequency but does not eliminate the need of using red-teams. 
Red-teams can provide important insights, especially for generating risk scenarios for a 
new type of system software. The proposed framework can also be used for assisting the 
red-teaming process.  
The red-team’s tasks include, 1) continuously updating knowledge about new 
vulnerabilities and attacks, 2) discovering knowledge of target network as part of the red-
team exercise, and 3) executing proof of concept attacks. The red-team currently spends a 
significant amount of time executing knowledge discovery and attack tools. However, the 
main value of using the red-team is in their theories about the attacker behavior and not in 
their ability to use these tools. The proposed framework provides an interface for red-
team to interact with the target network. This interface is used to observe and collect red-
team’s theories about attacker behavior. The advantages of this red-team interaction tool 
are summarized below:  
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1. It eliminates the red-team’s burden of executing knowledge discovery and attack 
tools. This allows red-team more time to develop and test attacker behavior 
theories.    
2. In secured facilities, it may not be possible to give the red-team access to the 
actual target network. The proposed framework’s red-team interface allows 
abstracting the actual system information, thus giving the red-team only the need-
to-know information.  
3. New proof-of-concept attacks generated by the red-team can be added to the 
threat ontology. 
10.1.3 Simplifying Risk Scenarios Generation, and Increasing Traceability 
and Reuse 
The proposed framework’s distributed planning logic simplifies the risk scenario 
generation without limiting the type of knowledge that can be used. The proposed 
framework automates the risk scenario generation by using the knowledge as it becomes 
available (or changes). 
According to the OMB, cyber-security risk assessment is a complex process and it 
does not improve the state of security [3]. The lack of improvement in security can also 
be attributed to lack of consideration of unique cyber-security domain requirements. An 
example of this is the assumption made by current risk scenario generation methods that 
the knowledge is completely known a priori. This assumption however produces counter-
intuitive results. This is illustrated in Section 9.2.2.2 using the case study described in 
Section 5.4. In this case study, the “SQUID Proxy Server” has a vulnerability that can be 
used to fingerprint the network. Current vulnerability graph method, assuming complete 
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knowledge, concludes that this is the only fingerprinting method available to the attacker, 
and eliminating it would secure the network. There is “known unknown” knowledge in 
the cyber-security community that the attacker can fingerprint some software systems 
using unknown (or unknowable) methods (for example, social engineering, dumpster 
diving, network packet sniffing). Hence, in real life eliminating the SQUID vulnerability 
may not secure the network. This analysis assuming the complete knowledge produces 
counter intuitive recommendations that may not improve state of security. The proposed 
framework assumes that there are unknowns in the cyber-security domain. The proposed 
framework’s reasoning assuming incomplete knowledge (open world reasoning) cannot 
conclude that SQUID proxy server’s vulnerability is the only fingerprinting action 
available to the attacker. However, it provides the defender the knowledge of how this 
vulnerability can be used for generating the risk scenario if the attacker chooses to exploit 
it.   
The distributed logic also provides traceability of why certain sub-goals and 
attacks were displayed in the risk scenarios. The distributed logic is developed using a 
language that the cyber-security and information technology community is already 
familiar with. This improves the communication of outcome, and the logic used for 
generating risk scenarios. The outcome defined in logical language, also provides 
information about why the software may have vulnerability and how it can be used to 
achieve the attacker goal. This logical definition provides information about how to 
eliminate the vulnerability or to change its use in risk scenario.  
The use of familiar ontology language also allows validation and extension of the 
distributed logic. This community participation not only may improve the accuracy of the 
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risk scenarios generated, but it may also increase the use of proposed framework for 
generating real world scenarios.  
10.1.4 Identifying the Cyber-security Domain Characteristics  
This dissertation identifies the cyber-security domain characteristics and 
requirements. Cyber-security assessment tools should be able to 1) capture domain 
dynamicity, 2) incorporate attacker behavior, and 3) elicit, encode and use expert 
theories. Cyber-security assessment techniques are often adopted from domains in which 
quantitative risk assessment is used. However, the risk assessment methods used in one 
domain may not be directly applicable to another domain.  
Currently not all cyber-security domain requirements are addressed equally. The 
intelligent nature of attacker behavior has been the focus of current research. However, 
the dynamicity of the domain often does not get much attention. These cyber-security 
assessments are driven by expert theories; little research has been done to elicit, validate, 
and calibrate these theories.   
10.1.5 Providing the Core Framework to Enable Potential Defensive and 
Expert Validation Applications 
The proposed framework’s ranked attack tree and encoded attacker behavior theories 
can be used for prioritizing vulnerability remediation based on attacker behavior. The 
proposed framework is currently being extended to develop an automate defense 
mechanism called TARA (Threat Auto Response Analysis). This is described in Section 
10.2.2. Proposed framework’s logical encoding of red-team’s attacker behavior theories 
can be used to identify the conflicts among these theories. These conflicting theories can 
255 
 
be validated and/or calibrated by analyzing their logic, and/or by collecting empirical 
attack data. This is explained in detail in Section 10.2.3 and 10.2.4. 
Finally, one of the contributions this research is trying achieve is to develop a 
framework that unifies the efforts of current cyber-security research domains. More 
specifically, it combines the efforts of attacker behavior, vulnerability assessment, attack 
analysis, and expert theory elicitation research. Traditionally, these cyber-security 
research domains are not integrated well enough to meet the need for cyber-security risk 
assessment. The proposed framework combines the outcome of these different domains. 
The lessons learned by using the proposed framework may provide the necessary 
feedback for effectively unifying these research disciplines. This unification is needed for 
performing more efficient cyber-security risk assessments.  
10.2 Applications and Extensions  
This section describes the applications and extensions of the proposed framework. 
10.2.1 Cyber-security Risk Assessment 
The current cyber-security risk assessment is nine-step process. The risk scenarios 
generated may become outdated with availability of new information by the time all risk 
assessment steps are executed. The proposed framework automates the risk scenario 
generation by using the knowledge as it becomes available (or changes). 
The proposed framework also supports current risk assessment process more 
comprehensively than the vulnerability graph frameworks. Table 14 compares how the 
NIST recommended methods [68], vulnerability graph, and proposed framework can be 




This section describes how the proposed framework can be used for cyber-security 
risk assessment in detail. 
Step 1- System Characterization: The proposed framework encodes information about 
software systems logically. This logical encoding and reasoning supports the system 
characterizations and familiarization step. The proposed framework can capture and 
combine the information about software systems in the target network, as it becomes 
available. This information can be queried by the risk analyst. The proposed framework 
supports specific as well as abstract queries. For example, to support the risk analyst’s 
specific query- “Query A: List all the systems that are not physically connected to the 
MySQL Server”, the asset ontology may use its logical relationships hierarchy to infer 
this information in real time. The proposed framework also allows abstract queries such 
as “Query B: List all systems susceptible to the buffer overflow attack”. This type of 
query can be answered by using encoded information about the software system and the 
logical definition of buffer overflow vulnerability. Note that Query B would provide the 
systems susceptible to the attack even though specific buffer overflow vulnerability may 
not yet exist.  
Federal guidance, FIPS 199 [69], mandates classifying the software systems based 
on their criticality. Instead of subjectively assigning a criticality level (high, medium, or 
low), the proposed framework can be used to define the logic of why the software system 
should be classified in these categories. Once this logic is encoded, the distributed logic 
automates this classification whenever information about software system becomes 
available (or changes). The explicit encoding of classification logic can also be used to 
communicate, validate, and update this (classification) logic. Currently FIPS 
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classification is used for recommending security controls. The proposed framework’s 
logic can be extended for more objective (and automated) impact assessment and control 
recommendations.  
Step 2- Threat Identification: This step identifies threats, their motivations, and actions. 
The proposed framework’s ability to capture attacker behavior (attacker’s exploratory 
nature, thought process, motivation, strategy, and preferences), and goals supports this 
step effectively.  
Step 3- Vulnerability Identification: The proposed framework’s ontology language 
allows capturing diverse and dispersed information. This also allows capturing the 
vulnerability information more effectively than the current manual and automated 
methods of collecting this information.  
Step 4- Control Analysis: The proposed framework can also be used to capture and 
encode the information about implemented controls. 
Step 5- Likelihood determination: The proposed framework’s risk scenarios, ranked 
using attacker preferences, and encoded logic can be used to assist risk analyst generating 
qualitative assessment of the likelihood levels. These risk scenarios can also be extended 
to create probabilistic network for quantitative likelihood calculation. 
Step 6-  Impact Analysis: NIST’s cyber-security risk management [68] guidance 
describes the impact as loss in confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. 
The proposed framework generates risk scenarios for compromising the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information. Hence, the proposed framework is better suited 
for supporting impact analysis of the risk assessment process.  
258 
 
Step 7- Risk Determination:  Proposed framework’s current focus is to generate the risk 
scenarios. These risk scenarios can be extended for quantitative risk assessment. 
Step 8- Control Recommendations: The proposed framework’s logical classification 
provides information about why the software may have vulnerability and how it can be 
used in given goal. The criteria defining the whys and how’s can be used for control 
recommendations. One of the proposed framework’s extensions is to develop a module 
called Threat Auto Response Assessment (TARA), to analyze and recommend 
countermeasures using information generated by FLUX and CieKI. In this module, the 
countermeasures (or controls) are treated as changes in the situation. The attacker’s 
situational behavior is used to determine how the attacker adapts to these changes. The 
output of FLUX, CieKI, and TARA can be used for the risk determination, and control 
recommendation steps.  
Step 9- Results Documentation: The objective of the proposed framework is to update 
the risk scenarios continuously with availability of information, which provides near real-







Vulnerability Graph Proposed Framework 
Step 1: System 
Characterization  
Uses a combination of 
manual and automated tools 
to collect system information; 
classifies the software 






presence of vulnerable 
applications  
Logically encodes the 
knowledge about software 
systems. Supports 
automated classification of 
software systems in 
accordance with FIPS 199.  
Step 2: Threat 
Identification 
Captures threat sources, 
motivation, and actions 
N/A Captures attacker’s 
motivation,  strategy, 





- Identifies vulnerabilities in 
the system. 
-Captures information from 
published vulnerability 
sources, cyber-security 
testing, and cyber-security 
requirements checklist. 
. 
- Identifies critical 
vulnerabilities allowing 
attacker to gain 
restricted privilege. 




scanning tools.  
-Identifies attacker’s 
preferred vulnerabilities 
and attacks for 
compromising the 
information.  
-Captures information from 
cyber-security testing, 
published vulnerability 
sources, and vulnerability 
scanning tools. 
Step 4:  Control 
Analysis 
Generates a list of 
implemented controls. 
N/A Proposed framework can be 
used to captures the 
implemented controls.  
Step 5:  
Likelihood 
determination   
Assigns likelihood levels 
(high, medium, low) using 
expert judgment.  
Vulnerability tree 
information  can be 
used by expert for 
qualitatively assessing 
likelihood of threat. 
Risk scenarios ranked using 
attacker preferences, and 
encoded information can be 
used by expert for 
qualitatively assessing 
likelihood of threat.  
Step 6:  Impact 
Analysis   
Assigns impact levels (high, 
medium, low) against the 
loss in confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of 
information. 
Indicates different 
ways attacker can gain 
restricted privileges (or 
violate a security 
property). 
Generates risk scenarios for 
compromising the 
confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of 
information, and stores 
detailed logic of systems, 
which can be used for 
impact analysis. 
Step 7:  Risk 
Determination  
Risk is calculated using a risk 
matrix of likelihood vs. 
impact. 
N/A Proposed framework can be 
extended for quantitative 
risk determination. 
Step 8:  Control 
Recommendation 
Identifies appropriate 
controls. Uses NIST 800-53 









output and encoding 
provides logical insights 
that can be used to identify 
controls. 
Step 9:  Results 
Documentation 
NIST recommends frequently 
updating risk assessment and 
documentation; OMB 
recommends evaluating 
controls once at least every 
three years. 
Vulnerability tree can 
be frequently updated 
and critical 
vulnerabilities can be 
documented. 
Updates the risk scenarios 
continuously with 
information availability, 
which provides near real-
time assessment and 
documentation. 
Table 14:  Framework’s use for cyber security risk assessment 
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10.2.2 Countermeasure Development 
The proposed framework can be used for developing countermeasures. 
10.2.2.1 Prioritizing Vulnerability Remediation using Attacker Behavior 
Due to the large number of available vulnerabilities and limited resources, it may not 
be possible to patch all vulnerabilities. Hence, this patching effort needs to be prioritized. 
Attacker behavior research [18, 19] suggests that just because vulnerability is present it 
does not necessarily mean that it will be exploited. This research also shows that 
attackers may prefer certain types of vulnerabilities to others. Thus, the prioritization of 
vulnerability remediation should be driven by attacker behavior. 
The proposed framework logically encodes the attacker behavior and uses it to 
trigger the information relevant for risk scenarios. The proposed framework also 
generates attack trees ranked according to attacker preference and the preferred attack 
scenarios. This information can be used for prioritizing vulnerability remediation using 
attacker behavior.  
10.2.2.2 Behavior Driven Countermeasure 
Apart from prioritizing the vulnerability remediation, the knowledge about attacker 
behavior can also be used to create behavior driven countermeasures, which leads the 
attacker away from the system to be protected.  
One of the challenges faced by the defender is the complex interconnectivity of the 
technology infrastructure with internet. These interconnections allow the attacker to 
launch attacks from any geographic location. However, this can be used in favor of the 
defender. Due to their geographic separation, the attackers have to rely on digital 
fingerprinting to locate the target and to perceive the opportunities. This is the reason 
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why the defender often tries to prevent the fingerprinting. Instead of preventing 
fingerprinting, the information provided can be controlled as a new defense strategy. In 
this strategy, controlled information can be used to lead the attacker away from the 
system to be protected, and to observe the attacker behavior in process.  
This behavior-driven countermeasure strategy is explained by expanding the case 
study example illustrated in this research. In this example, the attacker is trying to 
compromise the trade secret stored in the MySQL database, hosted on Linux Server but 
he/she does not know where this server is located. As described in the attack-scenario 
shown in Figure 60, the attacker has to launch fingerprinting action to locate the Linux 
Server. The attacker launches the initial fingerprinting action from outside the network, 
and only discovers the Windows Server. The fingerprinting is executed again after 
compromising the Windows Server. This second fingerprinting action discovers the 
Linux Server. Hence, exploiting the Linux Server requires a multi-step attack (i.e., 
Windows Server needs to be compromised as the first step). The attacker behavior 
determines if the attacker prefers single-step or multi-step attacks. In addition, the types 
of fingerprinting and attack actions chosen are dependent on the attacker behavior. 
When the defender tries to prevent fingerprinting efforts, the attacker may react by 
developing new types of fingerprinting actions. Instead of preventing fingerprinting 
actions, the defender can allow them while modifying the network by adding “dummy” 





Figure 77: Example of behavior driven countermeasure 
 
These “dummy” Linux Servers are similar to the specialized computers known as 
honeypots [130]. These honeypots do not serve any real users in the network. Hence, any 
traffic seen by them can be assumed as unintended traffic. This traffic can be captured 
and analyzed to determine if it is from an attacker. This captured attack traffic is used to 
study the attacker behavior.  
Figure 77 shows “dummy” Linux Servers inside and outside the network. The 
attacker launching a fingerprinting action from outside the network will discover the 
dummy “Linux Server D1”. After compromising this server, the attacker may discover 
that it does not contain the trade secret. At this point, the attacker can either abandon 
his/her goal or compromise the Windows Server to launch a second fingerprinting scan. 
Some of these second fingerprinting methods can be controlled so that instead of 
discovering the actual target of the attack, the attacker may discover the “Linux Server 
D2” instead. The fingerprinting of the actual Linux Server can be constrained so that only 
the trusted computers or users can locate this server.  
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This defense mechanism will not thwart all types of attackers, but will make it 
difficult for them to locate the actual machine. Meanwhile the dummy Linux Server 
acting as honeypots can be used to observe the attacker behavior and to determine 
attacker skill sets.  
In this behavior driven countermeasure strategy, the information about attacker 
preferences can be used to determine what fingerprinting information should be provided 
and what should be constrained.  
The research described in this dissertation is currently being extended to develop a 
third module TARA (Threat Auto Response Analysis) to automate the defense 
mechanisms. TARA uses the attack plans to generate the game tree and game theoretical 
models in order to select the optimal defense mechanism.  
10.2.3 Security Expert Theory Validation 
Expert theories are one of the main inputs to the current security risk assessment 
process. Expert’s experiential knowledge influences the formation of these theories. As a 
result, different security experts tend to form new theories differently, even when they are 
based on the same evidence. The subjectivity of these concepts and theories makes the 
present risk assessment output inconsistent and non-repeatable. This also gives expert 
elicitation and calibration a different meaning. Expert elicitation traditionally focuses on 
eliciting the expert probabilities, and calibration focuses on alignment of elicited 
probabilities with observed relative frequencies. In the case of the security domain, 
elicitation entails extracting 1) the expert belief in the form of concepts and theories, and 
2) the assumptions, evidence and logic behind the formation of these concepts and 
theories. Once elicited, the consistency and accuracy of these concepts and theories has to 
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be validated and calibrated. This section discusses the psychological foundation of how 
the concepts and theories are formed by experts, how they are used for human reasoning, 
and how they can be updated. This section also, describes examples of the expert theory 
validation using the proposed framework.  
10.2.3.1 Psychological Foundations of Human Concepts, Theories and Reasoning 
This section describes the psychological foundation of expert concepts and theories. 
It also describes how to update these concepts and theories. 
Concepts  
In cognitive science, the concepts are defined as basic constituents of thoughts. Our 
understanding and interaction with the world is driven by concepts[147].  According to 
[147], we rely on our concepts of the world to help us understand what is happening.   
Concepts are related to categorization. According to  [148], a concept is a mental 
representation that picks out a set of entities, or a category. In this case the concept 
“refers” and what it “refer” are categories[148]. Categorization is defined as the process 
by which the concepts determine whether some entity is a member of a category  [148]. 
According to  [148], “…classifying something as a category member allows people to 
bring their knowledge of the category to bear on the new instance. Once people 
categorize some novel entity, for example, they can use relevant knowledge for 
understanding and prediction.” An example of this is that if we see a new chair, [147] 
using our concept of chairs, we can draw the inference that it is appropriate to sit on that 




Experience and evidence are used to form concepts in order to categorize and 
generalize the observed objects [76]. The important thing to note in this case is that these 
generalizations, categorizations, and consequent predictions are limited to the realm of 
evidence and use the same vocabulary as the evidence. For example, [76]based on the 
observed phenomenon that on many occasions moldy bread relieves infected wounds, 
one could make the generalization that the mold relieves infection. However, this 
generalization is limited to the realm and vocabulary of the evidence.   
Theories 
The latest and wide spread development in the field of cognitive science suggests 
that these concepts are not formed in isolation, but that they depend on knowledge about 
the world [149]. According to  [76] these concepts are embedded in domain-specific 
theories. This idea is represented under different titles such as “theory view” [147], 
“theory theory” [76] etc.  According to this [76] our everyday conception of the mind as 
well as children’s early conceptions of the mind are implicit naïve theories and changes 
in those conceptions are theory changes.  According to [76], there are deep similarities 
between the scientific theory change and conceptual change in child’s theory. 
According to [76], theories are always constructed with reference to evidence and 
experience, which is different from theory itself. However, the relationship between 
evidence and theory is what distinguishes “the theory theory” from concepts [76]. 
Theories, unlike concepts, are designed to explain, and not to categorize and generalize, 
the empirical phenomenon.  
The core characteristic of theory is its abstractness. Theories postulate abstract 
entities[76] and rules that explain the data, but are not limited to the realm and 
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vocabulary of the evidence. This abstraction not only gives the theories their explanatory 
power, but can also be used for prediction. For example, Kepler’s theory of planets 
allowed prediction of behavior of new celestial objects that were quite unknown at the 
time when the theory was formulated [76]. According to [76], a theory makes predictions 
about a wide range of evidence, including the evidence that played no role in the 
construction of the theory. This can lead to a wide variety of unexpected predictions. 
Consequently, some theories will accurately predict future events based on the observed 
evidence in a manner that no concept, developed using generalization, could capture. On 
the other hand, some theories would be incorrect [76]. These predictions are closely tied 
to the explanation provided by the theory.   
Updating Concepts and Theories  
The knowledge of how concepts and theories are formed can be used to update them. 
Updating Concepts 
According to [147], we rely on categories to direct our behavior despite more 
reliable information that may be directly observable. In this case, human reasoning may 
ignore this new information in favor of using already formed concept. The proposed 
framework allows encoding of the concepts logically. In this case, the machine reasoning 
is used to identify the information (which could have been ignored by human reasoning) 
that conflicts with encoded concepts and categories. This conflict analysis can be used to 
incorporate information that is more reliable and to validate or calibrate the experts.  
Updating Theories Using Ontological Commitment 
Theories can be updated by using the understanding of how the domain knowledge is 
formed by a collection of theories. According to[148], the domain knowledge may be 
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formed by the theories and their ontological commitment.  Ontological commitment 
means that by believing in a theory, the human agent commits not only to the logical 
meaning of this theory, but also to the logical inferences drawn from this theory. In other 
words, the human agent is committed to these inferences even though he intended to only 
assert the base theory. The proposed framework’s logic is also built by using this 
ontological commitment principle. The expert can use the logical inferences generated by 
the proposed framework to verify if they are consistent with his/her belief. This allows 
experts to validate and calibrate their theories by doing what-if analysis on the logical 
inferences of their original theories. Apart from calibrating experts, the proposed 
framework allows experts to determine the impact of their new theories before they are 
committed to it. This is important feature because updating human theories after they are 
formed is more challenging. This is described in next section. 
Updating Theories Using Counter-evidence 
The theories provide an interpretation of the observed evidence, as opposed to simple 
description and classification[76]. In theories driven (formed, updated, falsified) by 
evidence, the collected evidence directly and completely influences the theory. In the 
case of theories, instead of gradually incorporating evidence, the evidence has to be 
accumulated [76],to a certain extent before the theory can be changed. Part of the reason 
is that the main purpose of the theory is to explain the observed evidence. Hence, some of 
the counter evidence, unlike in the case of concepts, is explained away in terms of 
theories. Other counter evidence, similar to the case of concepts, is sometimes ignored as 
noise. According to [76], “It is notoriously true that theoretical preconceptions may lead a 
scientist to dismiss some kinds of evidence as simply noise, or to reinterpret others as 
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suspect or the results of methodical failures.” This is conceptually similar to Richard 
Heuer’s suggestion that[150], “Patterns of expectation tell analysts, subconsciously, what 
to look for, what is important and how to interpret what is seen”. In this case, one can 
suggest that these theories form the patterns of expectations.  
According to [76], the theory modification goes through following phases.  
1. Denial: Any counterevidence to the theory is treated as noise, something “not 
worth attending to” [76]. 
2. Auxiliary Hypothesis: At later stages, the theory may call on ad hoc auxiliary 
hypotheses designed to account specifically for observed counterevidence [76]. 
These auxiliary hypotheses are generated to explain the cases of the 
counterevidence in specific case and are not used generically.  
3. Alternate model:  This requires availability or formulation of alternate models to 
the theory[76]. Even in this case the potential alternatives are not considered 
immediately. At first, the new theory appears in the form of small modifications 
of an earlier theory. According to [76], “only later may it become clear that the 
new idea also provides an alternative explanation for the evidence that was central 
to the earlier theory”. 
The proposed framework can be used to update these theories in the following 
manner: 
1. The proposed framework can be used to update the expert theory by identifying 
the conflict due to observed counter-evidence. It also provides a framework in 
which the experts can form and test the logic of auxiliary hypothesis.  
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2. The proposed framework is currently being extended to generate models that 
incorporate the evidence gradually as it becomes available. These models will 
allow calibrating and updating the encoded theory. This calibrated theory, the 
observed evidence, and the model used to update the theory can be used to 
calibrate the expert. 
10.2.3.2 Examples Expert Theory Validation using Proposed Framework 
The proposed framework supports elicitation of the attacker behavior theories from 
the red-teams. These theories are generated by experts dispersed in time and space. 
Hence, there may be conflict among the theories provided by different experts. The 
proposed framework can identify the logical conflict among these theories. This 
knowledge of conflict can be used either to correct the encoded logic or to calibrate 
experts.  
In some cases, experts may be able to use this conflict information and the inferences 
drawn (using their theories) to examine the premises and conclusion of their theories. 
This understanding may lead to expert’s improving their theories.  
The empirical approach can be used when the expert theories cannot be validated or 
calibrated by analyzing their inferences and conflicts. In this empirical approach, the 
theories can be tested as hypothesis by collecting the real attack data. Such empirical 
validation has been used by [18, 19, 151]to test the prevalent security hypotheses. One of 
the challenges in this approach lies in identifying the theories that need empirical 
validation. The proposed framework can be used to generate the concepts and theories 
that need empirical validation. 
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The examples of empirical validation, conflict identification, and adaptation of 
theories are shown below.  
Example of Empirical Validation 
According to the Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) training guide [15] and SANS 
security training guide [152], the first step of an attack is fingerprinting the system. One 
of the fundamental techniques for fingerprinting is called port scan. In this method, the 
attacker is trying to fingerprint which applications are executing on the target system by 
scanning the system’s ports. The ports are application end-points, which are used to 
communicate with other systems. One of the old myths of the security community is that 
port scans are the first step of the attack. Moreover, these port scans are sometimes 
considered difficult to protect because many court rulings have determined port scanning 
to be a legal activity [153, 154].  
Panjwani et al [151] used the empirical approach to validate if the port scans are 
precursors to the attack. According to this study, it was found that over 50% of the 
attacks were not preceded by any scans performed directly on the system to be 
compromised and only a 3.68% of the observed attacks were preceded by a port scan. 
These statistics are based on 6,203 observed attacker actions (fingerprinting and attacks). 
One of the challenges of performing the empirical validation of theories is the 
identification of the hypothesis that needs validation. The authors of this study were able 
to select this hypothesis for validation because it is a well-known theory in the security 
community, it is explicitly mentioned in the security literature, and preventing the port 
scans is used as a frequent countermeasure.  
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The proposed framework can be used for identifying the concepts and theories that 
may need validation. The proposed framework can also be extended to help collect better 
attack data. This is described in Section 10.2.4.  
Example of Theory Conflict 
In this example, the definition of buffer overflow target described in Section 6.4.2.2 






Figure 78: Target of the pattern logic fragment -reproduced Figure 38 
The buffer overflow vulnerability allows overloading a predefined amount of space 
in a buffer (a data structure used by the software), which can potentially overwrite and 
corrupt data in memory [120]. The buffer overflow attack can use this vulnerability to 
overwrite the location in memory that allows him to gain unauthorized access or it can 
corrupt data to crash the software. Buffer overflow vulnerability can be prevented by 
method called boundary protection that checks the bounds of buffers to prevent 
overloading. 
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Given this logic, when a system “System A” is known to have the properties 
“softThatsLacking BoundaryProtection” and “softUsesDataStructure Buffer”, then 
System A can be classified as the buffer overflow target “BO-Target”. This 
classification in turn infers that “System A” triggers the attack pattern “BO-Pattern”. 
It is known that programming languages like Java provides the ability of checking 
the buffer bounds. Hence, Java can be called a “buffer overflow safe” language (BO-
Safe-Language). This can be encoded as shown in Figure 79 below.  
In Figure 79, the definition of “buffer overflow protected system” is defined as a 
system developed using a “buffer overflow safe” language. This is encoded as BO-
ProtectedSystem equivalentClass (developedUsing someValuesFrom BO-Safe-
Language).  
Furthermore, it can be said that all “buffer overflow protected” systems have some 
type of boundary protection. This is encoded as BO-ProtectedSystem subclassOf 
(softThatHas hasValue BoundaryProtection). Finally, the information that Java is a 
“buffer overflow safe” language is encoded as Java  type BO-Safe-Language. 
Now if it is known that System A mentioned above is developed in Java encoded as    
SystemA developedUsing Java, it can be inferred that  
1. SystemA  type BO-ProtectedSystem 











 Figure 79: Example of conflict between concepts 
In the logic shown in Figure 79, the softThatHas is defined as a disjoint property of 
softThatsLacking. This is because any software can have only one of these two relations 
with any security protection.    
When the three following statements are made at the same time, SystemA 
developedUsing Java, SystemA softThatsLacking BoundaryProtection, and SystemA 
softUsesDataStructure Buffer, the logical reasoning used in this framework will generate 
a conflict. This is because the logic framework is trying to infer that SystemA 
Encoded Information 
Class/Individual/Property Property Class/Individual/Property 
BO-ProtectedSystem equivalentClass developedUsing someValuesFrom BO-
Safe-Language 
BO-ProtectedSystem subclassOf softThatHas hasValue 
BoundaryProtection 
System A developedUsing Java 
Java  type BO-Safe-Language 
softThatHas propertyDisjointWith softThatLacks 
Inferred Information 
Individual Property Class/Individual 
System A type BO-ProtectedSystem 
System A softThatHas BoundaryProtection 
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softThatHas BoundaryProtection, which conflicts with the asserted statement SystemA 
softThatLacks BoundaryProtection.  
In this example, these three encoded statements represent the accurate information. 
The reason behind the conflict is that even though SystemA is developed using a buffer 
overflow safe language, the Java application14 version executing this SystemA is 
vulnerable to the buffer overflow attack. This is also a good example of attacker 
adaptability. In this instead of targeting the application developed using the protected 
language, the attacker targets the Java application executing the developed application.  
In this case, the conflict can be resolved by updating the encoded logic and providing 
feedback to the red-team, who may have assumed that buffer overflow is not an 
applicable vulnerability for this “safe” application.  
Example of Appropriate Adaptation of Theories: 
Another extension of the proposed framework can be used to determine if the 
theories are appropriately adapted for the specific technology infrastructure. This is 
explained by a real-life example of theory adopted by security experts of a University. To 
protect the identity of the experts this University is referred to as ABC in this dissertation. 
One of the adopted theories used to identify compromised system is shown in Figure 80. 
In Figure 80, IRC stands for Internet Chat Relay, which is an online chat program.   
                                                 




Figure 80: Example of Expert Theory 
This source of theory could be attributed to the articles depicting Romania as 
“cybercrime central”  and “global center of Internet and credit card fraud”  [155, 156]. 
This theory of the security expert can be encoded as shown below.  
 
Figure 81: Security Expert Theory Encoding 
The security expert in this case has taken the evidence that attacks originating from 
Romania were observed in security breaches, and made the conclusion that all IRC 
conversations with Romanians are malicious.   
One way to calibrate or validate this theory is to calculate the strength of this type of 
reasoning. However, theories like these can also be calibrated by providing counter 
evidence. In this case, the counter evidence can be the fact that the University in question 
does have many international students, including students from Romania. Moreover, the 
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University also has a Romanian Student Organization. The presence of students from 
Romania on campus could be potential reason behind the chat connection to computers in 
Romania.  
The logical encoding helps the security expert explicitly separate the premise and 
conclusion of their theories. This allows adding new evidence premises. This information 
can be used for qualitatively updating expert’s strength of logical reasoning. In cases 
when quantitative information is needed, this encoding of premises and conclusion can be 
extended for creating probabilistic network models.  
10.2.4 Attack Data Collection 
Honeypots are used to collect the empirical attack data. The configuration of 
honeypots can be changed to do controlled experiments. The information about conflict 
between theories can be used to identify what types of experiments can be done, or what 
hypothesis can be proved by using honeypots. 
CieKI RTD acts as an interface between the red-team and the technology 
infrastructure. The concept of this interface can be extended to create an attacker data 
collection tool to act as the interface between the attacker and honeypots. This attack data 
collection tool can be used to control the information provided back to the attacker 
through honeypots. This allows the creation of an interactive framework that can be used 
to study how the attacker may behave in different situations. 
The information encoded and generated by the proposed framework can be used to 
identify the cyber-security theories as hypothesis to be tested, and determine what type of 
system configuration may be used as honeypots to collect relevant information.  
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10.2.5 Unifying Security Assessment Efforts 
One of the contributions of this research is that it creates a framework that unifies the 
efforts of different cyber-security research domains. Current major cyber-security 
research domains are attacker behavior, attack data collection, vulnerability discovery, 
defensive mechanisms research, and expert theory elicitation research. Traditionally, 
these research domains are not as well integrated, as the cyber-security risk assessment 
process requires them to be.  
The proposed framework combines the outcome of these different security research 
domains to generate the risk scenarios. The lessons learned from this research may 
provide the necessary feedback for effectively unifying these research disciplines.  
The domains that need to be integrated are described below: 
Attacker Behavior Research   
The study of attacker behavior has been of interest in the cyber-security community. 
This study serves the “think like the hacker” defensive strategy. The main tool for 
understanding attacker behavior has been interviewing the hackers[157-159]. The 
questions these interviews try to study are: Who are the attackers? What makes an 
attacker attack? How do they attack? etc. 
These interviews are often used for profiling the attackers. One of the recent attempts 
in achieving this has been the “hackers profiling project” [158], which classifies the 
hackers into 11 different categories. This project collects data by using an online 
questionnaire about attacker behavior. 
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This attacker behavior research using attacker interviews has provided a varied 
outcome, and some interesting insights, but this outcome (and insights) are at a higher 
philosophical level.  
There also has been some research conducted to study attacker behavior using 
honeypots. The primary focus of this research has been to uncover new technical attacks. 
This method has also been used successfully used to study the attacker decisions. 
Currently honeypots are static in nature, i.e., they are made of computers that do not 
respond to the choices made by the attacker. As a result, it is difficult to understand the 
goal or the context in which these decisions were made.  
This dissertation introduces a framework that allows capturing the thought process 
and reasoning used by the red-team. This provides an insight into decision-making 
techniques used by the red-team acting as attackers. The proposed framework can also be 
extended to collect more situational attacker behavior using honeypots.  
Vulnerability and Attack Research  
Vulnerability and attack research has been traditionally devoted to developing new 
ways of discovering vulnerabilities and identifying how they can be exploited. 
Consequently, current risk scenario generation mainly focuses on vulnerability 
identification. Often these scenarios are reduced to capturing only the presence of a single 
vulnerability and how it can be exploited.   
The knowledge of existing vulnerabilities is also used to develop more secure 
software and to new patching methods. This knowledge is often encoded in the form of 
the attack patterns. This attack pattern describes the typical steps taken by the attacker to 
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exploit the vulnerability. The proposed framework uses the knowledge about 
vulnerability, attack pattern, and attack to develop the threat ontology. 
Attack Data Collection and Analysis   
This focus of this research has been identification of new types of attacks. Honeypots 
are often used to collect the attack data and to develop attack signature. The attack data is 
one of the main sources of information used to develop the threat ontology. 
Expert Elicitation and Calibration 
Expert elicitation traditionally focuses on eliciting the expert probabilities, and 
calibration focuses on alignment of elicited probabilities with observed relative 
frequencies. In the case of the security domain, elicitation entails extracting 1) the expert 
belief in the form of concepts and theories, and 2) the assumptions, evidence and logic 
behind the formation of these concepts and theories. In cyber-security domain the expert 
theories are rarely validated or calibrated. The proposed framework elicits and explicitly 
encodes the expert’s theories and uses them to generate the risk scenarios. The proposed 
framework also supports validation and calibration of these theories.  
The proposed framework creates a framework that unifies the efforts of these cyber-






11 Conclusion   
This dissertation describes a framework for automatically generating cyber-security 
risk scenarios. The proposed framework is designed by using the unique cyber-security 
domain requirements identified in this dissertation and by overcoming the limitations of 
current risk scenario generation frameworks.  
The proposed framework generates risk scenarios by:   
 Capturing diverse cyber-security domain knowledge dispersed in space and time.  
 Assuming that there are unknowns in the cyber-security domain, and new 
knowledge is available frequently  
 Emulating the attacker’s exploratory nature, thought process, motivation, 
strategy, preferences, and his/her interaction with the target  environment. 
 Building the attacker’s knowledge state using knowledge discovered during the 
attack process 
 Encoding and using the red-team expert’s theories about attacker’s strategy and 
preferences  
The proposed framework’s distributed logic simplifies the risk scenario generation 
without limiting the type of knowledge that can be used. The proposed framework also 
generates risk scenarios assuming that knowledge is incomplete and there are unknowns 
in cyber-security domain. This incomplete knowledge assumption overcomes limitation 
of current methods producing counter-intuitive results. The proposed framework 




The distributed logic is developed using a language that the cyber-security and 
information technology community is already familiar with. This improves the 
communication of outcome, and logic used for generating risk scenarios. The use of 
familiar ontology language also allows validation, extension, and re-use of the current 
distributed logic.  
The proposed framework can also be used for assisting red-teaming process. The 
proposed framework provides an interface for red-team to interact with the target 
network. This interface is used to observe and collect red-team’s theories about attacker 
thought process, and behavior. This interface eliminates the red-team’s burden of 
executing knowledge discovery and attack tools, allowing red-team more time to develop 
and test attacker behavior theories. In secured facilities, it may not be possible to give the 
red-team access to the actual target network. The proposed framework’s red-team 
interface allows abstracting the actual system information, thus giving the red-team only 
the need-to-know information.  
The proposed framework’s ranked attack tree and encoded attacker behavior theories 
can be used for can be used for prioritizing vulnerability remediation based on attacker 
behavior. Proposed framework’s logical encoding of red-team’s attacker behavior 
theories can be used to identify the conflicts among these theories. These conflicting 
theories can be validated and/or calibrated by analyzing the logic of these encoded 
theories and their inferences, and/or by collecting empirical attack data. The proposed 
framework unifies the efforts of different cyber-security research domains. More 
specifically, it combines the efforts of attacker behavior, vulnerability assessment, attack 
analysis, and expert theory elicitation research. Traditionally, these cyber-security 
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research domains are not integrated well enough to meet the need for cyber-security risk 
assessment.  
One of the proposed framework’s extensions is to develop a module, Threat Auto 
Response Assessment (TARA), to analyze and recommend countermeasures using 
information generated by FLUX and CieKI. TARA also contains a behavior driven 
countermeasures, which uses attacker behavior knowledge to lead the attacker away from 
the system to be protected. The proposed framework acts as an interface between the red-
team and the target network. The interface can be extended to create an attacker data 
collection tool to act as the interface between the attacker and honeypots. This attack data 
collection tool can be used to control the information provided back to the attacker 
through honeypots. This allows the creation of an interactive framework that can be used 
to study how the attacker may behave in different situations. 
Cyber-security risk assessment processes and methods are adapted from other 
domains. In these domains, the risk assessment methods were applied more rigorously 
after major incidents.  
Before the Apollo incident, NASA relied on its contractors to apply good 
engineering practices [23]. According to [23], NASA’s initiative to use more rigorous 
quantitative safety goals were not adopted because managers would not have appreciated 
the uncertainty in risk calculations. Later it was discovered that the main reason was, 
“initial estimates of catastrophic failure probabilities were so high that their publication 
would have threatened the political viability of the entire space program” [23]. Since the 
Challenger accident, NASA has instituted more robust quantitative risk analysis 
programs. According to [23], basic risk assessment methods developed by the aerospace 
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program in the 1960s were used in the 1975 Reactor Safety Study[24], published by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). According to [23], “Shortly after the Three Mile 
Island accident, a new generation of PRAs appeared in which some of the methodological 
defects of the Reactor Safety Study were avoided.” 
Apart from adapting risk assessment methods from these domains, the cyber-security 
domain can use the lessons learned to improve its risk assessment methodology before an 




Appendix I: Attacker Behavior 
 This dissertation describes and uses three core characteristics of attacker 
behavior as follow: 
1. Attackers treat attack goal as an intellectually stimulating problem to be solved.  
2. The method used in compromising a system is exploratory in nature and often 
does not follow a predetermined guideline. In other words, the attack is not 
necessarily a pre-planned activity.  
3. The goal of the attack may be determined or changed based on the information 
gathered during this exploratory phase. 
This appendix describes attacker interviews to illustrate this behavior. 
“Well, it's power at your fingertips. You can control all these computers from the 
government, from the military, from large corporations. And if you know what you're 
doing, you can travel through the internet at your will, with no restrictions. That's power; 
it's a power trip.” This was the answer [157] of a 16 year old hacker to the question 
“What is it about the computer that makes it become such an obsession for young guys?” 
asked by PBS frontline team [157]. Further Q&A between this young hacker who was 
caught breaking into NASA's computers and sentenced to six months in jail for taking 
possession of $1.7 million in software is as indicated below. These are direct transcript 
taken from the interview[157].  
“Why is that so important? 
Well, everybody likes to feel in control.  
In my time, they did it by playing hockey or football. How does the computer compare? 
It's intellectual. It stimulates my mind. It's a challenge.  
How hard was it for you to get into some blue-chip locations?  
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The government didn't take too many measures for security on most of their computers. They lack 
some serious computer security, and the hard part is learning it. I know Unix and C like the back 
of my hand, because I studied all these books, and I was on the computer for so long. But the hard 
part isn't getting in. It's learning to know what it is that you're doing. 
When you start out, you sort of poke at various cyberfences and walls. You're just looking for the 
soft spots. You don't target a place because it's got something that you want--it's just that it's a 
challenge? 
I would target a place because it looks like a challenge. Like, if I say, "The navy has a 
computer network in Jacksonville, maybe that would be fun to poke around." And then I'd target 
them. I'd look at their computers and I'd see what I can do there.” [157] 
 
Another interview done by Computer Crime Research Center [159] with a hacker called 
“Mazez Ghost” describes the dynamic interaction between the opportunities and attack 
tools.  
 “Is it hard to penetrate into the "closed" computer systems?” [159] 
 “Not always. It is a rather specific work. It depends on hacking tools. Sometimes break in 
demands application of special software, sometimes examination of protection flaws, several 
standard flaws that are widely mentioned in hacking howto's. More often it is pure chance, 
hacker's intuition and examination of system administrator's psychology.” [159] 
These interviews were used in this appendix to demonstrate the attacker behavior 





Appendix II: Ontology 
This dissertation uses the concept of ontology extensively. This appendix provides 
more background on ontology and describes how they are used currently in cyber-
security domain. 
Background 
Ontology is a structured, logical representation of the domain being modeled in 
terms of its core concepts, properties, and relationships. It also provides the reasoning 
support to determine the consistency of the represented concepts.   
The concept of ontology has its roots in philosophy, which was later adopted by the 
field of mathematical logic and computer science. In all its application and adoptions, the 
word Ontology, still retains its basic concept of representing the things that exist. 
According to Sowa [160], in logic, the existential quantifier is a notation for asserting that 
something exists. However, logic itself has no vocabulary for describing the things that 
exist. Ontology fills this gap. It is the study of existence, of all the kinds of entities, 
abstract and concrete that makes up the world. 
This ontology has been used in the computer science for representing the domain 
knowledge- its core concepts and relationships among them. One of the well-known 
definitions of ontology  in computer science is [161], “An ontology is an explicit 
specification of conceptualization.” According to [161], the “conceptualization” means 
an abstract model of the world, taking the form of a definition of the properties of 
important concepts and relations and “explicit specification” [161] means that model 
should be specified in an “unambiguous language” [161] which can be processed by 
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machines as well as humans. In summary, ontology facilitates modeling the knowledge of 
domain in a machine understandable manner.   
The focus in this case is on modeling the representation of world in a machine-
understandable manner that can be used for logical reasoning. In addition, ontology 
provides a mean to model the multi-dimensional relation between the entities. This 
allows capturing the human understanding of the world in a more expressive manner. 
This century old concept of ontology has gained popularity in computer science in 
last twenty years [162]. According to [162], “This popularity is likely because the 
promise of ontologies targets one of the core difficulties of using computers for human 
purposes: Achieving interoperability between multiple representations of reality (e.g. data 
or business process models) residing inside computer systems, and between such 
representations and reality, namely human users and their perception of reality.” The 
ontology achieves this by providing expressive language to represent the domain, means 
to map the concepts across domain, and to define the relation among the entities across 
domains. One of the most popular applications of this is in the field of information fusion 
in which ontologies are used for combining diverse knowledgebase.  
The popular reasons of using ontologies are their ability to represent domain 
information and their information fusion capability. Apart from this, this dissertation uses 
the ontology language for the open world reasoning. This open world reasoning is used to 
generate the attack plans.  
In summary, ontology allow representing the domain knowledge in a structured, 
formal, and machine understandable form. This formalization of shareable domain 
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concepts provides communication, reusability and organization of knowledge [135], as 
well as a better computational inference. 
Ontology and Security 
In cyber-security domain too much terminology is vaguely defined [163]. As a 
result, it is difficult to communicate clearly about cyber-security incidents, not only with 
non-expert people but also between experts [118]. This becomes a bigger challenge if this 
communication has to occur in the midst of a cyber-security incident. Current cyber-
security ontology focus on improving the communication and knowledge sharing. 
Ontology research in cyber-security domain has been focused developing applied 
and general cyber-security ontology. Most of the ontologies in cyber-security are applied. 
The goal of general ontology development has been to define a global ontology capturing 
all cyber-security concepts.  
The proposed framework can be considered as an applied ontology. The focus of 
this dissertation is on using the open world reasoning capabilities and the distributed 
nature of the ontologies to generate the attack plan. Its goal is to use the cyber-security 
knowledge generated from diverse source (including the knowledge generated from other 
ontologies). Other ontologies described in this appendix can be used as information 
source to the proposed framework. The proposed framework’s ontologies also can be 
integrated (or map) in broader cyber-security domain ontology.  
This appendix introduces the cyber-security domain ontologies. The purpose of this 
appendix is not to do a comprehensive review but to give an overview of how ontologies 




Applied Security Ontology  
Gomes et al [118] classifies current cyber-security ontologies in four categories 
described below: 
Application Development:   
A significant amount of ontology development has been in the requirements 
engineering field. Dobson and Sawyer introduces the use of ontologies for Requirements 
Engineering and develops ontology for Dependability Requirements Engineering[164]. 
Karyda et al addresses [165] the issue of incorporating cyber-security requirements in the 
development of secure applications using ontology. This ontology captures and cyber-
security knowledge from cyber-security experts to support and improve communication 
between cyber-security experts, users, and developers[165] [118]. Firesmith [166] 
developed reusable safety requirements ontology. Lee [167] used ontology to identify 
cyber-security requirements for certification and accreditation activities defined in 
regulatory documents.  
Semantic Web Services: 
A significant amount of research has been done to develop ontology for web 
services. According to W3C [168], the internet is more and more used for application-to-
application communication. This communication is enabled by programmatic interfaces 
called web services. These interfaces are defined using web service descriptions, which 
are encoded in a pre-determined language for providing common understanding of 
features of the web services.  
Denker et al [169]proposed using ontology to annotate the service descriptions 
with information about their cyber-security requirements and capabilities. Kagal et al 
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[170]and Denker et al [171] extended this proposal by adding cyber-security and privacy 
policies [118]. Ashri, et al. [172], further extended the web service security descriptions 
by capturing the  cyber-security implications that arise due to interactions between web 
service providers and clients that may have different cyber-security policies [118]. Ashri, 
et al [172]proposed a “Semantic Firewall”, a device that reasons about whether the 
interacting entities are able to support the required cyber-security policies. 
Security Attacks: 
  Vorobiev, et al. [173] used cyber-security ontologies for providing common 
vocabulary for a distributed system’s components to talk to each other for detecting 
attacks and devising countermeasures. 
Undercoffer et al [174] developed ontology of intrusion detection system for 
communicating the information about attacks intelligibly.    
Inter-organizational Database Access: 
According to [118], ontology are used for preserving privacy of databases 
belonging to different organizations that must provide access to users from the other 
organizations. Mitra et al [175] developed Privacy Access Control Toolkit, which enables 
privacy-preserving secure semantic access control and allows sharing of data among 
heterogeneous databases without sharing metadata. Pan et al. [176] used ontology to 
address access control challenge by creating a role-mapping table that maps one 
organization role hierarchy into the other organization role hierarchy[118].  
General Security Ontology  
The goal of general ontology development has been to define a global ontology 
capturing all cyber-security concepts.  
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Tsoumas and Gritzalis  [177] proposed general cyber-security ontology by 
extending the Distributed Management Task Force’s (DMTF) Common Information 
Model (CIM). DMTF is an industry organization that develops, maintains, and promotes 
standards for systems management in enterprise IT environments [178]. CIM is an open 
standard that defines how managed elements in an IT environment are represented [179].  
Blanco et al [135]  did a comprehensive review of current cyber-security 
ontologies, and concluded that it is impossible to formalize all existing cyber-security 
concepts. Blanco et al [135] suggested that the definition of a complete security ontology 
is not an isolated task, and recommended using community effort for joining and 




Appendix III: Technologies used in this dissertation 
Web Ontology Language (OWL)[110] is a family of languages, which provides 
different levels of expressiveness that can be used for describing ontologies. OWL 
version 1 family includes three languages called OWL Full, OWL Lite and OWL DL 
[110]. This dissertation uses OWL DL. OWL DL was designed to provide the maximum 
expressiveness possible while retaining computational completeness, decidability, and the 
availability of practical reasoning algorithms[110]. 
Software called Protégé [180] was used as a graphical user interface for encoding the 
ontologies. Flux was designed using Protégé. 
CieKI was developed in Java programming language using a Java framework, for 
building ontology driven semantic web applications, called Jena [181]. 
An open source Java based OWL DL reasoner [141] DL Query. Pellet [182] was 
used for making inferences using open world reasoning. Pellet was used for reasoning in 
Flux (using Protégé) as well as in CieKI (using Jena)  
The graphical output of the proposed  framework were generated using a Java 
software library (and its examples) that can be used for visualization of data represented 
as a graph or network, called Java Universal Network/Graph Framework (JUNG)[140]. 
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Appendix IV: Annualized Loss Expectancy 
A risk-based loss model that is often published in cyber-security books [73] is called 
annualized loss expectancy (ALE) model. This model is very similar to EPA’s exposure 
based assessment model. Annualized loss expectancy calculates [73] the expected 
monetary loss for the asset over one year period. It is calculated [73] as:  
ALE = SLE * ARO  
Where SLE is the Single Loss Expectancy and ARO is the Annualized Rate of 
Occurrence. The SLE is calculated as multiplication of the Asset Value (AV) and the 
exposure factor (EF) [73] . Exposure factor is defined as the % of loss a realized threat 
would have on asset[73]. This exposure factor is usually calculated using expert 
judgment. 
SLE = AV * EF 
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Appendix V: Output of proposed framework 
This appendix show some features of the graphical outputs. These outputs are 
generated using JUNG graphical libraries and its examples [140].  
The output of can be manipulated with the command panel shown at the bottom of 
the window. This panel is shown in the Figure 82 below. 
.  
Figure 82: Command Panel - Graphical Output 
  
Mode 1 and 4 command panel has a “Collapse Tree” button adapted from JUNG 
examples [140], which can be used to collapse the attack tree into concentric class view. 
This concentric class view is shown in Figure 84. The command panel has a zoom utility 
adapted from JUNG examples [140], which can be used to focus in and out as needed. 
The graphical output’s nodes can be individually selected and moved by selecting the 
“PICKING” option from the drop-down menu shown in Figure 82. The 
“TRANSFORMING” option allows shifting the entire output (attack tree or scenarios). 
Finally, “My Lens” utility can be used to inspect a specific portion of the output without 
zooming in. The “PICKING”, “TRANSFORMING” and  “My Lens” utilities are adapted 







Figure 83: Lens Utility 
 
 





Appendix VI: Cognitive Security Metrics  
According to[183] , “Security research is sometimes referred to as the ‘Humanities 
of Computer Science’ because, too frequently, ‘secure’ systems are built using equal 
measures of folklore and black arts. Despite the humorous intention, there is a kernel of 
truth in this jest. Computer security, at least ‘security in the large’, is not currently a 
science. This claim may seem unfair, given the progress made in security over the past 
decades. However, our present tools and methodologies are at most adequate for 
understanding systems security on a small scale.”  
The two main critiques of why security is considered unscientific are 1) lack of 
reliable metrics and 2) inability to use scientific method to study security.  
How this research can be used to identify the hypothesis to be tested, and how the 
attack data can be collected to evaluate this hypothesis, was explained in Section 10.2. 
This section focuses on discussing the current state of security metrics and proposed use 
of cognitive security metrics. 
Current security metrics can be classified into two categories 1) metrics that denote 
the maturity level of processes contributing to the security of a system [74] and 2) metrics 
that denote the extent to which security characteristics are present in a system [74]. These 
metrics are system focused. The purpose of these metrics is, directly or indirectly, to 
characterize the security enforcing mechanisms implemented in the system [74]. This is 
in accordance with one of the primary goal of the security industry, to produce more 
secure software.  
One of the shortcomings of current security metrics is their narrow focus on 
measuring only the system point of view of security. The measurability, accuracy, and 
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usefulness of the security metrics are also driven by the characteristics of security domain 
identified in Chapter 3. These security domain characteristics influence the security 
metrics in following manner: 
 Dynamicity:  Due to the dynamicity of the security domain, it becomes difficult to 
determine if the past statistics about security mechanisms, vulnerabilities, or 
attacks are useful in predicting the present or future state of the system. However, 
past statistics are frequently used to portray the system security. 
 Attacker Behavior:  Since some statistics about vulnerabilities and attacks (for 
example, the number and type of vulnerabilities discovered and exploited the 
number and types of attacks launched etc.) are dependent on the human attacker, 
it is challenging to determine the validity and usefulness of such statistics. For 
example, the attacker can possibly distort such statistics by launching a large 
number of attacks towards the system that is not his/her primary target. This may 
mislead the defender and may shift the focus of defensive allocation of resources 
away from the primary target. 
 Expert Theories: According to NIST, [74] while effort is being made to develop 
and use quantitative security metrics, current measurements are driven by expert 
judgment. In this effort, expert opinion is used to rank security characteristics 
quantified as (for example, 1=low, 2=medium, 3=high) [74]. According to [74], 
“Because of the subjectivity involved, some of the attributes sought in a good 
metric are not readily obtainable. For example, results in penetration testing or 
other methods of assessment that involve specialized skills are sometimes not 
repeatable, since they rely on the knowledge, talent, and experience of an 
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individual evaluator, which can differ from other evaluators with respect to a 
property being measured.” 
There has been an attempt to determine the severity of vulnerability and the 
vulnerabilities published by leading software companies[122]  and reporting agencies 
[124]. This provides some information needed for risk assessment, but it does not give 
much insight into how the attacker may discover or exploit these vulnerabilities.  
This dissertation proposes the use of cognitive metrics of measurement of security. 
In other words, instead of measuring the outcome of the decisions made by the attacker, 
the research suggests focusing on determining how the attacker makes the decisions and 
measuring the critical parameters that influence such decisions. Apart from measuring the 
temporal statics about vulnerabilities and the improvement of security features on 
software, it suggests measuring the temporal difficulty of discovering or exploiting 
vulnerabilities as a function of cognitive workload. Examples of workload related metrics 
include difficulty in discovering or exploiting specific types of vulnerabilities, difficulty 
in launching existing or developing new types of attacks, etc. These types of metrics will 
help quantitatively answer the question such as, even though the number of 
vulnerabilities is increasing and we still have not eradicated a single type of vulnerability, 
have we made it more difficult to discover and exploit these vulnerabilities? 
The proposed framework facilitates elicitation of the attacker preferences for 
generating the attack tree. This framework can be used/extended to evaluate the cognitive 
workload required by the red-team. Furthermore, the proposed research also provides a 




Appendix VII: Automated Event Sequence Diagram Generation   
A related work in the engineering risk assessment domain has been done by [35, 
184]. This work develops a tool called SimPRA, for identifying the risks associated with 
complex systems (such as nuclear power plants, space missions, chemical plants, and 
military systems) [35]. 
The SimPRA framework has three major components: 1) a simulator that generates 
detailed scenarios, 2) a scheduler that controls the timing and occurrence of the events, 
and 3) a planner that is responsible for guiding the simulation by generating high-level 
scenarios  [35]. 
This section describes the planning module of SimPRA. This planning module offers 
a new method for capturing different types of engineering knowledge. The method is 
used for automatically generating generalized event sequence diagrams. In this planning 
framework, the engineering system hierarchy (consisting of the system, sub-systems, and 
sub-elements) is defined as a structure tree  [35]. The system and sub-system functional 
requirements are presented by a functionality tree  [35]. State transition rules are defined 
for each element of the system hierarchy  [35]. SimPRA also defines how the states of the 
system (and sub-systems) may change by changing the states of their sub-elements  [35]. 
SimPRA uses transition graph to show how each system structure provides the expected 
functionality  [35]. 
SimPRA uses a modified Hierarchical Task Network (HTN) [80] planning algorithm 
. Both the HTN algorithm and the proposed framework’s planning logic use the concept 
of hierarchical task analysis. In hierarchical task analysis, tasks are systematically 
decomposed into sub-tasks.   
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SimPRA’s planning algorithm uses the knowledge of how the engineering systems 
are decomposed into sub-systems and sub-elements [35]. This hierarchical system 
decomposition is used by the planning algorithm to understand how to change the state of 
sub-elements to lead the system (and sub-systems) to the goal state  [35].  
SimPRA also uses qualitative knowledge to prune the branches of the event 




Access Level:  “A category within a given security classification limiting entry or system 
connectivity to only authorized persons.” [120] 
Administrative Account: “A user account with full privileges on a computer.” [120]  
Advisory: “Notification of significant new trends or developments regarding the threat to the 
information systems of an organization. This notification may include analytical insights into trends, 
intentions, technologies, or tactics of an adversary targeting information systems.” [120]  
Alert: Notification that a specific attack has been directed at an organization’s information systems. 
[120] 
Application: “A software program hosted by an information system.” [120] 
Asset: “A major application, general support system, high impact program, physical plant, mission 
critical system, personnel, equipment, or a logically related group of systems.” [120] 
Attack: “Any kind of malicious activity that attempts to collect, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy 
information system resources or the information itself.” [120] 
Attacker Behavior: Attacker behavior is characterized by attacker’s exploratory nature, thought 
process, motivation, strategy, and preferences.  
Attack Graph/Vulnerability Graph: The attack graph represents how the available vulnerabilities 
can be exploited in sequence to take the system from a secure to an unsecure state. Unsecure state is 
defined as the system state in which attacker has gained restricted privileges[1].  
Attack Pattern: This attack pattern describes the typical steps taken by the attacker to exploit the 
vulnerability 
Attack Scenario: A graph representing exact steps taken by red-team or attacker. 
Audit: “Independent review and examination of records and activities to assess the adequacy of 
system controls, to ensure compliance with established policies and operational procedures, and to 
recommend necessary changes in controls, policies, or procedures” [120] 
Automated Planning: Automated planning is a branch of artificial intelligence[78] and is defined as 
the task of coming up with a sequence of actions that will achieve a defined goal. 
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Baseline: “Hardware, software, databases, and relevant documentation for an information system at a 
given point in time.” [120] 
Buffer Overflow Attack: A method of overloading a predefined amount of space in a buffer, which 
can potentially overwrite and corrupt data in memory [120]. 
Closed World Reasoning: Reasoning assuming that the knowledge about domain being modeled is 
complete. It also assumes that whatever knowledge that is not encoded is false [117].  
Client (Application): “A system entity, usually a computer process acting on behalf of a human user, 
that makes use of a service provided by a server.” [120] 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE): “A dictionary of common names for publicly 
known information system vulnerabilities.” [120] 
Compromise: “Disclosure of information to unauthorized persons, or a violation of the security 
policy of a system in which unauthorized intentional or unintentional disclosure, modification, destruction, 
or loss of an object may have occurred.” [120] 
Confidentiality: “Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.” [120] 
Countermeasure: “Actions, devices, procedures, or techniques that meet or oppose (i.e., counters) a 
threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or 
by discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken.” [120] 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ): “A host or network segment inserted as a “neutral zone” between an 
organization’s private network and the Internet.” [120] 
Denial of Service (DoS): “An attack that prevents or impairs the authorized use of networks, systems, 
or applications by exhausting resources.” [120] 
Domain-specific: Specific information about a domain.  
Expert Theories: Theories of experts. In this dissertation expert theories refer to theories of security 
experts.  
Firewall: “A gateway that limits access between networks in accordance with local security policy.” 
[120] 
Fingerprinting: The act of making digital observations about software. 
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Goals: Attacker’s primary goal is to compromise confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information. 
Hacker: “Unauthorized user who attempts to or gains access to an information system.” [120] 
Honeypot: “A system (e.g., a Web server) or system resource (e.g., a file on a server) that is designed 
to be attractive to potential crackers and intruders and has no authorized users other than its 
administrators.” [120] 
Information: “An instance of an information type.” [120] 
Integrity: “Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring 
information non-repudiation and authenticity.” [120] 
Internal Network: “A network where: (i) the establishment, maintenance, and provisioning of 
security controls are under the direct control of organizational employees or contractors; or (ii) 
cryptographic encapsulation or similar security technology provides the same effect. An internal network is 
typically organization-owned, yet may be organization-controlled while not being organization-owned.” 
[120] 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): “Hardware or software product that gathers and analyzes 
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible security breaches, 
which include both intrusions (attacks from outside the organizations) and misuse (attacks from within the 
organizations.)” [120] 
National Vulnerability Database – (NVD):  “The U.S. government repository of standards-based 
vulnerability management data. This data enables automation of vulnerability management, security 
measurement, and compliance (e.g., FISMA).” [120] 
Network: “Information system(s) implemented with a collection of interconnected components. Such 
components may include routers, hubs, cabling, telecommunications controllers, key distribution centers, 
and technical control devices.” [120] 
Open World Reasoning: Reasoning assuming that the knowledge about domain being modeled is 
incomplete. It does not make any assumption about knowledge that is not encoded [117].  
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Port: “A physical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the module for 
physical signals, represented by logical information flows (physically separated ports do not share the same 
physical pin or wire).” [120] 
Port Scanning:  “Using a program to remotely determine which ports on a system are open (e.g., 
whether systems allow connections through those ports).” [120] 
Privilege: “A right granted to an individual, a program, or a process.” [120] 
Proxy: “A proxy is an application that “breaks” the connection between client and server. The proxy 
accepts certain types of traffic entering or leaving a network and processes it and forwards it. This 
effectively closes the straight path between the internal and external networks making it more difficult for 
an attacker to obtain internal addresses and other details of the organization’s internal network. Proxy 
servers are available for common Internet services; for example, a Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 
proxy used for Web access, and a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) proxy used for email.” [120] 
Red Team: “A group of people authorized and organized to emulate a potential adversary’s attack or 
exploitation capabilities against an enterprise’s security posture. The Red Team’s objective is to improve 
enterprise Information Assurance by demonstrating the impacts of successful attacks and by demonstrating 
what works for the defenders (i.e., the Blue Team) in an operational environment.” [120] 
Red Team Exercise: “An exercise, reflecting real-world conditions, that is conducted as a simulated 
adversarial attempt to compromise organizational missions and/or business processes to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the security capability of the information system and organization.” [120] 
Remediation: “The act of correcting a vulnerability or eliminating a threat. Three possible types of 
remediation are installing a patch, adjusting configuration settings, or uninstalling a software application.” 
[120] 
Run Time: The time it takes for the algorithm to execute. 
Scanning: “Sending packets or requests to another system to gain information to be used in a 
subsequent attack.” [120] 




Security Categorization: “The process of determining the security category for information or an 
information system. See Security Category.” [120] 
Security Category: “The characterization of information or an information system based on an 
assessment of the potential impact that a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such 
information or information system would have on organizational operations, organizational assets, or 
individuals.” [120] 
Security Controls: “The management, operational, and technical controls (i.e., safeguards or 
countermeasures) prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the system and its information.” [120] 
Social Engineering: “An attempt to trick someone into revealing information (e.g., a password) that 
can be used to attack systems or networks.” [120] 
Sub-goals: Represents attacker’s cognitive domain specific tasks to achieve his/her intended goal of 
compromising information. 
Threat Pattern:  A template encoding logical information about how the attack may exploit 
vulnerabilities, the effect of exploiting vulnerability,  and presence of a known vulnerability and attack. 
Trigger: The act of classification by distributed logic is called trigger. In this dissertation when any 
individuals are classified as members of sets then they are considered as “triggered”. 
Vulnerability: “Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or 
implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source.” [120] 
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